


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C A E S A R .

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✓ *Ad. L. G. M. W.*
C Æ S A R. *C. Julius*

TRANSLATED BY

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IN TWO VOLUMES.

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CONTENTS

OF

THE FIRST VOLUME.

	Page
<u>BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF CÆSAR</u>	<u>v</u>
<u>Arguments</u>	<u>xvii</u>

WARS IN GAUL.

<u>Book I.</u>	<u>25</u>
<u>II.</u>	<u>63</u>
<u>III.</u>	<u>84</u>
<u>IV.</u>	<u>104</u>
<u>V.</u>	<u>126</u>
<u>VI.</u>	<u>161</u>
<u>VII.</u>	<u>186</u>
<u>VIII.</u>	<u>245</u>

THE following translation of Cæsar's Commentaries is taken from the celebrated edition of the late Dr. Clarke, printed for J. Tonson in 1712. All possible care has been taken to render it exact, and to preserve the distinctness and perspicuity of expression for which the original is so justly famous. The reader will perceive that the very turn and manner of Cæsar have been copied with the utmost attention ; and though the success may not always answer expectation, yet candour will induce him to make great allowances when he considers the inimitable beauty of the Latin, and the difficulty of expressing ancient manners and transactions in modern language.

It may be proper to mention, that besides the seven books of the Gallic War, and the three of the Civil, written by Cæsar himself, the Supplements of A. Hirtius are likewise inserted in the following translation, consisting of one additional book to the Gallic War, and three books of the Alexandrian, African, and Spanish Wars.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

OF

C Æ S A R.

CAIUS JULIUS CÆSAR was the son of Lucius Cæsar by Aurelia, the daughter of Cotta, and was born about ninety years before the Christian era. In consequence of the close affinity subsisting between his family and Marius, the genius and accomplishments of the young hero were regarded with the utmost suspicion by the dictator Sylla, who sought for a favourable opportunity to destroy him. Cæsar, being apprized of his danger, quitted Rome at the desire of his friends, and sought protection, for some time, at the court of Nicomedes, King of Bithynia. His stay here was but short, as he was desirous to proceed to Rhodes, where he studied rhetoric under Apollonius Molo with such success, that in forensic eloquence he was esteemed second only to Cicero, who had himself profited by the instructions of the same master.

On his return to Rome, Cæsar determined to cul-

tivate the favour of the populace, in order that he might obtain by their means the highest offices in the republic. He now made himself conspicuous by the impeachment of several powerful delinquents, while his readiness in defending poor clients, joined to an insinuating address and condescension, gained him considerable interest, at the same time that the freedom of his table and the magnificence of his expense gradually augmented his power, and brought him into the administration.

Having served the office of military tribune, he next went out as questor into Spain, with Antistius Veter, the pretor. When his commission had expired he returned to the capital; and, on the death of Metellus, proved successful in a competition with Isauricus and Catulus, two of the most illustrious patricians, for the dignity of chief pontiff.

In the year of Rome 690, the conspiracy of Catiline and his infamous associates was detected and crushed by Cicero, at that time consul; and Cæsar was generally believed to have connived at, and even to have been deeply implicated in, their nefarious counsels. Cicero was, however, deterred from consenting to his accusation by his fears of the common people, who were so strongly attached to Cæsar that they had just elected him pretor.

About this time a profligate young nobleman, named Publius Clodius, entertained a violent passion for Pompeia, Cæsar's wife; and as an interview would have been attended with great difficulty and hazard, he resolved to disguise himself in women's apparel, and introduce himself as a female musician

at a religious solemnity, which was celebrated in Cæsar's house by the Roman matrons, in honour of the Good Goddess,—a festival at which no man was allowed to be present. Claudius did not long remain undiscovered; and was immediately ejected from the house: and although Cæsar exerted himself in screening the criminal from the punishment due to his impiety, and the participation of his wife in this design amounted, at best, to suspicions which could never be proved, he immediately divorced her; "Because," said he, "I would have the chastity of my wife clear even of doubt."

The government of Spain was allotted to Cæsar after his pretorship. Having completed his levies with incredible despatch, he marched against the Callæcians and Lusitanians, defeated them, and penetrated to the ocean, reducing nations by the way that had never borne the Roman yoke. His victories in this province procured for him the title of Commander, which was conferred on him by his army; and he was enabled, in a short time, to fill, not only his own coffers, but also to enrich his soldiers with booty.

In the year of Rome 693, Cæsar returned from Spain; and, in order to secure to himself the consulship, effected a reconciliation between Pompey and Crassus. By making them friends, he secured the interest of both these distinguished men; and while he appeared to be performing an office of humanity, he effectually undermined the constitution, by ruining the authority of the senate. This alliance was rendered still stronger by the marriage of

Pompey with Julia, the daughter of Cæsar ; and soon after these nuptials, he himself married Calpurnia, the daughter of Piso. Thus supported, Cæsar walked to the place of election between Crassus and Pompey, and was declared consul. Calpurnius Bibulus, a zealous republican and friend of Cato, was given him for a colleague.

Cæsar had no sooner entered on his office than, with the sanction of his two powerful friends, he proposed laws which were well calculated to please the common people, but which filled all good citizens with grief and indignation. He now proposed an extensive division of land, and a distribution of corn ; and contrived still further to alienate the affections of the senate from Pompey, by persuading him to fill the forum with armed men, as the only means of silencing the objections of their opponents ; while Bibulus was exposed to such imminent danger by his opposition to the laws of his ambitious colleague, that he shut himself up in his own house during the remainder of the year. Cato still continued vehemently to denounce the acts of the triumvirate, as fraught with ruin to the republic, and Cæsar ordered him to be taken into custody ; but observing that the people followed him to his prison with feelings of admiration at his exalted virtue, he thought proper to put on the semblance of conciliation, and directed that he should be released.

The ambition of Cæsar was now gratified by the government of Gaul, both on this and the other side of the Alps, together with Illyricum, for five years. But the step, which of all others reflected the

greatest disgrace on him, was his patronage of Clodius, on whom he depended for the ruin of Cicero, of whose talents and influence he felt the most lively apprehensions. For this purpose he procured the election of Clodius as tribune of the people; nor would he set out for his government till he had so far embroiled them as by these means to procure Cicero's banishment.

As the expeditions of Cæsar in Gaul and Britain are beautifully and circumstantially related by himself in his Commentaries, it will be sufficient, in this place, to remark, that, whether we compare him with the generals of the early ages of the commonwealth, with his more immediate contemporaries, or even with Pompey himself, the achievements of Cæsar bear away the palm. In the fifth year of his command, Pompey and Crassus were elected consuls, and succeeded in prolonging the term of his government for five years more, while the senate voted him supplies from the treasury for the prosecution of the war. During these ten years, Cæsar, the better to accomplish his ambitious designs, omitted no opportunity of securing to himself the attachment and affection of his army by profuse largesses. By these means he contrived to identify the personal interest of the soldier with the glory of the commander; and rendered his troops so invincible, that he took eight hundred cities by assault, conquered three hundred nations, and fought pitched battles at different times with three millions of men, one million of whom he put to the sword, and made another million prisoners!

The time had now arrived when Cæsar was to reap the fruits of his policy and victories. In the year of Rome 699, Crassus, whose riches and influence had hitherto kept in check the violence of his colleagues, perished in the Parthian campaign ; and the death of Julia, the wife of Pompey, in childbed, the same year, destroyed the last remaining link of their former friendship.

The fears of Pompey were at length sufficiently aroused ; and he endeavoured, when too late, to avert the fatal consequences which he himself had mainly contributed to produce ; but the power of Cæsar now defied control. By means of his immense wealth, he was enabled effectually to bribe the Roman populace, who were eager, not only to bestow their voices for the man who bought them, but with all manner of offensive weapons to fight for him, in his application for a second consulship, and for the continuance of his commission in Gaul. In this critical posture of affairs, the senate nominated Pompey sole consul, and continued to him his governments of Spain and Africa ; while Cæsar was not only stripped of his command by a decree of the senate, but Curio, Antony, and others of his partisans, were driven with disgrace from Rome, after sustaining the greatest indignities. This rash conduct on the part of the senate afforded Cæsar a plausible pretext for commencing hostilities, of which he took care to avail himself. He now crossed the Rubicon, which formed the boundary of his province, and entered Italy sword in hand ; while Pompey and the consuls were so confounded

by the rapidity of his movements and distrust of their own safety, that they left Rome to its fate, having ordered the senate and the rest of the citizens to follow them without delay to Brundisium, whence they embarked for Dyrrhachium : and Cæsar, after the conquest of all Italy in the short space of sixty days, repaired to Rome, where he procured ample supplies from the public treasury. After a short stay in the city, he proceeded to Spain ; and, having defeated Pompey's lieutenants Afranius, Petrius, and Varro, entirely subjugated the whole province. On his return to Rome he was declared dictator ; and having caused himself to be elected consul with Servilius Isauricus, he embarked with a large and well-disciplined army for Macedonia. His arrival at Dyrrhachium was signalized by his besieging Pompey in his camp ; but in a battle that ensued, in consequence of this measure, Cæsar was so roughly handled that the timid caution of Pompey alone saved him from a signal defeat. He was now compelled to retreat ; at which the officers and troops of Pompey were so immoderately elated that they induced their commander, by their remonstrances and impetuosity, although much against his own inclinations, to force the enemy to a general engagement in the plains of Pharsalia, which proved fatal to Pompey, who, leaving his routed army, fled into Egypt, where he was basely murdered by the young king Ptolemy, who himself shortly after lost both his kingdom and life in a sea-fight with Cæsar. This conquest presented an opportunity to Cæsar of establishing the famous Cleopatra, the sister of

Ptolemy, as queen of Egypt ; of whose person and accomplishments he became deeply enamoured. By her he had a son, named Cæsarian.

The repose of Cæsar was soon interrupted by the intelligence which he received, that his general, Domitius, had been driven out of Pontus by Pharnaces, the son of Mithridates, who, by his valour, had not only cleared his patrimonial territories from foreign troops, but had likewise made himself master of Bithynia and Cappadocia ; and was at that time busy in exciting all the kings and governors of Asia to expel the Romans. Cæsar immediately marched against him, and, in a great battle near Zela, defeated his hopes, and deprived him of his dominions. In order to depict the celerity of his martial exploits in this campaign to his friends at Rome, he related the whole expedition in three words, signifying, "I came, saw, conquered."

In the year of Rome 706, Cæsar returned to the city, and was immediately appointed dictator a second time. In the following year he sailed to Africa, whither Cato and Scipio had retired after the battle of Pharsalia, and formed an alliance with Juba, the king of Numidia, by whose assistance they had succeeded in raising a formidable army. Cæsar, with incredible despatch, having forced his way through a country almost impassable by reason of its woods and defiles, suddenly surprised the united army of Scipio and Juba in the neighbourhood of Thapsus, and, in a short time, made himself master of three camps, and killed fifty thousand of the enemy, with the loss only of fifty men.

After this engagement Scipio slew himself, to avoid falling into the hands of the victor ; while Juba was glad to seek his safety by flight. Cæsar now hastened to besiege Utica, of which place Cato was appointed the governor ; who, finding all resistance fruitless, and disdaining to accept life from the destroyer of his country, put a period to his existence with his own sword, after expressing to some philosophical friends his belief in the immortality of the soul. The enmity of Cæsar to this virtuous patriot was rather increased than diminished by his death. Cicero had ventured to publish an encomium on Cato's character in a treatise, entitled "Cato," which excited universal admiration, for the eloquence of its author, and the subject of its eulogies ; while Cæsar, inwardly displeased at its success, shortly after published a work of an opposite tendency, which he named "Anti-cato," in which he meanly endeavoured to calumniate the motives and tarnish the reputation of a man, the consistency of whose virtue he could not but inwardly venerate and approve.

On his return to Rome, magnificent triumphs were decreed by the senate for his conquests in Egypt, Pontus, and Africa. The attention of Cæsar was soon after directed towards Spain, where the two sons of Pompey had collected a numerous army ; and the claims of the hostile factions were decided by a well-contested battle on the plains of Munda, in which the fortunes of Cæsar at length prevailed ; although, at one time, the chances of his success appeared so unpromising, that he had resolved to put a period to his own existence, in order

CÆS. VOL. I.—B

to avoid the ignominy of defeat. Thirty thousand of the enemy were slain. The elder of Pompey's sons lost his life in the engagement, but the younger effected his escape. After this battle, Cæsar is reported to have said, that "he had often before fought for victory, but that was the first time he had contended for his life."

His triumphal entry into Rome, at the close of this year, was generally condemned, even by his friends, as an ostentatious display, serving only to awaken in the public mind a sense of their wretched degradation, and to excite a warm sympathy for the unfortunate family of that great man, whose memory they still revered. The obsequious senate now created him dictator for life, and all honours and preferments were placed at his sole disposal. Far, however, as his power extended, it was still too circumscribed for the projects of his ambition. He now formed a design of invading Parthia, and made vast preparations for that purpose: but, previous to his departure, he was eager to assume the title of king,—which his flatterers openly encouraged by adorning his statues with royal diadems, which were immediately taken off by two patriotic tribunes, who committed the culprits to prison; which so exasperated Cæsar that he deposed them from their office, and loudly complained to the senate of the insolence of their behaviour.

It was now sufficiently apparent that a regal despotism was the end and aim of all the measures of the dictator; and, in consequence of this conviction, a numerous band of conspirators, with Brutus and

Cassius at their head, determined openly to assassinate him in the senate-house ; which design they were enabled to accomplish ; and he expired at the base of Pompey's statue, pierced with twenty-three wounds, on the 15th of March, in the fifty-sixth year of his age, and forty-four years before the Christian era.

A just estimate of the character of this extraordinary man can best be obtained by a careful perusal of the history of the times in which he flourished ; in the principal events of which he bore so conspicuous a share. Plutarch, in the history of his life, gives a minute and faithful detail both of him and his contemporaries, conveyed in an entertaining and instructive narrative. We have now only to add, that Cæsar's Commentaries have been universally admired by all scholars, as well for the elegance as for the purity of their style ; while the attention of all classes of readers is effectually secured by the importance and interest attached to the transactions which they relate. Besides the Gallic and Civil Wars, Cæsar wrote several other works, which are now lost. The History of the Alexandrian, African, and Spanish Campaigns is attributed to his pen by some writers ; but that work, together with the eighth book of the Gallic War, is now generally ascribed to Hirtius, the colleague of Pansa in the consulship, who lost his life at the siege of Modena.

ARGUMENTS.

WARS IN GAUL.

BOOK I

1. **DESCRIPTION** and division of Gaul—2. Design by the Helvetians of invading it—3. Preparations—5. Difficulties—7. March—8. Cæsar's resolution to hinder it—10. He attacks and defeats them at the river Arar—11. Their embassy to Cæsar, and his answer—14. Cæsar reduced to great straits for want of corn by the perfidy of Dumnorix the Æduan, whom nevertheless he pardons—17. Cæsar defeats the Helvetians in a second battle—21. They surrender, and are obliged to return to their own country—22. The Gauls congratulate Cæsar on his victory—23. And complain to him of the irruption of the Germans into Gaul, under Ariovistus—24. Cæsar's embassy to Ariovistus—27. His answer—28. Cæsar leads his army against Ariovistus—30. The consternation that seizes his troops—31. He animates them by a speech—33. Interview between Cæsar and Ariovistus—37. Breaks off by the approach of the German cavalry—38. Perfidy and cruelty of Ariovistus—39. Cæsar and Ariovistus prepare for battle; manner of fighting in use among the German horse—41. Cæsar defeats the Germans with great slaughter, obliges them to repossess the Rhine, and by one battle puts an end to the war.

BOOK II.

1. **THE** confederacy of the Belgians against the people of Rome—3. The Rhemi submit on the approach of Cæsar—4. And inform him of the strength and designs of the confederates—6. Cæsar passes the Axona with his army—7. Bibrax, a town belonging to the Rhemi, assaulted by the Belgians—8. Cæsar relieves it, and obliges the Belgians to retire—9. The armies drawn up on both sides, but without coming to an engagement—11. The Belgians, despairing of success, decamp and return home—12. Cæsar attacks their rear, and makes great slaughter—13. He then marches against the Suessiones, and obliges them to submit—14. Advancing next into the country of the Bellovaci, he pardons them at the intercession of Divitiacus—16. The Ambiani surrender, but the Nervians stand on their defence—23. They are defeated, however, in a long and bloody engagement, and almost

all cut off—29. Cæsar prepares to attack the Atuatuci—31. They submit—33. But falling treacherously on the Romans during the night—34. Are many of them cut to pieces, and the rest sold for slaves.

BOOK III.

1. THE Nantuates, Veragrians, and Seduni fall unexpectedly on Ser. Galba, Cæsar's lieutenant—3. But are overthrown with great slaughter—6. Galba leads back his legion into the country of the Allobrogians—7. At the same time the Venetians, and other states bordering on the ocean, revolt—9. Cæsar prepares to attack them, not without great difficulty—10. He divides his army, and distributes it into the several provinces of Gaul—12. The advantages of the Venetians, and the manner of their defence—13. A description of their shipping, and its suitableness to the nature of the coast—14. Cæsar, finding it in vain to attack them by land, comes to a naval engagement with them, and gets the victory—17. Meantime, Q. Titurius Sabinus, his lieutenant, by an artful stratagem defeats the Unellians—21. At the same time, P. Crassus, in Aquitain, having vanquished the Sotiates, obliges them to submit—24. Together with several other states of the same province—29. Cæsar attacks the Morini and Menapians with success, but the season being far advanced, he is obliged to send his army into winter-quarters.

BOOK IV.

1. THE Usipetes and Tenchtheri, German nations, expelled by the Suevians, come over into Gaul—2. The manners and way of life of the Suevians—3. And of the Ubians—4. The Usipetes and Tenchtheri drive the Menapians from their habitations—5. Cæsar, knowing the wavering and unsettled temper of the Gauls, repairs early in the spring to the army—6. Embassy of the Germans to Cæsar, and his answer—9. An action between the cavalry, in which the Germans have the advantage—10. But are afterward driven from their camp with great slaughter—13. And pursued by Cæsar, who makes a bridge over the Rhine for that purpose—16. Cæsar lays waste the territories of the Sigambri—17. And having freed the Ubians from the servitude under which they lived, returns into Gaul—18. He then passes over into Britain—22. And lands his army with great difficulty, the natives making a vigorous opposition—24. They are defeated at length, and send ambassadors to sue for peace—26. Cæsar's fleet almost entirely ruined by a storm, which induces the Britons to revolt—29. Their way of fighting from their chariots—30. Which disconcerts the Romans at first—31. But being again put to flight, they obtain peace—32. After which Cæsar returns into Gaul—33. And marching against the Morini, whom the hope of plunder tempted to fall on some of his detached parties, obliges them to submit.

BOOK V.

1. CÆSAR, leaving orders with his lieutenants in Gaul to build a fleet, sets out for Italy and Illyricum, where he puts a stop to the incursions of the Pirustæ—2. Returning thence into Gaul, he marches against

the Treviri, and quiets the disturbances in that province—4. *Dumnorix*, withdrawing from the Roman camp with the *Æduan* cavalry, is pursued and slain—7. *Cæsar* passes over into Britain—8. And forces the enemy from the woods in which they had taken shelter—9. But understanding that his fleet had suffered greatly by a storm, he quits the pursuit of the Britons, repairs his fleet, fortifies his camp, and then returns against the enemy—10. A description of Britain, and its inhabitants—11. *Cæsar* defeats the Britons in various encounters—14. Passes the Thames—19. Returns into Gaul—20. And because of the great scarcity of corn, distributes his legions among the several states—21. *Tasgetius* slain among the *Carnutes*—22. *Ambiorix* and *Cativolcus* excite several states to a revolt—23. *Ambiorix* by an artful speech persuades *Titurius* to quit his camp, and attacking him in his march, cuts him off with his whole party—30. Being afterward joined by the *Nervians*, he falls on *Cicero's* camp—36. The noble emulation of *Pulvis* and *Varenus*—37. *Cæsar* marches to *Cicero's* relief—41. The Gauls quit the siege, and advance to meet him—42. *Cæsar* defeats them in battle—44. And to prevent their continual revolts, resolves to pass the winter in Gaul—45. The *Senones*, *Treviri*, and other states, bear the Roman yoke with impatience—47. *Indutiomarus* attacks *Labienus's* camp—49. But being slain in the attempt, the Gauls separate, and tranquillity is in a great measure restored.

BOOK VI.

1. *CÆSAR*, apprehending greater commotions in Gaul, augments his forces—2. He reduces the *Nervians* by a sudden invasion—3. And admits the *Senones*, *Carnutes*, and *Menapians* to a surrender—6. *Labienus*, pretending fear, suddenly attacks and routs the *Treviri*—9. *Cæsar* passes the Rhine a second time—10. The *Suevians* prepare to oppose the Romans—11. The manners of the Gauls and Germans described—12. The *Æduans* and *Sequani* at the head of two opposite factions in Gaul: the *Sequani* declining in power, the *Rhemi* substitute themselves in their place—13. Description of the *Druids*—15. The religion of the Gauls—16. The Gauls and Germans differ much as to their manners and customs—23. The *Hercynian* forest—24. A bull with one horn—25. Wild asses—26. *Buffaloes*—27. *Cæsar*, fearing the want of provisions, repasses the Rhine, and marches against *Ambiorix*—28. The great power of fortune—29. *Ambiorix* disbands his troops, and counsels them to provide for their own safety—30. *Cæsar* divides his army, and marches in person in quest of *Ambiorix*—31. Is obliged to proceed with great circumspection in ravaging the country—32. The *Sicambri* cross the Rhine, and fall on *Cæsar's* camp—35. The astonishing bravery of *Sextius Baculus* on this occasion—37. The Romans suffer some loss—38. The Germans at length relinquish the attack, and return home—40. *Cæsar* lays waste the country of the *Eburones*; *Ambiorix* narrowly escapes being taken—41. *Cæsar* returns to Italy.

BOOK VII.

1. THE Gauls concert measures for renewing the war—2. The *Carnutes* massacre a number of Roman citizens at *Genabum*—6. *Vercingetorix*

excites his followers to a revolt, and by the consent of many nations is declared generalissimo of the league—8. Cæsar suddenly invades Auvergne—10. Vercingetorix invests Gergovia, whither he is followed by Cæsar—11. Cæsar makes himself master of Vellaunodunum and Genabum—12. Vercingetorix quits the siege of Gergovia; Cæsar possesses himself of Noviodunum, puts Vercingetorix's cavalry to flight, and invests Avaricum—13. By advice of Vercingetorix, the Biturigians set fire to their towns that they may not furnish subsistence to the Romans—16. Cæsar in great straits for want of corn—17. The two armies near each other, but without coming to a battle—19. Vercingetorix, accused of treason, clears himself—21. Cæsar continues the siege of Avaricum—22. The construction of the walls of towns among the Gauls—23. Avaricum, after a resolute defence, is at last taken by storm—28. Vercingetorix consoles his men by a speech—29. And prepares with greater force to renew the war—30. Cæsar quiets the intestine divisions of the Æduans—32. Sets out on his march towards Auvergne—33. Passes the Allier by a feint—34. And arriving before Gergovia, seizes an eminence near the town—35. The Æduans form the design of a revolt from the Romans—38. But by Cæsar's prudence and diligence, are in some measure prevented—41. Cæsar carries three of the enemy's camps before Gergovia—44. The Romans, pressing the attack too far, are repulsed with great slaughter—49. Cæsar reprehends the temerity of his soldiers—50. And resolves to retire into the country of the Æduans—52. Noviodunum seized and set on fire by the treachery of the Æduans—54. Labienus, after a successful expedition against the Parisians, returns to Cæsar with all his forces—57. The revolt of the Æduans followed by that of almost all Gaul—58. Preparations for war—59. The Gauls, under the conduct of Vercingetorix, attack Cæsar in the territories of the Lingones—61. But are routed with great slaughter—62. Cæsar pursues them as far as Alesia—63. Description of that town—64. The Gauls defeated in an engagement between the cavalry—65. Vercingetorix sends away all his horses—66. Cæsar surrounds Alesia with lines of circumvallation and contravallation—69. The Gauls, drawing their forces together, endeavour to raise the siege—71. Critognatus's speech to the garrison of Alesia—72. The Gauls within and without the town prepare to attack the Romans—73. A battle of the horse, in which the Romans have the advantage—74. The Gauls make several attempts on the Roman lines, but are always repulsed with loss—81. At length the Romans, sallying from the intrenchments, defeat the Gauls with great slaughter—82. Alesia surrenders—83. The Æduans and Averni submit; Cæsar sends his army into winter-quarters.

BOOK VIII.

Hirtius's Preface—1. The Gauls form a resolution to renew the war—2. Cæsar falls unexpectedly on the Biturigians, and compels them to submit—4. He afterward disperses the Carnutes by the terror of his arms—5. The Bellovaci prepare for war—6. Their designs—7. Cæsar endeavours to draw them to an engagement, by inspiring them with a contempt of his small numbers—8. But as they carefully avoid a battle, he resolves to fortify his camp—11. The Bellovaci intercept the Roman foragers—12. Daily skirmishes within view of the two camps

—13. The Bellovaci artfully counterfeit a retreat—16. And falling on the Romans from an ambuscade, after an obstinate fight, are entirely dispersed—17. The Bellovaci and other states submit—20. Cæsar divides his army—21. Caninius and Fabius relieve Duracius, besieged by Dumnaeus in Limo—24. Caninius pursues Drapes and Luterius—25. Fabius obliges the Carnutes and other states to submit—26. Drapes and Luterius possess themselves of Uxellodunum—27. Caninius invests the town—28. Intercepts a convoy escorted by Luterius—29. Attacks and carries the camp of Drapes—30. And joining the forces under Fabius, returns to the siege of Uxellodunum—31. Cæsar repairs to the camp of Caninius—33. And depriving the besieged of water, compels the town to surrender—37. He then sends his army into winter-quarters—38. Commius, defeated in an engagement of horse, surrenders to Antony—41. The year following, Gaul being in perfect quiet, Cæsar goes into Italy—42. Where he is received with the highest demonstrations of respect—43. He returns to the army, where he learns the designs formed against him at Rome—46. And thereon sets out again for Italy.

WARS IN GAUL.

CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES.

WARS IN GAUL.

BOOK I.

1. The whole country of Gaul is divided into three parts; of which the Belgians inhabit one; the Aquitains another; and a people, called in their own language Celts, in ours Gauls, the third. These all differ from each other in their language, customs, and laws. The Gauls are divided from the Aquitains by the river Garonne, and by the Marne and the Seine from the Belgians. Of all these nations the Belgians are the most warlike; as being furthest removed from the culture and refinements of the province, and but little resorted to by merchants, who furnish the means of luxury and voluptuousness. They are also situated next to the Germans, who inhabit beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually engaged in war. For this reason likewise the Helvetians are distinguished by their bravery beyond the rest of the Gauls; because they are almost constantly at war with the Germans, either for the defence of their own territories, or acting themselves as the aggressors. One of these divisions, that which we have said was possessed by the Gauls, begins at the river Rhine, and is bounded by the Garonne, the ocean, and the territories of the Belgians. It touches also, towards the Helvetians and Sequani, on the river Rhine, extending itself northward. The country of the Belgians, commencing

CÆs. Vol. I.—C

from the remotest confines of Gaul, stretches as far as the lower Rhine, running all the way between the north and the east. Aquitain extends from the Garonne to the Pyrenean mountains, and that part of the ocean which borders on Spain. Its situation is north-west.

2. Orgetorix was by far the richest and most illustrious of the Helvetians. This nobleman, in the consulship of M. Messala and M. Piso, prompted by an aspiring ambition, formed a confederacy of the principal men of the state; and persuaded the people to quit their country in a body, representing, "that as they surpassed all the nations around them in valour, it would be easy for them to gain the entire sovereignty of Gaul." He the sooner brought them into this design, because the Helvetians, by the nature of their situation, are everywhere confined within very narrow territories; on one side by the Rhine, a broad and deep river, which separates their country from that of the Germans; on the other by Mount Jura, a high ridge of hills, which runs between them and the Sequani; lastly, by the lake Lemanus, and the river Rhone, which is the boundary on the side of the Roman province. By this means it happened that they could not so easily enlarge their territories, or make conquests on the neighbouring states; which, to men of a warlike spirit, and fond of fighting, was abundant cause of discontent: for being a numerous people, and of great fame for their bravery, they thought themselves much too straitened in a country which was but two hundred and forty miles in length, and about one hundred and eighty in breadth.

3. Urged by these considerations, and still more by the authority and persuasions of Orgetorix, they resolved to provide every thing necessary for an expedition; to buy up a great number of wagons and carriage-horses; to form large magazines of corn, that they might have sufficient to supply them in

their march ; to establish peace and amity with the neighbouring states. They imagined two years would be sufficient for these preparations, and obliged themselves by a law to begin their march on the third. The whole management of this design was committed to Orgetorix, who undertook an embassy to the neighbouring states. On this occasion he persuaded Casticus, the son of Catamantales, of the nation of the Sequani, whose father had for many years enjoyed the sovereignty over that people, and been styled friend and ally by the senate of Rome, to possess himself of the supreme authority in his own country, which his father had held before him. He likewise persuaded Dumnoric the Æduan, the brother of Divitiacus, who was at that time the leading man in his own state, and greatly beloved by the people, to attempt the same among the Æduans : and, the more to secure him to his interest, gave him his daughter in marriage. He told them, “that they might with the greatest facility accomplish their designs ; as he was himself assured of attaining the supreme authority in his own state, which was without dispute the most powerful and considerable of all Gaul ; and would then employ his whole interest and forces to establish them in their respective sovereignties.” Moved by these considerations, they reciprocally bound themselves by a solemn oath ; not doubting, when they had once attained the chief sway in their several states, with the united forces of three such powerful and mighty nations, to render themselves masters of all Gaul. The Helvetians having notice of this design, obliged Orgetorix, according to the custom of their country, to answer to the charge brought against him, in chains : and had he been found guilty, the law condemned him to be burnt alive. On the day appointed for his trial, he assembled all his slaves and domestics, amounting to ten thousand men ; and all his clients and debtors, of which the number was very great : by their means

he rescued himself out of the hands of his judges. While the people, provoked at this contempt of the laws, were preparing to support their authority by force, and the magistrates had assembled a great number of men for that purpose, Orgetorix died: nor are the Helvetians without suspicion of his having made away with himself.

4. After his death, the Helvetians still continued to prosecute, with the same diligence, the design they had formed of quitting their country. When they had completed their preparations, they set fire to all their towns, to the number of twelve; to their boroughs and villages, which amounted to four hundred; and to their other private buildings. They likewise burnt all their corn, except what they had resolved to carry along with them; that, having no hope of returning to their own country, they might be the more disposed to confront all dangers. Each man had orders to carry out with him provisions for three months. The Rauraci, Tulingians, and Lato-brigians, neighbouring nations, being persuaded to follow the same counsel, likewise set fire to their towns and villages, and joined with them in the expedition. The Boians, too, who had formerly inhabited beyond the Rhine, and passing over into Noricum, had settled in that country, and possessed themselves of Noreia, its capital city, were associated into the design.

5. There were only two ways by which they could march out of their own country. One through the territories of the Sequani, between Mount Jura and the Rhone, narrow and difficult; insomuch, that in some places a single file of wagons could hardly pass. The impending mountain was besides very high and steep, so that a handful of men was sufficient to stop them. The other lay through our province, far easier and readier; because the Rhone, which flows between the confines of the Helvetians and Allobrogians, a people lately subjected to the Ro-

mans, was in some places fordable; and Geneva, a frontier town of the Allobrogiens, adjoining to the territories of the Helvetians, had a bridge belonging to this last people. They therefore doubted not, either of persuading the Allobrogiens, who as yet seemed to bear no great affection to the people of Rome, or at least of obliging them by force, to grant them a passage through their territories. Every thing being now ready for the expedition, they appointed a day for their general rendezvous on the banks of the Rhone. The day fixed on was the twenty-eighth of March, in the consulship of L. Piso and A. Gabinius.

6. Cæsar, having notice of these proceedings, and that it was the design of the Helvetians to attempt a passage through the province, hastened his departure from Rome; and posting by great journeys into farther Gaul, came to Geneva. He began with breaking down the bridge over the Rhone; and as there was at that time but one Roman legion in Transalpine Gaul, he ordered great levies to be made throughout the whole province. The Helvetians, being informed of his arrival, deputed several noblemen of the first rank, with Numeius and Verodoctius at their head, to wait on him in the name of the state, and represent, “that they meant not to offer the least injury to the Roman province; that necessity alone had determined them to the design of passing through it, because they had no other way by which to direct their march: that they therefore entreated they might have his permission for that purpose.” But Cæsar, bearing in mind that L. Cassius the consul had been slain, and his army routed, and made to pass under the yoke, by the Helvetians, did not think proper to grant their request. Neither could he persuade himself, that men so ill affected to the people of Rome, if permitted to pass through the province, would abstain from acts of hostility and violence. However, that he might gain time, till the troops he had ordered to be raised could assemble, he told the

ambassadors he would consider of their demand; and that if they returned by the nineteenth of April, they should have his final answer. Meanwhile, with the legion he then had, and the soldiers that came in to him from all parts of the province, he ran a wall sixteen feet high, and nineteen miles in length, with a ditch, from the lake Lemanus, into which the Rhone discharges itself, to Mount Jura, which divides the territories of the Sequani from the Helvetians. This work finished, he raised redoubts from space to space, and manned them with troops, that if the enemy should attempt to force a passage, he might be in a condition to hinder them. When the day appointed came, and the ambassadors returned for an answer, he told them that he could not, consistent with the usage and behaviour of the people of Rome on the like occasions, grant any troops a passage through the province; and should they attempt it by force, he let them see he was prepared to oppose them.

7. The Helvetians, driven from this hope, endeavoured to force the passage of the river; some with boats coupled together, or floats, which they had prepared in great numbers; others by the fords of the Rhone, where was the least depth of water; sometimes by day, but oftener in the night; but being repulsed by the strength of the works, the concourse of the troops, and the discharge of darts, they at last abandoned the attempt. There was still one way left through the territories of the Sequani, by which, however, without the consent of the natives, they could not march because of the narrowness of the pass. As they were not able to prevail by their own application, they sent ambassadors to Dumnorix the Æduan, that through his intercession they might obtain this favour from the Sequani. Dumnorix, by his popularity and generosity, had great influence with the Sequani, and was also well affected to the Helvetians, because from among them he had mar-

ried the daughter of Orgetorix. Besides, urged by ambitious views, he was framing to himself schemes of power, and wanted to have as many states as possible bound to him by offices of kindness. He therefore charged himself with the negotiation, obtained for the Helvetians the liberty of passing through the territories of the Sequani, and engaged the two nations mutually to give hostages: the Sequani, not to molest the Helvetians in their march; and the Helvetians, to pass without offering any insult or injury to the country.

8. Cæsar soon had intelligence of their march, and that they now designed to pass through the country of the Sequani and Æduans into the territories of the Santones, which border on those of the Tolosatians, a state that makes part of the Roman province. Should this happen, he foresaw many inconveniences likely to arise from the neighbourhood of a warlike and disaffected people in an open and plentiful country. For these reasons he gave the command of the new works he had raised to T. Labienus, his lieutenant, and he himself hastened by great journeys into Italy. There he raised two legions, and drew three more, that were cantoned round Aquileia, out of their winter-quarters; and, with these five legions, took the nearest way over the Alps into Farther Gaul. The Centrones, Graioceli, and Caturigians, seizing the higher ground, endeavoured to oppose his march; but, having repulsed them in several encounters, he, in seven days after setting out from Ocelum, a city in the extreme confines of the nearer province, arrived among the Vocontians, whose territories lie within the farther province. Thence he led his army into the country of the Allobrogi; and, crossing their territories, entered on the lands of the Segusians. These are the first on the other side the Rhone, beyond the boundaries of the Roman province.

9. The Helvetians had by this time marched their

forces through the narrow pass of Mount Jura, and the territories of the Sequani; and were come into the country of the Æduans, plundering their lands. The Æduans, unable to defend themselves and possessions from the violence of their enemies, sent ambassadors to Cæsar to request aid. They told him, "that such at all times had been their merit with the people of Rome, that they might challenge greater regard than to have their lands laid waste, their children led into captivity, and their towns assaulted and taken, almost in the very sight of a Roman army." At the same time also the Ambarri, friends and allies of the Æduans, sent to inform him, "that, compelled to abandon the open country, they could hardly defend their towns from the rage of the enemy." The Allobrogians, likewise, who had dwellings and possessions beyond the Rhone, fled to him for protection, and assured him, "that there was nothing left them but a naked and desolate country." Whereon Cæsar, moved by these complaints and remonstrances, resolved not to wait till the fortunes of his allies should be consumed, and the Helvetians arrive in the territories of the Santones.

10. The river Arar flows into the Rhone, through the confines of the Æduans and Sequani, with a current incredibly smooth and gentle, insomuch that it is impossible to distinguish by the eye which way its waters glide. The Helvetians were at this time employed in passing it on floats and a bridge of boats. When Cæsar was informed by his spies, that three parts of their forces were got over the river, and that the fourth still remained on this side, he left the camp about midnight with three legions, and came up with the party of the enemy that had not yet passed. As he found them unprepared, and incumbered with their baggage, he attacked them immediately, and killed a great number on the spot. The rest fled, and sheltered themselves in the nearest woods. This was called the Tigurine Canton, being

one of the four into which the whole body of the Helvetians are divided. This very canton, in the memory of our fathers, marching out of their own territories, had vanquished and killed the consul L. Cassius, and obliged his army to pass under the yoke. Thus, whether by chance or the direction of the immortal gods, that part of the Helvetian state which had brought so signal a calamity on the Roman people, were the first to feel the weight of their resentment. In this Cæsar avenged not only the public, but likewise his own domestic injuries; because in the same battle with Cassius, was slain also L. Piso his lieutenant, the grandfather of L. Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law.

11. After this battle, that he might come up with the remaining forces of the Helvetians, he caused a bridge to be made across the Arar, and carried over his army. The Helvetians, dismayed at his sudden approach, as he had spent only one day in passing the river, which they had with the utmost difficulty accomplished in twenty, sent an embassy to him, at the head of which was Divico, who had been general of the Helvetians in the war against Cassius. He addressed Cæsar to this effect: "That if the people of Rome were disposed to conclude a peace with the Helvetians, they would go and settle in whatever country Cæsar should think fit to assign them; but if they persisted in the design of making war, he would do well to call to mind the ancient disgrace of the Roman people, and the valour of the Helvetic nation: that in having surprised one of the cantons, while the others, who had passed the river, could not return to succour it, there was no reason to be much elated on the advantage, nor to despise his enemies: that the Helvetians had learned of their ancestors to depend more on courage than on cunning and ambushes; and it therefore imported him to beware, not to render the place where they were then posted famous and memorable with posterity,

by a new defeat of the Roman people, and the destruction of their army."

12. To this Cæsar replied: "That he therefore the less doubted of the issue, as he well knew all the circumstances of the affair to which the Helvetians referred; and resented them the more strongly, as they had happened undeservedly to the Roman people: that had they been conscious of any injury on their side, it would have been easy for them to have kept on their guard; but herein were they deceived, that neither did they know of any thing which might give them cause of fear, nor could they apprehend they had any thing to fear without cause: that supposing him inclined to overlook old injuries, could they expect he would also forget their late insults, in attempting, against his will, to force a passage through the province, and laying waste the territories of the Æduans, Ambarri, and Allobrogians? That their boasting so insolently of their victory, and wondering that vengeance had been deferred so long, were a new set of provocations. But they ought to remember, that the immortal gods were sometimes wont to grant long impunity, and a great run of prosperity to men, whom they pursued with the punishment of their crimes, that, by the sad reverse of their condition, vengeance might fall the heavier. Though these were just grounds of resentment, yet, if they would satisfy the Æduans and their allies for the ravages committed in their country, as likewise the Allobrogians, and give hostages for the performance of their promises, he was ready to conclude a peace with them." Divico replied: "That such were the institutions of the Helvetians, derived from their ancestors, that they had been accustomed to receive, not to give hostages; and that nobody knew it better than the Romans." Having returned this answer, he departed.

13. The next day they decamped. Cæsar did the

same: and ordered all the cavalry, whom, to the number of four thousand, he had raised in the province, and drawn together from the Æduans and their allies, to go before and observe the enemy's march. But pressing too close on their rear, they were obliged to engage in a disadvantageous place, and lost a few men. The Helvetians, encouraged by this success, as having, with no more than five hundred horse, repulsed so great a multitude, began to face us more boldly, and sometimes to sally from their rear, and attack our van. Cæsar kept back his men from fighting; thinking it sufficient for the present, to straiten the enemy's forages, and prevent their ravaging and plundering the country. In this manner the armies marched for fifteen days together; insomuch that between our van, and the rear of the Helvetians, the distance did not exceed five or six miles.

14. In the mean time Cæsar daily pressed the Æduans for the corn which they had promised in the name of the public: for by reason of the coldness of the climate (Gaul, as we have said, lying considerably to the north), he was so far from finding the corn ripe in the fields, that there was not even sufficient forage for the horses. Neither could he make use of those supplies which came to him by the way of the Arar, because the Helvetians had turned off from the river, and he was determined not to leave them. The Æduans put him off from day to day with fair speeches; sometimes pretending that it was bought up, and ready to be sent; sometimes, that it was actually on the way. But when he saw no end of these delays, and that the day approached for delivering out corn to the army, calling together their chiefs, of whom he had a great number in his camp; among the rest Divitiacus, and Liscus, their supreme magistrate, who is styled Vergobret in the language of the country, and created yearly with a power of life and death; he severely

inveighed against them: "That at a time when corn was neither to be procured for money, nor had out of the fields, in so urgent a conjuncture, and while the enemy was so near, they had not taken care to supply him;" adding, "that as he had engaged in that war chiefly at their request, he had the greater reason to complain of their abandoning him."

15. On this, Liscus, moved by Cæsar's speech, thought proper to declare what he had hitherto concealed: "That there were some among them whose authority with the people was very great; and who, though but private men, had yet more power than the magistrates themselves. That these, by artful and seditious speeches, alarmed the multitude, and persuaded them to keep back their corn; insinuating, that if their own state could not obtain the sovereignty of Gaul, it would be better for them to obey the Helvetians, Gauls like themselves, than the Romans; there not being the least reason to question but these last, after having subdued the Helvetians, would, along with the rest of Gaul, deprive the Æduans also of their liberty. That the very same men gave intelligence to the enemy of all the designs of the Romans, and whatsoever was transacted in their camp; his authority not being sufficient to restrain them: nay, that though compelled by necessity he had now made a discovery of the whole matter to Cæsar, he was not ignorant of the danger to which he exposed himself by such a conduct; and had, for that reason, chosen to be silent, as long as he thought it consistent with the safety of the state." Cæsar perceived that Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, was pointed at by this speech: but as he was unwilling that these matters should be debated in the presence of so many witnesses, he speedily dismissed the council, retaining only Liscus. He then questioned him apart on what he had just said, and was answered

with greater courage and freedom. He put the same questions to others also in private, who all confirmed the truth of what had been told him: "That Dumnorix was a man of an enterprising spirit, fond of revolutions, and in great favour with the people, because of his liberality: that he had for many years farmed the customs and other public revenues of the Æduans at a very low price, no one daring to bid against him: that by this means he had considerably increased his estate, and was enabled to extend his bounty to all about him: that he constantly kept a great number of horsemen in pay, who attended him wherever he went: that his interest was not confined merely to his own country, but extended likewise to the neighbouring states: that the better to support this interest, he had married his mother to a man of principal rank and authority among the Biturigians, had himself taken a wife from among the Helvetians, and matched his sister and the rest of his kindred into other the most powerful states: that he favoured and wished well to the Helvetians, on the score of that alliance; and personally hated Cæsar and the Romans, because by their arrival his power had been diminished, and Divitiacus his brother restored to his former credit and authority: that should the Romans be overthrown, he was in great hopes of obtaining the sovereignty by means of the Helvetians: on the contrary, should they prevail, he must not only give up these hopes, but even all expectation of retaining the influence he had already acquired." Cæsar likewise found, on inquiry, that in the last engagement of the horse, Dumnorix, who commanded the Ædian cavalry, was the first that fled, and by that flight struck a terror into the rest of the troops.

16. These things appearing, and other undoubted circumstances concurring to heighten his suspicions; that he had procured for the Helvetians a passage through the territories of the Sequani; that he had

CÆS. VOL. I.—D

effected an exchange of hostages between the two nations; that he had done all this not only without permission from him, or his own state, but even without their knowledge and participation; that he was accused by the chief magistrate of the Æduans; they seemed altogether a sufficient ground to Cæsar why he should either himself take cognizance of the matter, or order the state to proceed against him. One thing, however, still kept him in suspense: the consideration of his brother Divitiacus, a man of singular probity, justice, and moderation; a faithful ally of the Roman people, and on the footing of friendship with Cæsar. That he might not therefore give offence to one for whom he had so great a value, before he took any farther step in the affair, he sent for Divitiacus, and having removed the usual interpreters, addressed him by C. Valerius Proculus, a prince of the province of Gaul, his intimate friend, in whom he reposed the greatest confidence. He put him in mind of what had been said of Dumnorix in his own presence in the council of the Gauls, and repeated the fresh complaints made to himself against him in private. He urged, and even requested that, without offence to him, he might either proceed against him himself, or order the state to take the matter under consideration. Divitiacus, embracing Cæsar with many tears, begged him not to take any severe resolution against his brother. "He was sensible," he told him, "of the truth of all that was alleged, and had himself more reason to be dissatisfied than any man: that at a time when his authority was great, both at home and in the other provinces of Gaul, and his brother but little considered on account of his youth, he had used his interest to bring him into credit: that though Dumnorix had made use of that power acquired by his means, to diminish his favour with the people, and even to urge on his ruin, he nevertheless still found himself swayed by his affection and a regard

for the esteem of the public : that should his brother meet with any rigorous treatment from Cæsar, while he himself possessed so large a share of his favour, all men would believe it done with his consent, and the minds of the Gauls be for ever alienated from him." Cæsar, observing his concern, took him by the hand, comforted him, desired him to make an end of speaking, assured him that such was his regard for him, he would for his sake overlook not only his own injuries, but even those of the republic. He then sent for Dumnorix, called him into his brother's presence, declared the subjects of complaint he had against him, mentioned what he himself knew, and what was laid to his charge by the state, and admonished him for the future to avoid all cause of suspicion; adding that he would forgive what was past for the sake of his brother Divitiacus. He appointed, however, some to have an eye over him, that he might be informed of his behaviour, and of those he conversed with.

17. The same day, having learned by his scouts that the enemy had posted themselves under a hill about eight miles from his camp, he sent out a party to view the ground and examine the ascent of the hill. These reporting it to be extremely easy, he detached T. Labienus, his lieutenant, about midnight, with two legions, and the same guides who had examined the ground the day before; and having acquainted him with his design, ordered him to get possession of the top of the hill. He himself set out three hours after with the rest of the army, by the same route the Helvetians had taken, and sent all the cavalry before. P. Considius, an officer of reputation, who had served in the army of L. Sylla, and afterward that of M. Crassus, advanced with a small party to get intelligence.

18. At daybreak, when Labienus had got possession of the top of the hill, and Cæsar was within a mile and a half of the enemy's camp; while they in

the mean time, as he afterward learned from his prisoners, knew nothing either of his or Labienus's approach, Considius came galloping back, and assured Cæsar that the summit of the mountain was possessed by the enemy, and that he had seen the Gallic arms and ensigns there. Cæsar retired to a neighbouring hill, and drew up his men in order of battle. Labienus, whose instructions were not to engage the enemy till he saw the rest of the army approaching their camp, that the attack might be made on all sides at the same time, having gained the top of the hill, waited the arrival of our men, without stirring from his post. At length, when the day was far spent, Cæsar understood by his spies that Labienus was in possession of the mountain, that the enemy had decamped, and that Considius, blinded by fear, had reported what he never saw. The rest of that day he followed the enemy at the usual distance, and encamped within three miles of them.

19. The day after, as the time drew near for delivering out corn to the army, and as he was not above eighteen miles from Bibracte, the capital of the Æduans, where he hoped to find sufficient supplies for the subsistence of his troops, he quitted the pursuit of the Helvetians, and directed his march thither. The enemy, being informed of this motion by some deserters who had belonged to the troop of L. Emilius, an officer of horse among the Gauls, and either ascribing it to fear in the Romans (the rather, because they had not attacked them the day before, though possessed of the higher ground), or flattering themselves with the hopes of intercepting their provisions, all on a sudden changed their resolution, and, instead of continuing their former march, began to pursue and harass our rear. Cæsar, observing this, retired to a neighbouring hill, and sent his cavalry to sustain the charge of the enemy. In the mean time he drew up his four veteran legions in three lines towards the middle of the hill, in such a

manner that the two legions newly raised in Cisalpine Gaul, and all the auxiliaries, were posted above them; and the whole mountain was covered with his troops. He ordered all the baggage to be brought into one place, and committed it to the charge of those who stood on the upper part of the hill. The Helvetians following with all their forces, drew their carriages likewise into one place; and having repulsed our cavalry and formed themselves into a phalanx, advanced in close order to attack our van.

20. Cæsar, having first sent away his own horse, and afterward those of all his officers, that by making the danger equal, no hope might remain but in victory, encouraged his men, and began the charge. The Romans, who fought with the advantage of the higher ground, pouring their darts on the enemy from above, easily broke their phalanx, and then fell on them sword in hand. What greatly encumbered the Gauls in this fight was, that their targets being many of them pierced and pinned together by the javelins of the Romans, they could neither draw out the javelins, because forked at the extremity, nor act with agility in the battle, because deprived in a manner of the use of their left arms; so that many, after long tossing their targets to and fro to no purpose to disengage them, chose rather to throw them away, and expose themselves without defence to the weapons of their enemies. At length, however, being overpowered with wounds, they began to give ground; and observing a mountain at about a mile's distance, gradually retreated thither. Having gained the mountain, and our men pursuing them, the Boians and Tulingians, who, to the number of fifteen thousand, covered their retreat, and served as a guard to their rear, falling on the Romans in flank as they advanced, began to surround them. This being perceived by the Helvetians, who had retired to the mountain, they again returned on us, and renewed the fight. The Romans facing about, charged the

enemy in three bodies; their first and second line making head against those who had been forced to retreat, and their third sustaining the assault of the Boians and Tulingians. The battle was bloody, and continued for a long time doubtful; but the enemy being at last obliged to give way, one part withdrew towards the hill whither they had before retreated, and the rest sheltered themselves behind the carriages. During this whole action, though it lasted from one o'clock in the afternoon till evening, no man saw the back of the enemy. The fight was renewed with great obstinacy at the carriages, and continued till the night was far spent; for the Gauls, making use of their carts by way of a rampart, darted their javelins on us from above; and some thrusting their lances through the wheels of the wagons, wounded our men. After a long dispute, we at last got possession of their baggage and camp. A son and daughter of Orgetorix were found among the prisoners. Only a hundred and twenty thousand of the enemy survived this defeat; who, retreating all that night, and continuing their march without intermission, arrived on the fourth day in the territories of the Lingones. The Romans meanwhile made no attempt to pursue them; the care of their wounded and of burying their dead obliging them to continue on the spot three days. Cæsar sent letters and messengers to the Lingones not to furnish them with corn or other necessaries, if they would avoid drawing on themselves the same treatment with the fugitives; and after a repose of three days, set forward to pursue them with all his forces.

21. The Helvetians, compelled by an extreme want of all things, sent ambassadors to him to treat about a surrender. These meeting him on the way, and throwing themselves at his feet in suppliant terms, and with many tears, begged for peace. Cæsar gave them no express answer at that time; only ordered the Helvetians to wait for him in the place

where they then were, which they did accordingly. On his arrival he demanded hostages, their arms, and the slaves who had deserted to their camp. As the execution of all this took up some time, about four thousand men of the canton called Urbigenus, either fearing punishment should they deliver up their arms, or induced by the hopes of escaping (because in so great a multitude they fancied their flight might be concealed, nay, perhaps remain altogether unknown), stole out of the camp in the beginning of the night, and took the route of Germany and the Rhine. Cæsar being informed of it, despatched orders to those through whose territories they must pass, to stop and send them back wherever they should be found, if they meant to acquit themselves of favouring their escape. He was obeyed, and the fugitive Urbigenians were treated as enemies. All the rest, on delivering the hostages that were required of them, their arms, and the deserters, were admitted to a surrender. The Helvetians, Tulingians, and Lato-brigians had orders to return to their own country, and rebuild the towns and villages they had burned. And because having lost all their corn they were utterly without the means of subsisting themselves, he gave it in charge to the Allobrogians to supply them. Cæsar's design in this was, that the lands deserted by the Helvetians might not be left vacant, lest the Germans beyond the Rhine, drawn by the goodness of the soil, should be tempted to seize them, and thereby become neighbours to the Allobrogians and the Roman province in Gaul. The Boians, at the request of the Æduans, who esteemed them highly on account of their valour, were permitted to settle in their territories; where they assigned them lands, and by degrees admitted them to all the rights and privileges of natives. A roll was found in the Helvetian camp, written in Greek characters, and brought to Cæsar. It contained a list of all who had set out on this expedition capable of

bearing arms; likewise of the children, women, and old men. By this it appeared that the number of the Helvetians was two hundred and sixty-three thousand; of the Tulingians, thirty-six thousand; of the Latobrigians, fourteen thousand; of the Rauraci, twenty-three thousand; of the Boians, thirty-two thousand; in all three hundred and sixty-eight thousand, of which ninety-two thousand were fit to bear arms. A review being made by Cæsar's command of those that returned to their own country, the number was found to be a hundred and ten thousand.

22. The war with the Helvetians being ended, ambassadors from all parts of Gaul, men of principal consideration in their several states, waited on Cæsar to congratulate his success. They told him, "that though they were sensible the people of Rome, in the war against the Helvetians, meant chiefly to avenge the injuries formerly received from that nation, yet had the event of it been highly advantageous to all Gaul; because in a time of full prosperity the Helvetians had left their territories with design to make war on the other states; that having brought them under subjection, they might choose themselves a habitation at pleasure, and render all the rest of the country tributary." They requested "that they might have his permission to hold by a day prefixed a general assembly of all the provinces of Gaul; there being some things they wanted to discuss and propose to him, which concerned the whole nation in common." Leave being granted accordingly, they fixed the day for the assembly, and bound themselves by an oath not to discover their deliberations to any, unless named for that purpose by general consent.

23. On the rising of the council, the same chiefs of the states as before returned to Cæsar, and begged to be admitted to confer with him, in private, of matters that regarded their own and the common

safety. Their desire being granted, they all threw themselves at his feet, and with tears represented, “that it was of no less importance to them to have their present deliberations kept secret, than to succeed in the request they were going to make; because, should any discovery happen, they were in danger of being exposed to the utmost cruelties.” Divitiacus the Æduan spoke in the name of the rest. He told him “that two factions divided all Gaul; one headed by the Æduans, the other by the Averni; that after a contention of many years between these for the superiority, the Averni and Sequani came at last to a resolution of calling in the Germans: that at first only fifteen thousand had crossed the Rhine; but being a wild and savage people, and greatly liking the customs, manners, and plenteous country of the Gauls, others soon followed; insomuch that at present there were no less than a hundred and twenty thousand of them in Gaul: that the Æduans and their allies had frequently tried their strength against them in battle; but by a succession of defeats had lost all their nobility, senate, and cavalry: that, broken by these calamities and losses, though formerly they had held the first sway in Gaul, both by their own valour and the favour and friendship of the people of Rome, yet now they were reduced to the necessity of sending their principal noblemen as hostages to the Sequani, and of obliging themselves by an oath neither to demand their hostages back, nor implore the assistance of the Roman people, nor refuse a perpetual submission to the dominion and authority of the Sequani: that he alone of all the Æduans had refused to take the oath, or give his children for hostages, and on that account had fled his country, and came to Rome to implore the assistance of the senate; as being the only man in the state whom neither obligation of oath nor the restraint of hostages withheld from such a step: that after all, it had fared worse with the victorious Sequani than with

the vanquished Æduans; because Ariovistus, king of the Germans, had seated himself in their territories, had seized a third of their lands, the most fertile in all Gaul, and now ordered them to give up another third in behalf of the Harudes, who had passed the Rhine a few months before with twenty-four thousand men, and wanted a settlement and habitations: that in a few years all the native Gauls would be driven from their territories, and all the Germans transplant themselves over the Rhine, the climate being far superior to that of their own country, and the way of living not admitting a comparison: that Ariovistus, ever since the defeat of the Gauls at Amagetobria, had behaved with unheard-of tyranny and haughtiness, demanding the children of the first nobility as hostages, and exercising all manner of cruelties on them, if his orders were not implicitly followed in every thing: that he was a man of a savage, passionate, and imperious character, whose government was no longer to be borne; and unless some resource was found in Cæsar and the people of Rome, the Gauls must all follow the example of the Helvetians, and like them abandon their country, in order to find some other habitation and settlement remote from the Germans, wherever fortune should point it out to them: that were these complaints and representations to come to the knowledge of Ariovistus, he made no doubt of his inflicting the severest punishments on all the hostages in his hands: but that it would be easy for Cæsar, by his own authority, and that of the army he commanded, by the fame of his late victory, and the terror of the Roman name, to hinder any more Germans from passing the Rhine, and to defend Gaul from the insults of Ariovistus."

24. When Divitiacus had made an end of speaking, all who were present, with many tears began to implore Cæsar's aid. He observed that the Sequani alone did nothing of all this; but pensive, and

with downcast looks, kept their eyes fixed on the ground. Wondering what might be the cause, he questioned them on it. Still they made him no answer, but continued silent as before, with the same air of dejection. When he had interrogated them several times, without being able to obtain one word in return, Divitiacus the Æduan again resumed the discourse, and observed, "that the condition of the Sequani was by so much more deplorable and wretched than that of the rest of the Gauls, as they alone durst not, even in secret, complain of their wrongs, or apply anywhere for redress; and no less dreaded the cruelty of Ariovistus when absent, than if actually present before their eyes: that other states had it still in their power to escape by flight; but the Sequani, who had received him into their territories, and put him in possession of all their towns, were exposed, on discovery, to every kind of torment." X Cæsar, being made acquainted with these things, encouraged the Gauls, and promised to have a regard to their complaints. He told them "that he was in great hopes Ariovistus, induced by his intercession and the authority of the people of Rome, would put an end to his oppressions." Having returned this answer, he dismissed the assembly.

25. Many urgent reasons occurred on this occasion to Cæsar why he should consider seriously of the proposals of the Gauls, and redress the injuries of which they complained. He saw the Æduans, friends and allies of the people of Rome, held in subjection and servitude by the Germans, and compelled to give hostages to Ariovistus and the Sequani; which, in the present flourishing state of the Roman affairs, seemed highly dishonourable both to himself and the commonwealth. He saw it likewise of dangerous consequence to suffer the Germans by little and little to transport themselves over the Rhine, and settle in great multitudes in Gaul; for that fierce and savage people, having once possessed

themselves of the whole country of Gaul, were but too likely, after the example of the Teutones and Cimbri, to break into the Roman province, and thence advance to Italy itself; more especially as the Rhone was the only boundary by which the Sequani were divided from the territories of the republic. It therefore appeared necessary to provide without delay against these evils; and the rather, because Ariovistus was become so insolent, and took so much on him, that his conduct was no longer to be endured.

26. For these reasons he thought proper to send ambassadors to Ariovistus to desire he would appoint a place for an interview, that they might discourse together about some public affairs of the highest importance to them both. Ariovistus replied, "that if he had wanted any thing of Cæsar, he would himself have waited on him for that purpose; and if Cæsar had any thing to desire of him, he must likewise come in person to demand it: that for his own part, he could neither venture into these provinces of Gaul, where Cæsar commanded, without an army, nor bring an army into the field without great trouble and expense: that he besides wondered extremely what business either Cæsar or the people of Rome could have in his division of Gaul, which belonged to him by right of conquest." This answer being reported to Cæsar, he again sent an embassy to him to this effect: "that since, notwithstanding the great obligations he lay under both to himself and the people of Rome in having, during his consulship, been declared king and ally by the senate, he yet manifested so little acknowledgment to either as even to refuse an interview, and decline treating of affairs that regarded the common interest, these were the particulars he required of him;—first, not to bring any more Germans over the Rhine into Gaul: secondly, to restore the hostages he had taken from the Æduans, and permit the Se-

quani likewise to do the same: lastly, to forbear all injuries towards the Æduans, and neither make war on them nor their allies. That his compliance with these conditions would establish a perpetual friendship and amity between him and the people of Rome. But if he refused conditions so just, as the senate had decreed in the consulship of M. Messala and M. Piso that whoever had the charge of the province of Gaul should, as far as was consistent with the interest of the commonwealth, defend the Æduans, and the other allies of the people of Rome, he thought himself bound not to overlook their just complaints."

✕27. To this Ariovistus replied, "that by the laws of war the conqueror had a right to impose what terms he pleased on the conquered; that in consequence of this, the people of Rome did not govern the vanquished by the prescriptions of another, but according to their own pleasure: that if he did not intermeddle with the Roman conquests, but left them to the free enjoyment of their rights, no more ought they to concern themselves in what regarded him. That the Æduans, having tried the fortune of war, had been overcome and rendered tributary; and it would be the highest injustice in Cæsar to offer at diminishing his just revenues: that he was resolved not to part with the hostages the Æduans had put into his hands; but would nevertheless engage neither to make war on them nor their allies, provided they observed the treaty he had made with them, and regularly paid the tribute agreed on: if otherwise, the title of friends and allies of the people of Rome would be found to stand them but in little stead: that as to Cæsar's menace of not overlooking the complaints of the Æduans, he would have him to know no one had ever entered into a war with Ariovistus but to his own destruction: that he might when he pleased bring it to a trial, and would, he doubted not, soon be made sensible

CÆS. VOL. I.—E

what the invincible Germans, trained up from their infancy in the exercise of arms, and who for fourteen years together had never slept under a roof, were capable of achieving."

28. At the same time that Cæsar received this answer, ambassadors also arrived from the Æduans and Treviri. From the Æduans, to complain "that the Harudes, who had lately come over into Gaul, were plundering their territories; insomuch that even by their submissions and hostages they were not able to obtain peace of Ariovistus." From the Treviri, to inform him "that a hundred cantons of the Suevians, headed by two brothers, Nausa and Cimberius, had arrived on the banks of the Rhine, with design to cross that river." Cæsar, deeply affected with this intelligence, determined to undertake the war without delay, lest this new band of Suevians, joining the old forces of Ariovistus, should enable him to make a greater resistance. Having therefore with all diligence provided for the subsistence of his army, he advanced towards him by great marches.

29. The third day he was informed that Ariovistus approached with all his forces to take possession of Vesontio, the capital of the Sequani; and that he had already got three days' march beyond his own territories. Cæsar judged it by all means necessary to prevent him in this design, as the town itself was not only full of all sorts of warlike ammunition, but likewise strongly fortified by nature, and commodiously situated for carrying on the war: for the river Doux forming a circle round it, as if described with a pair of compasses, leaves only an interval of six hundred feet, which is also inaccessible by reason of a very high and steep mountain, whose bases are washed on each side by the river. This mountain is shut in with a wall; which, forming a citadel, joins it to the town. Hither Cæsar marched day and night without intermission; and, having

possessed himself of the place, put a garrison into it.

30. While he tarried here a few days to settle the order of his convoys and supplies, the curiosity of our men, and the talk of the Gauls (who proclaimed on all occasions the prodigious stature of the Germans, their invincible courage, and great skill in arms—insomuch that in the frequent encounters with them they had found it impossible to withstand their very looks), spread such a sudden terror through the whole army that they were not a little disturbed by the apprehensions it occasioned. This fear first began among the military tribunes, the officers of the allies, and others who had voluntarily followed Cæsar from Rome; who, being but little acquainted with military affairs, lamented the great danger to which they fancied themselves exposed. Some of these, on various pretences, desired leave to return; others, out of shame, and unwilling to incur the suspicion of cowardice, continued in the camp. But these last, incapable of putting on a cheerful countenance, and at times even unable to suppress their tears, skulked in their tents, either bemoaning their fate, or discoursing with their companions on the common danger. Wills were made all over the camp, and the consternation began to seize even those of more experience,—the veteran soldiers, the centurions, and the officers of the cavalry. Such among them as affected a greater show of resolution said it was not the enemy they feared, but the narrow passes and vast forests that lay between them and Ariovistus, and the difficulty there would be in furnishing the army with provisions. Some even told Cæsar that when he gave orders for marching, the army, attentive to nothing but their fears, would refuse to obey.

31. Cæsar, observing the general consternation, called a council of war; and having summoned all the centurions of the army to be present, inveighed

against them with great severity for presuming to inquire, or at all concern themselves, which way or on what design they were to march. "Ariovistus," he told them, "during his consulship, had earnestly sought the alliance of the Roman people. Why, therefore, should any one imagine he would so rashly and hastily depart from his engagements? That, on the contrary, he was himself firmly persuaded, that as soon as he came to know his demands, and the equal conditions he was about to propose to him, he would be very far from rejecting either his friendship or that of the people of Rome. But if, urged on by madness and rage, he was resolved on war, what, after all, had they to be afraid of? Or why should they distrust either their own bravery or his care and conduct? That they were to deal with enemies of whom trial had been already made in the memory of their fathers, when, by the victory of C. Marius over the Teutones and Cimbri, the army itself acquired no less glory than the general who commanded it: that trial had likewise been lately made of them in Italy in the Servile war, when they had also the advantage of being exercised in the Roman discipline; on which occasion it appeared how much resolution and constancy were able to effect, since they had vanquished in the end those very enemies, armed and flushed with victory, whom at first they had without cause dreaded even unarmed. In fine, that they were the very same Germans with whom the Helvetians had so often fought, not only in their own country, but in Germany itself, and for the most part came off victorious, though they had by no means been a match for our army: that if the defeat and flight of the Gauls gave uneasiness to any, these would readily find on inquiry that Ariovistus, confining himself many months to his camp and fastnesses, and declining a general action, had thereby tired out the Gauls with the length of the war; who, despairing at last of a battle,

and beginning to disperse, were thereon attacked and routed, rather by conduct and craft than the superior valour of the Germans. But though a stratagem of this kind might take with rude and uncultivated people, yet could not even the German himself hope that it would avail against a Roman army. that as to those who sheltered their cowardice under the pretence of narrow passes, and the difficulty of procuring provisions, he thought it argued no small presumption in them either to betray such a distrust of their general's conduct, or offer to prescribe to him what he ought to do; that these things fell properly under his care: that the Sequani, Leuci, and Lingones were to furnish him with provisions: that the corn was now ripe in the fields: and that themselves would soon be judges as to what regarded the ways: that the report of the army's refusing to obey him gave him not the least disturbance, because he very well knew that no general had ever been so far slighted by his soldiers, whose ill success, avarice, or other crimes, had not justly drawn that misfortune on him: that in all these respects he fancied himself secure, as the whole course of his life would witness for his integrity, and his good fortune had shown itself in the war against the Helvetians: that he was therefore resolved to execute without delay what he otherwise intended to have put off a little longer; and would give orders for decamping the very next night, three hours before day, that he might as soon as possible know whether honour and a sense of duty, or an ignominious cowardice had the ascendant in his army: nay, that should all the rest of the troops abandon him, he would, nevertheless, march with the tenth legion alone, of whose fidelity and courage he had no manner of doubt, and which should serve him for his pretorian guard." Cæsar had always principally favoured this legion, and placed his chief confidence in it, on account of its valour.

32. This speech made a wonderful change on the minds of all, and begot an uncommon alacrity and eagerness for the war. The tenth legion, in particular, returned him thanks, by their tribunes, for the favourable opinion he had expressed of them, and assured him of their readiness to follow him. Nor were the other legions less industrious, by their tribunes and principal centurions, to reconcile themselves to Cæsar; protesting they had never either doubted or feared, nor ever imagined that it belonged to them, but to the general, to direct in matters of war. Having accepted of their submission, and informed himself, by means of Divitiacus, in whom, of all the Gauls, he most confided, that by taking a circuit of above forty miles he might avoid the narrow passes, and lead his army through an open country, he set forward three hours after midnight, as he had said; and after a march of seven days successively, understood by his scouts that he was within four and twenty miles of Ariovistus's camp.

33. Ariovistus, being informed of his arrival, sent ambassadors to acquaint him "that he was now willing to accept an interview, as they were come nearer one another, and he believed it might be done without danger." Cæsar did not decline the proposal, imagining he was now disposed to listen to reason, since he offered that of his own accord which he had before refused at his request: neither was he without hope, that in regard of the benefits he had received, both from himself and the people of Rome, he would, on knowing his demands, desist from his obstinacy. The fifth day after was appointed for the interview. Meantime, as ambassadors were continually passing and repassing, Ariovistus, under pretence that he was afraid of an ambuscade, demanded "that Cæsar should bring no infantry with him to the conference: that they should both come attended by their cavalry only: that otherwise he could not resolve to give him a meet-

ing." Cæsar, unwilling to drop the design of the interview, but neither caring to trust his safety to the Gauls, thought the best way was, to dismount all the Gallic cavalry, and give their horses to the soldiers of the tenth legion, who had the greatest share of his confidence; that, in case of danger, he might have a guard on which he could rely. This being done accordingly, one of the soldiers of that legion said, pleasantly enough, "that Cæsar had done even more than he had promised; that he had only given them hopes of becoming his pretorian guard, and now he had raised them to the rank of horse."

(34. There was a large plain, and in the midst of it a rising ground of considerable height, equally distant from both camps. At this place, by appointment, the conference was held. Cæsar stationed the legionary soldiers, whom he had brought with him on the horses of the Gauls, two hundred paces from the mount. Ariovistus did the same with the German cavalry. The conversation was on horseback, each being accompanied by ten friends, or principal officers; for so Ariovistus had desired. When they were come to the place, Cæsar began by putting him in mind of the favours he had received both from himself and the people of Rome: that he had been styled friend and ally by the senate; that very considerable presents had been sent him; that these honours, conferred by the Romans on very few, and only for signal services to the state, had yet been bestowed on him, not on account of any just claim on his side, but merely by the favour of Cæsar, and the bounty of the senate. He told him, likewise of the just and ancient alliance between the Romans and the Æduans; of the many honourable decrees of the senate in their favour; that they had always held the first rank and authority in Gaul, even before their alliance with Rome; that it was the constant maxim of the Roman people, not only to defend their friends and allies in the possession of their just rights, but

likewise to study the enlargement of their honour, interest, and dignity; that it could never therefore be supposed they would submit to see them stripped of those privileges which had belonged to them before they were received into their friendship. In fine, he concluded with repeating the same demands which he had before made by his ambassadors: "that he would not make war on the Æduans or their allies; that he would restore their hostages; that if he could not oblige any of the Germans to repass the Rhine, at least he would suffer no more of them to come into Gaul."

35. Ariovistus spoke little to Cæsar's demands, but enlarged greatly on his own virtues: "that he had crossed the Rhine, not of his own motion, but invited and intreated by the Gauls themselves; that the great hopes and expectations they had given him had been his only inducement to quit his country and relations; that he had settlements in Gaul assigned by the Gauls themselves, hostages voluntarily sent, and a tribute in consequence of the rights of war; it being the constant practice of conquerors to impose that mark of subjection on those they had subdued: that he had not made war on the Gauls, but the Gauls on him: that though all their several states had united against him, and brought up their forces with design to crush him, he had yet found means to vanquish and disperse them in one battle: that if they were again resolved to try the fortune of war, he was ready and prepared to receive them; but if they rather chose peace, it was unjust in them to refuse a tribute which they had hitherto voluntarily paid: that the friendship of the people of Rome ought to be an honour and security to him, not a detriment, nor had he courted it in any other view; but if by their alliance he must submit to lose his tributes and his right over the people he had subdued, he was no less willing to give it up than he had been ambitious to obtain it: that he had

indeed brought over a multitude of Germans into Gaul, yet not with any design of disturbing the country, but merely for his own security, as appeared by his not coming but at the request of the natives, and his not attacking them, but defending himself: that his arrival in Gaul was prior to that of the Romans, whose army had never till that time passed the boundaries of their own province. What could they mean by coming into a country that belonged to him? Or why should they concern themselves with a part of Gaul that was no less his property than the province itself was that of the people of Rome? If it would not be allowable in him to make any attempt on their possessions, neither could they, without injustice, disturb him in the enjoyment of his rights: that as to the pretence of alliance between the Romans and Æduans, he was not so much a barbarian, nor so wholly a stranger to the affairs of the world, as not to know, that neither had the Æduans assisted the Romans in the late war against the Allobrogi, nor received any assistance from them in their many conflicts with himself and the Sequani: that he ought to be jealous of Cæsar's pretended regard to the Æduans, and had but too much reason to suspect that the continuance of the Roman army in Gaul could be with no other design than that of oppressing him: that if he did not therefore depart, and withdraw his troops out of those parts, he would no longer look on him as a friend, but an enemy: that he was well assured, should he even slay him in battle, he should do a pleasure to many of the nobles and great men at Rome, who had explained themselves to him by couriers, and whose favour and friendship he might procure by his death; but that if he would retire, and leave him in the undisturbed possession of Gaul, he would not only amply reward him, but engage at his own cost and hazard, to put an end to any war Cæsar should think fit to undertake."

36. Many reasons were offered by Cæsar, in return to this speech, why he could not depart from his first demands: "that neither his own honour, nor that of the people of Rome, would suffer him to abandon allies, who had deserved so well of the commonwealth: that it no way appeared to him wherein Ariovistus had a juster claim to the possession of Gaul than the Romans: that the Averni and Ruteni had been subdued by Q. Fabius Maximus, who yet, contented with their submission, had neither reduced their country into a province, nor subjected it to a tribute: that if antiquity of title was to decide, the Romans had an undoubted right to the sovereignty of Gaul: if, on the contrary, the decree of the senate was to take place, Gaul must remain free, and subject only to its own laws."

37. While these things passed at the interview, Cæsar was informed that Ariovistus' cavalry were drawing nearer the mount, and had even assaulted the Romans with stones and darts. Cæsar immediately broke off the conference, retreated to his own men, and strictly charged them to forbear all acts of hostility towards the enemy. He did not fear the success of an action, with that chosen legion, against the German cavalry; but he was willing to maintain a conduct perfectly clear, and not give the enemy the least handle to assert that they had been treacherously drawn into an ambuscade by a pretended conference. When it was known in the camp with what haughtiness Ariovistus had behaved at the interview; that he had ordered the Romans out of Gaul; that his cavalry had fallen on Cæsar's guard, and that an end had thereby been put to the conference, a much greater alacrity and desire of fighting spread themselves through the whole army.

38. Two days after Ariovistus sent ambassadors to Cæsar, to propose a renewal of the negotiation begun; and that he would either again appoint a day for a conference, or depute some one to bring the

treaty to a conclusion. Cæsar saw no reason for granting a second interview ; more especially when he considered that the time before the Germans could not be restrained from falling on our men. Neither was he inclined to send any of his principal officers ; it seeming too great a venture to expose them to the perfidy of these barbarians. He therefore cast his eyes on C. Valerius Procillus, the son of C. Valerius Caburus, a young man of great merit and politeness, whose father had been made free of the city by C. Valerius Flaccus. His singular integrity, and knowledge of the language of the Gauls, which Ariovistus, by reason of long stay in those parts, spoke readily, fitted him in a particular manner for this embassy : and as he was likewise one towards whom it would no way avail the Germans to use any treachery, he thought him less liable to an insult of that kind. M. Mettius was joined in commission with him, who was allied to Ariovistus by the rights of hospitality. Their instructions were, to hear the German's proposals, and carry back a report of them to Cæsar. But no sooner were they arrived in Ariovistus' camp than, in presence of the whole army, calling out to know their business, and whether they were come as spies, he commanded them to be put in irons, without suffering them to make any reply.

39. The same day he came forward with all his forces, and lodged himself under a hill, about six miles from our camp. The day after he went two miles beyond it, to cut off Cæsar's communication with the Æduans and Sequani, from whom he received all his provisions. Cæsar, for five days continually, drew up his men in order of battle before the camp, that if Ariovistus had a mind, he might not be without an opportunity of coming to an engagement. The Germans kept all that time within their lines ; only we had daily skirmishes with their cavalry, whose manner of fighting was this. They

had about six thousand horse, who chose a like number out of the foot, each his man, and all remarkable for strength and agility. These continually accompanied them in battle, and served as a rear-guard, to which, when hard pressed, they might retire : if the action became dangerous, they advanced to their relief ; if any horseman was considerably wounded, and fell from his horse, they gathered round to defend him ; if speed was required, either for a hasty pursuit, or sudden retreat, they were become so nimble and alert by continual exercise, that laying hold of the manes of the horses, they could run as fast as they.

40. Cæsar finding that Ariovistus declined a battle, thought it necessary to provide for the freedom of his convoys. With this view he marked out a place for a camp, six hundred paces beyond that of the enemy, whither he marched with his whole army drawn up in three lines. The first and second line had orders to continue under arms, and the third to employ themselves in fortifying the camp. Ariovistus sent sixteen thousand light-armed foot, and all his horse, to alarm our men, and hinder the work. But Cæsar remained firm to his first design, ordering the two lines that continued under arms to keep off the enemy, and the third to go on with the intrenchments. The work being finished, he left two legions there, with part of the auxiliaries, and carried back the other four to his former camp. The next day he assembled all his troops from both camps, drew them up according to custom, and offered the enemy battle ; but they still refusing to come to an engagement, he retired again about noon. Ariovistus then detached part of his forces to attack the lesser camp. A sharp conflict ensued that lasted till night. At sunset Ariovistus thought proper to sound a retreat, after many wounds given and received. Cæsar inquiring of the prisoners why Ariovistus so obstinately refused an engagement, found

that it was the custom among the Germans for the women to decide, by lots and divination, when it was proper to hazard a battle; and that these had declared the army could not be victorious, if they fought before the new moon.

41. The day after, Cæsar having left a sufficient guard in his two camps, ranged all the auxiliary troops before the lesser camp, placing them directly in view of the enemy for the greater show, because the number of legionary soldiers was but inconsiderable, compared with that of the Germans. Then advancing at the head of all his forces in three lines, he marched quite up to the enemy's camp. On this the Germans, compelled by necessity, appeared before their intrenchments, and having distributed their troops by nations, and disposed them at equal distances one from another, the Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusians, and Suevians, encompassed the whole army with a line of carriages to take away all hopes of safety by flight. The women mounted on these carriages, weeping and tearing their hair, conjured the soldiers, as they advanced to battle, not to suffer them to become slaves to the Romans. Cæsar, having appointed a lieutenant and questor to each legion, to serve as witnesses of every man's courage and behaviour, began the battle in person at the head of the right wing, observing the enemy to be weakest on that side. The signal being given, our men charged so briskly, and the enemy advanced so swiftly and so suddenly to meet them, that the Romans, not having time to throw their darts, betook themselves immediately to their swords; but the Germans, quickly casting themselves into a phalanx, according to the custom of their country, sustained the shock with great firmness. Many of our soldiers leaped on the phalanx, tore up the bucklers of the enemy with their hands, and wounded them that lay under them. Their left wing was soon routed and put to flight;

CÆS. VOL. I.—F

but on the right they had the advantage, and were like to overpower the Romans by their number. Young Crassus, who commanded the cavalry, and was more at liberty than those immediately engaged in the fight, observing this, made the third line advance to support them. On this the battle was renewed, and the enemy everywhere put to the rout; nor did they cease their flight till they had reached the banks of the Rhine, about fifty miles distant from the place of combat. There only a few escaped, some by swimming, others by boats. Of this last number was Ariovistus, who, embarking in a small vessel he found by the edge of the river, got safe to the other side: all the rest were cut to pieces in the pursuit by our cavalry. Ariovistus had two wives, one a Suevian, whom he had brought with him from Germany; the other a Norican, sister to King Vocion, whom he had married in Gaul; both perished in this flight. Of his two daughters, one was killed, the other taken prisoner. C. Valerius Presillus, whom his keepers dragged after them in their flight, bound with a triple chain, fell in with Cæsar in person as he was pursuing the German cavalry. Nor was the victory itself more grateful to that general than his good fortune in recovering out of the hands of the enemy a man the most distinguished for his probity of the whole province of Gaul, his intimate and familiar friend; and to find the joy and success of that day no way diminished or clouded by the loss of a person he so highly esteemed. Procillus told him that lots had been thrice drawn in his own presence, to decide whether he should be burnt alive on the spot, or reserved for another time, and that the lot, three times favourable, had preserved his life. Mettius was likewise recovered and brought.

42. This battle being reported beyond the Rhine, the Suevians, who were advanced as far as the banks of that river, thought proper to return to their own

country; but retreating in disorder and confusion, they were attacked by the Ubians, a people bordering on the Rhine, and many of them cut to pieces. Cæsar having in one campaign put an end to two very considerable wars, went into winter-quarters somewhat sooner than the season of the year required. He distributed his army among the Sequani, left Labienus to command in his absence, and set out himself for Cisalpine Gaul, to preside in the assembly of the states.

BOOK II.

1. IN the winter, while Cæsar was in Hither Gaul, as we have intimated above, he was alarmed by frequent reports, which were also confirmed by letters from Labienus, that all the Belgians, who, as has been said, possessed one of the three divisions of Gaul, had joined in a league against the people of Rome, and ratified it by an exchange of hostages. The causes of this confederacy were: first, their fear lest the Romans, having subdued all the rest of Gaul, should next turn their arms against them; and then the persuasions and importunity of some among the Celtæ, many of whom, as they had greatly disliked the neighbourhood of the Germans in Gaul, so were they no less displeased to see a Roman army take up winter-quarters and grow habitual in the country; others, from a levity and inconstancy of temper, were fond of every project that tended to a revolution. In fine, some were influenced by ambitious views, it being usual in Gaul for such as were most powerful in their several states, and had men and money at command, to exercise a kind of sovereignty over their fellow-subjects, which they

foresaw would be greatly checked by the authority and credit of the Romans in Gaul.

2. Cæsar, roused by these messages and reports, levied two new legions in Hither Gaul, and early in the spring sent Q. Pedius, his lieutenant, to conduct them over the Alps. Himself, as soon as there began to be forage in the fields, came to the army; he commissioned the Senones, and other Gauls who bordered on the Belgians, to inform themselves of the motions and designs of the confederates, and send him from time to time an exact account. They all agreed in their reports, that they were levying troops, and drawing their forces to a general rendezvous: whereon, thinking he ought no longer to delay marching against them, and having settled the necessary supplies for his army, he decamped, and in fifteen days arrived on the confines of the Belgians.

3. As his approach was sudden, and much earlier than had been expected, the Rhemi, who of all the Belgians lay the nearest to Celtic Gaul, despatched Iccius and Autobrigius, the two principal men of their state, to represent to Cæsar, "that they put themselves and fortunes under the power and protection of the Romans, as having neither approved of the designs of the rest of the Belgians, nor had any share in their confederacy against the people of Rome: that, on the contrary, they were ready to give hostages, to execute his commands, to receive him into their towns, and to furnish him with corn and other supplies for his army; that indeed the rest of the Belgians were all in arms, and that the Germans on this side the Rhine had associated with them: nay, that so universal and prevalent was the infatuation, they had not even been able to draw off the Suessiones, a people united to them by the nearest ties of blood and friendship, who were subject to the same laws, lived under the same form

of government, and acknowledged but one common magistrate.”

4. Cæsar inquiring of the ambassadors what states had taken up arms, of what name and consideration, and what forces they could bring into the field, found that the Belgians were for the most part Germans originally, who, having formerly crossed the Rhine, had been drawn by the fertility of the country to settle in those parts, after driving out the ancient inhabitants; that in the late eruption of the Teutones and Cimbri, when all the other provinces of Gaul were overrun, they alone had ventured to stand on their defence, nor suffered the barbarians to set foot in their territories; whence it happened, that presuming on so well known an instance of their bravery, they laid claim to great authority, and challenged high military renown. As to their numbers, the Rhemi told him they could give him the most exact information, because in consequence of their affinity and neighbourhood, they had opportunities of knowing what quota of men each particular state had promised to furnish in the common council of Belgium. “That the Bellovaci held the most distinguished rank, as surpassing all the other states in prowess, authority, and number of forces; that they were able to muster a hundred thousand fighting men, and had promised out of that number sixty thousand chosen troops, in consideration of which they demanded the whole administration of the war. That next to them in dignity were the Suessiones, a people bordering on their own territories, and possessed of a very large and fruitful country, over which even of late years, Divitiacus had been king, one of the most powerful princes of all Gaul, and who, besides his dominions in those parts, reigned also over Britain; that their present sovereign was Galba, whose singular prudence and justice had procured him, by the consent of all the confederates, the supreme command in the war: that these had

within their territories twelve fortified towns, and promised to bring into the field fifty thousand men: that the like number had been stipulated by the Nervians, who, inhabiting the remotest provinces of Gaul, were esteemed the most fierce and warlike of all the Belgian nations: that the Atrebatians were to furnish fifteen thousand, the Ambiani ten thousand, the Morini twenty-five thousand, the Menapians nine thousand, the Caletes ten thousand, the Velocassians and Veromanduan the like number; the Atuatici twenty-nine thousand; and the Condrusians, Eburonès, Ceresians, and Pæmani, all comprehended under the common name of Germans, forty thousand.

5. Cæsar exhorting the men of Rheims to continue firm in their alliance, and promising amply to reward their fidelity, ordered the whole body of their senate to repair to his camp, and the sons of their principal nobility to be brought him as hostages, all which was accordingly performed by the day appointed. He then addressed himself to Divitiacus, the Æduan, representing, in the warmest manner, of what consequence it was to the common cause to divide the forces of the enemy, that he might not be reduced to the necessity of encountering so great a multitude at once. This, he told him, might easily be effected, if the Æduans would march their forces into the territories of the Bellovacî, to plunder and lay waste the country. With these instructions he dismissed them.

6. Meantime, being informed by his scouts and the people of Rheims, that all the forces of the Belgians were marching towards him in a body, and that they were even advanced within a few miles, he made all the haste he could to pass his army over the Axona, which divides the Rhemi from the rest of the Belgians, and encamped on the farther side of that river. By this situation he secured all behind him, covered one side of his camp with the river,

and rendered the communication with the Rhemi, and those other states whence he expected to be supplied with provisions, safe and easy. Adjoining to his camp was a bridge over the river; there he placed a strong guard, and left Q. Titurius Sabinus, his lieutenant, on the other side, with six cohorts. He then drew round his camp a ditch eighteen feet broad, strengthened with a rampart twelve feet high.

7. The Belgians, in their march, fell furiously on Bibrax, a town belonging to the Rhemi, about eight miles distant from Cæsar's camp. The inhabitants, with great difficulty, held out against that day's assault. The manner of storming a town is the same among the Belgians as among the Gauls; for having surrounded the walls with the whole body of their army, and by a continual discharge from their slings cleared the ramparts, they approach the gates under covert of their bucklers, and undermine the walls. This was easy in the present case, because the multitude employed in throwing stones and darts was so great, that none of the garrison durst appear on the walls. When night had put an end to the assault, Iccius, who then commanded in the town, a man of principal rank and authority among the Rhemi, and one of those who had come ambassadors to Cæsar to treat about a peace, despatched messengers to acquaint him, that unless he was speedily relieved, it would be impossible for him to hold out any longer.

8. Hereon Cæsar, making use of those for guides who had come express to his camp from Iccius, detached about midnight a party of Cretan and Numidian archers, with some Balearean slingers, to the assistance of the garrison. Their arrival encouraged the besieged to stand on their defence, and inspired them with hopes of repulsing the enemy, who now began to despair of success, when they heard that a reinforcement had entered the town. Wherefore, after a short stay before the place, hav-

ing plundered all the country round about, and burnt the houses and villages wherever they came, they marched in a body towards Cæsar's camp, and posted themselves within two miles of his army, inclosing a space of more than eight thousand paces in circumference, as near as could be computed from the smoke and fires of their camp.

9. Cæsar at first resolved to avoid coming to a battle, as well on account of the numbers of the enemy, as the high opinion entertained of their courage. He suffered the horse, however, to engage daily in small skirmishes, that he might the better judge of the valour of the Belgian troops, and the resolution and bravery of his own men. Finding that the Romans were nothing inferior to their enemy in courage, he resolved to wait for them before his camp; the ground being very commodious, and as it were formed by nature for the reception of an army: for the hill on which the camp stood, rising with an easy ascent from the plain, was but just of a sufficient breadth on the side facing the enemy to receive the several lines of the army, drawn up in order of battle. On the right-hand and on the left the descent was steep, whereby the mountain swelling in front, but gradually abating its declivity as you advanced towards the bottom, came at last to a plain. Along each side of the hill Cæsar dug a trench of about four hundred paces in length, and built forts at the extremities, where he placed engines to repulse the enemy, should they offer to attack him in flank, or endeavour during the fight to surround him with their numbers. These dispositions being made, and having left the two new-levied legions in his camp, as a body of reserve in case of need, he drew up the other six in order of battle. The Belgians likewise drew up their troops, and stood fronting our army.

10. Between Cæsar and the enemy there was a small morass. The Belgians waited to see if we would pass it: our men, on the other hand, were

ready in arms, that, should the enemy attempt to come over, they might fall on them, and take advantage of their confusion. Meantime the cavalry on both sides engaged ; but as neither army would hazard the passage of the morass, Cæsar, who had the better in the skirmish of the horse, led back his men to their camp. The Belgians marched directly towards the Axona, which, as we have said, lay behind our camp, and, having found a ford, endeavoured to pass over part of their army. Their design was, if possible, to make themselves masters of the fort where Q. Titurius commanded, and break down the bridge, or, should they fail in that attempt, to ravage and lay waste the territories of the Rhemi, whence our army was supplied with provisions.

11. Cæsar being informed of these things by Titurius, crossed the bridge with his cavalry, light-armed Numidians, archers, and slingers, and marched to attack the enemy. A very sharp conflict ensued ; for the Romans falling on them while they were yet passing the river, and by reason of their disorder unable to defend themselves, slew great numbers. The rest, who with undaunted courage advanced on the bodies of their companions, were repulsed by the multitude of darts from our men ; and the cavalry surrounding those that were already got over, put them all to the sword. The Belgians being thus disappointed, both in their design on Bibrax, and the passage of the Axona, finding too that provisions began to be scarce, and that our army could not be drawn to fight them at a disadvantage, called a council of war. It was there judged most expedient to separate, and return every man to his own country, with a resolution, however, to assemble from all parts, in defence of that state whose territories should be first invaded by the Romans : for they concluded it much safer to carry on the war at home, where they might have provisions and every thing at command, than venture a battle within the confines of a foreign state.

These reasons were at the same time backed by a still more powerful consideration ; for the Bellovaci having intelligence that Divitiacus and the Æduans were advancing towards their territories, could not be restrained from marching directly homewards, to defend their own country.

12. This resolution being taken about the second watch of the night they left their camp with great noise and tumult, regarding neither the order of their march, nor the due subordination of command, but each man pressing for the foremost rank, that he might get the sooner home ; insomuch that their retreat had all the appearance of a precipitate flight. Cæsar, who had immediate notice of this from his spies, apprehending some stratagem, because he as yet knew nothing of the reason of their departure, would not stir out of his trenches. But early in the morning, on more certain intelligence of their retreat, he detached all the cavalry, under Q. Pedius and Arunculeius Cotta, his lieutenants, to harass and retard them in their march. T. Labienus had orders to follow with three legions. These falling on their rear, and pursuing them many miles, made a dreadful slaughter of the flying troops. While the rear, on finding themselves attacked, faced about and valiantly sustained the charge of our men, the vanguard, as fancying themselves out of danger, were not to be restrained either by necessity or the voice of their commanders, but on hearing the alarm behind them broke their ranks, and betook themselves to flight. Thus the Romans, with little or no loss on their side, continued the slaughter all the remaining part of the day. About sunset they gave over the pursuit, and in obedience to the orders they had received, returned to their camp.

13. The next day, before the enemy had time to rally, or recover out of their consternation, Cæsar led his army into the territories of the Suessiones, which join to those of the Rhemi ; and after a long

march reached Noviodunum. He was in hopes of carrying the town by assault, because he understood it was destitute of a garrison ; but as the ditch was broad, and the wall very high, the defendants, though few in number, withstood all his efforts ; wherefore, having fortified his camp, he began to provide engines, and get every thing in readiness for a siege. Meantime such of the Suessiones as had escaped the late slaughter threw themselves during the night into the town. But Cæsar advancing his preparations with great expedition, and approaching under cover of his mantelets to the very walls, where he cast up a mount and planted his battering towers, the Gauls astonished at the greatness of the works, as having never seen or heard of any such before, and at the despatch wherewith they were carried on, sent deputies to treat about a surrender, and by the mediation of the Rhemi obtained conditions of peace.

14. Cæsar, having received the principal men of their state as hostages, among whom were the two sons of Galba, their king, and obliged them to deliver up all their arms, admitted the Suessiones to a surrender, and led his army against the Bellovaci. These, retiring with their effects into Bratuspantium, their capital city, and understanding that Cæsar was advanced within five miles of the town, sent a deputation of all their old men, who came forth in venerable procession to meet him, signifying, by outstretched hands, and in the most submissive terms, that they put themselves under his power and protection, nor pretended to appear in arms against the people of Rome ; and when he approached still nearer the city, and encamped within view of the walls, the women and children from the ramparts, with extended arms, according to the custom of their country, besought the Romans for peace.

15. Hereon Divitiacus, who, after the retreat of the Belgian army, had dismissed the Æduans, and

returned to Cæsar's camp, interposed in their behalf, representing "that the Bellovaci had always lived in strict friendship and alliance with the Æduans: that the artful insinuations of their chiefs, who misrepresented Cæsar as one that had enslaved the Æduan state, and held it under an ignominious tyranny and oppression, had alone induced them to forsake their ancient allies, and take up arms against the people of Rome: that the authors of this advice, seeing its pernicious effects, and the ruin they had brought on their country, were retired into Britain: that not only the Bellovaci themselves, but the Æduans too, in their behalf, implored his clemency and forgiveness: that in granting their request, he would greatly enlarge the credit and authority of the Æduans among the Belgian states; which was of so much the greater moment, as in all their wars they were wont to have recourse to them for assistance." Cæsar, out of regard to Divitiacus and the Æduans, promised to grant them pardon and protection; but as they were possessed of very extensive territories, and surpassed in power and number of forces all the other Belgian states, he demanded six hundred hostages.

16. These being accordingly delivered, together with all their arms, Cæsar left their city, and advanced into the country of the Ambiani, who submitted immediately on his approach. Adjoining to them were the Nervians: of whose manners and genius Cæsar inquiring, found "that they suffered no resort of merchants into their cities, nor would allow of the importation of wine, or other commodities tending to luxury; as imagining that thereby the minds of men were enfeebled, and their martial fire and courage extinguished: that they were men of a warlike spirit, but altogether unacquainted with the refinements of life: that they continually inveighed against the rest of the Belgians, for ignominiously submitting to the Roman

yoke, and abandoning the steady bravery of their ancestors. In fine, that they had openly declared their resolution of neither sending ambassadors to Cæsar, nor accepting any terms of peace." Cæsar, after a march of three days across their territories, understood from some prisoners "that he was now advanced within ten miles of the Sambre, on the other side of which the enemy had posted themselves, and there waited the coming up of the Romans: that they had been joined by the Atrebatians and Veromanduan, neighbouring nations, whom they had persuaded to take part in, and share the fortune of the war: that they expected also to be reinforced by the Atuatici, who were already on their march: and that all their women, and such as on account of their age were unfit to bear arms, had been conveyed to a place of safety, inaccessible by reason of the marshes that surrounded it."

17. Cæsar, on this intelligence, sent his scouts and centurions before to choose out a convenient place for his camp. Meantime, as many of the Belgians who had lately submitted, and also not a few Gauls, followed the Roman army; some of these, as was afterward known from the prisoners, observing the order and disposition of our march, deserted in the night to the enemy, and informed them "that the several legions were separated from one another by a number of carriages posted between them: that they would therefore have a favourable opportunity, as soon as the first legion had arrived in the camp, and while the rest were yet a great way behind, of falling on it encumbered with the baggage, and obtaining an easy victory; by which, and the plunder of the carriages, they would strike such a terror through the whole army as must necessarily draw after it a total defeat." This advice was the more readily listened to, because of old, the Nervians, being very weak in horse (nor even as yet have they greatly increased their

CÆS. VOL. I.—G

strength this way, placing their whole confidence in their foot), in order to secure themselves against the inroads of the cavalry of the neighbouring nations, had everywhere fortified the country with barricadoes of young trees; which being split in the middle, and bent down on both sides, the void spaces were so closely interwoven with brambles, thorns, and a multitude of boughs, issuing from the trees themselves, that they formed a fence not only impossible to be passed, but even to be seen through. As these, therefore, must greatly impede and perplex the march of the Roman army, they thought the advice given them by the Belgians was by no means to be neglected.

18. The place chosen by our men for their camp was a hill, running with an even descent from the summit till it reached the banks of the Sambre. Directly opposite to this, on the farther side of the river, and at the distance of about two hundred paces, was another hill, of a like acclivity with the former, plain and open round the bottom, but covered on the top with woods, so thick that they hindered the prospect. Among these woods the enemy lay concealed, and only a few squadrons of horse appeared on the open ground by the river side, whose depth in that place did not exceed three feet.

19. Cæsar having sent the cavalry before, followed himself with the rest of the army. But the order and disposition of his march differed from the account given in to the enemy by the Belgians: for knowing that the Nervians were near, he led up six legions in front, ready equipped for battle, according to his usual custom. After them followed the baggage of the whole army; and then the two new legions, who closed the march, and served as a guard to the carriages. Meantime the Roman cavalry, with the slingers and archers, having passed the river, engaged the enemies' horse: but as they retired from time to time into the woods, and again

sallied on our men, who durst not pursue them beyond the open ground, the six legions that formed the van, coming up during these successive encounters, began to intrench themselves. When the first line of our carriages appeared within sight of those that lay concealed in the woods, which was the time previously concerted by the enemy for giving the onset, the Nervians, who stood ready drawn up within the thicket, and had mutually exhorted one another to a resolute behaviour, rushed suddenly forward with all their forces, and fell furiously on our cavalry. These being easily repulsed and broken, they ran down with incredible speed to the Sambre; insomuch, that at one and the same instant they seemed to be in the woods, in the river, and charging our men on the other side. Nor were they less expeditious in mounting the hill, and attacking those who were employed in fortifying the camp.

20. Now had Cæsar all the parts of a general on his hands at once: to erect the standard, which was the signal for the men to fly to arms; to proclaim the battle by sound of trumpet; to draw off the soldiers from the works; to recall those that were gone to fetch materials for the rampart, to draw up the army in order of battle, to encourage his men, and give the word of onset; in most of which he was prevented by the shortness of the time, and the sudden assault of the enemy. In this emergency two things chiefly contributed to the preservation of the Romans: one, the ability and experience of the soldiers, who, practised in former battles, knew their duty, and what was expedient in the present conjuncture, no less than the officers themselves; the other, the orders given by Cæsar to his several lieutenants not to quit the works and the legions where they commanded till the fortifications of the camp were finished; for these, on seeing the danger and sudden approach of the enemy, waited not for

new instructions from the general, but gave forth such orders as their own prudence and the present necessity suggested.

21. Cæsar having made the necessary dispositions, ran to encourage his men ; and, as chance ordered it, fell in with the tenth legion. When exhorting them in few words to exert their wonted bravery, and manfully sustain the assault without terror or dismay, as he saw the enemy within reach of dart, he gave the signal to engage. Hastening thence to another quarter of the field, he found the battle already begun. So short was the time allowed us to prepare ourselves, and such the resolution and impetuosity of the Nervians in rushing to the encounter, that neither could the officers find leisure to regulate the ensigns, nor the soldiers to put on their helmets, or uncase their targets. Each man, as he arrived from the works, joined himself to the first standard that came in his way, that he might not lose that time in looking for his own company which was to be employed in fighting the enemy.

22. The army being drawn up rather according to the nature of the place, the declivity of the hill, and the particular necessity of the time, than agreeably to order and the rules of war, as the legions were forced to engage separately, some in one place, some in another, and the view of the fight was everywhere interrupted by the thick hedges described above, it was not possible in these circumstances to distinguish with any certainty where to send the necessary supplies, how to provide against the exigences of the field, nor indeed for one man to have an eye to all the occurrences that called for notice and redress. In such an unequal situation of things, therefore, much room was left for the various events and interposition of fortune.

23. The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legions, who were on the left of the army, having cast their darts, advanced against the Atrebatians, with whom

it was their fortune to engage. These, now weary, breathless, and overpowered with wounds, were quickly driven from the higher ground quite back to the Sambre ; where the Romans, still pressing them sword in hand, slew great numbers as they endeavoured to pass the river. Nor did our men decline pursuing them to the other side ; but following too far, till they were drawn into a place of disadvantage, the enemy suddenly faced about, and renewed the charge ; yet were a second time obliged to betake themselves to flight. So, likewise, in another quarter of the field, the eleventh and eighth legions, having overthrown the Veromandians, against whom they fought, drove them from the higher ground to the very banks of the river.

24. As by this means the front and left side of the Roman camp lay in a manner quite exposed (for the twelfth legion, and not far from that the seventh, were posted in the right wing), the Nervians, headed by Boduognatus, their king, advanced thither in a close body ; and while one party endeavoured to surround the legions by taking them in flank, the rest mounted the hill, in order to get possession of the camp. At the same time our cavalry, with the light-armed infantry, who in the very beginning of the engagement had been repulsed and broken, as we have related above, returning to the camp, and meeting the enemy in front, again betook themselves to flight. The servants too of the army, who from the top of the hill had beheld our men victorious, and pursuing the enemy across the river, having sallied out for the sake of plunder, when they now looked back and saw the Nervians in possession of the camp, fled with the utmost precipitation. This confusion was still more increased by the clamour and uproar of those that attended the carriages ; in-somuch, that the panic spreading on all sides, each man thought of providing for his safety by flight. The cavalry of Treves, who were in the highest

esteem among the Gauls for their valour, and had been sent by the state to reinforce Cæsar's army, alarmed by these several appearances, when they saw our camp filled with multitudes of the enemy, the legions overpowered, and in a manner quite surrounded; the horse, archers, slingers, and Numidians routed, dispersed, and flying on all hands; imagining all was lost, returned to their own country, and reported that the Romans were utterly overthrown, and their camp and baggage in possession of the enemy.

25. Cæsar, having encouraged the tenth legion, hastened to the right wing of the army. He there found his men overpowered by the enemy; the ensigns of the twelfth legion all crowded into one place, and the soldiers themselves standing so close together, that they had not room to use their arms; all the centurions of the fourth cohort slain, the standard-bearer killed, and the standard taken; the centurions of the other cohorts almost all either killed or dangerously wounded; among these P. Sextius Baculus, the first centurion of the legion, a man of great courage, so weakened by the multitude of his wounds that he was hardly able to support himself; the rest discouraged, and avoiding the fight, and some even running away, because abandoned by the troops that were to sustain them; the enemy pressing vigorously in front from the lower ground, at the same time flanking the legions on either side with great fury: in a word, things reduced to the last extremity, and no body of reserve to restore the battle. Whereon, snatching a buckler from a soldier who stood in the rear of the legion, for he himself was come hither without one, and pressing to the front of the battle, he called the centurions by name, encouraged the rest, and commanded the soldiers to advance the ensigns, and widen their ranks, that they might be the more at liberty to use their swords. His arrival inspiring the men with hope, and reviving

their courage, as every one was ambitious of distinguishing himself in the presence of his general, and even in his greatest extremity, redoubled his efforts, the progress of the enemy was a little checked.

26. Cæsar observing that the seventh legion, which fought at some distance from the other, was likewise very much pressed by the enemy, commanded the military tribunes to draw the two legions together by degrees, and joining them back to back, oppose the enemy with a double front. This being done, as they were now in a condition to support each other, and no longer feared being surrounded, they began to make a more vigorous opposition, and fight with greater courage. Meantime the two new legions that formed the rear of our army, and had been appointed to guard the baggage, hearing of the battle, advanced with all possible speed, and were seen by the Nervians from the top of the hill; and T. Labienus, who had made himself master of the enemy's camp, observing from the higher ground how matters went on our side, detached the tenth legion to our assistance. These understanding by the flight of our cavalry and servants the distress we were in, and the danger that threatened the camp, the legions and the general made all the haste they could to join us.

27. The arrival of this detachment produced so great a change in our favour, that many of the soldiers, who before lay oppressed with wounds, now resuming courage, and supporting themselves with their shields, renewed the fight. Nay, the very servants of the camp, observing the consternation of the enemy, unarmed as they were, rushed among their armed battalions. The cavalry, too, striving by extraordinary efforts of valour to wipe away the ignominy of their late flight, charged the enemy in all places where the void spaces between the legions suffered them to advance. Meantime the Nervians, though now reduced to the last extremity, exerted

themselves with such determined courage, that their front ranks being cut off, those who stood behind mounted the bodies of the slain, and thence continued to maintain the fight; and when these too by their fall had raised a mountain of carcasses, such as remained ascending the pile, poured their javelins on us as from a rampart, and even returned the darts thrown at them by our men. Fame therefore deceived not in proclaiming so loudly the bravery of a people, who thus ventured to cross a very broad river, to climb the steepest banks, and rush on an enemy possessed of all the advantages of ground: difficulties which though seemingly insurmountable, appeared yet as nothing to men of their resolution and magnanimity.

28. The battle being ended, and the name and nation of the Nervians in a manner quite extinguished, the old men (who, with the women and children, as we have related above, had been conveyed into a place surrounded with bogs and marshes), hearing of this terrible overthrow, and judging that nothing would be able to stop the progress of the conquerors, or protect the conquered from their victorious arms, resolved with the consent of all that survived the late disaster, to send ambassadors to Cæsar and surrender themselves. These in reciting the calamities of their country, represented, that of six hundred senators, there remained only three; and that from sixty thousand fighting men they were reduced to five hundred. Cæsar, as a proof of his compassion towards this brave and unfortunate people, readily took them under his protection; allowing them free and full possession of their towns and territories, and strictly commanding all the neighbouring nations to abstain from injuries and wrongs.

29. The Atuatici, of whom mention has been made above, being on their march with all their forces to join the Nervians, and hearing of their defeat, immediately returned home; when, abandoning

all their other towns and castles, they conveyed themselves and their riches into a place of great strength, which nature had fortified with uncommon care; for it was on every side surrounded with high rocks and precipices, having only one avenue of about two hundred feet broad, that approached the town with a gentle rising. Here they raised a double wall of prodigious height, whereon, as a further security, they laid great numbers of huge stones and strong pointed beams. This people were descended from the Teutones and Cimbri, who, in their march towards the Alps and Italy, left their heavy baggage on this side the Rhine, with a detachment of six thousand men to guard it. These, after the final overthrow of their countrymen, being for many years harassed and persecuted by the neighbouring states, sometimes invading others, sometimes defending themselves, at last, with the consent of all the bordering nations, obtained peace, and chose this place for a habitation.

30. On the first arrival of the Roman army they made frequent sallies from the town, and engaged our men in small skirmishes. But Cæsar, having drawn a line of contravallation twelve feet high, fifteen miles in circumference, and everywhere well fortified with redoubts, they kept themselves within their walls. When we had now finished our approaches, cast up a mount, and were preparing a tower of assault behind the works, they began at first to deride us from the battlements, and in reproachful language ask the meaning of that prodigious engine raised at such a distance! With what hands or strength, men of our size and make (for the Gauls, who are for the most part very tall, despise the small stature of the Romans) could hope to bring forward so unwieldy a machine against their walls?

31. But when they saw it removed, and approaching near the town, astonished at the new and un-

usual appearance, they sent ambassadors to Cæsar to sue for peace. These being accordingly introduced, told him "that they doubted not but the Romans were aided in their wars by the gods themselves; it seeming to them a more than human task to transport with such facility an engine of that amazing height, by which they were brought on a level with their enemies, and enabled to engage them in close fight: that they therefore put themselves and fortunes into his hands, requesting only, that if his clemency and goodness, of which they had heard so much from others, had determined him to spare the *Atuatici*, he would not deprive them of their arms: that the neighbouring nations were almost all their enemies, as envying their superior valour; nor would it be possible for them to defend themselves from their attacks if their arms were taken away: in fine, that if such must be their fate, they would rather choose to undergo any fortune from the hands of the Romans than expose themselves to be cruelly butchered by those over whom they had been wont to exercise dominion."

32. To this Cæsar replied, "that in regard of his usual conduct on these occasions, rather than for any merit of theirs, he was willing to grant them terms of peace, provided they submitted before the battering-ram touched their walls; but that no surrender would be accepted unless they agreed to deliver up their arms: that he would take the same care of them as he had before done of the *Nervians*, and lay his express commands on the neighbouring nations to abstain from all injuries towards a people who had put themselves under the protection of the Romans." The ambassadors returning with this answer to their countrymen, they accepted in appearance the conditions offered them by Cæsar, and threw so vast a quantity of arms into the ditch before the town that the heap almost reached to the top of the wall. Nevertheless, as was afterward known,

they retained about a third part, and concealed them privately within the town. The gates being thrown open, they enjoyed peace for the remaining part of that day.

33. In the evening Cæsar ordered the gates to be shut, and the soldiers to quit the town, that no injury might be offered to the inhabitants during the night. Whereon the Atuatici, in consequence of a design they had before concerted, imagining that the Romans, after a surrender of the place, would either set no guard at all, or at least keep watch with less precaution, partly arming themselves with such weapons as they had privately retained, partly with targets made of bark or wicker, and covered over hastily with hides, made a furious sally about midnight with all their forces, and charged our works on that side where they seemed to be of easiest access.

34. The alarm being immediately given by lighting fires, as Cæsar had before commanded, the soldiers ran to the attack from the neighbouring forts. A very sharp conflict ensued; for the enemy, now driven to despair, and having no hope but in their valour, fought with all possible bravery, though the Romans had the advantage of the ground, and poured their javelins on them both from the towers and the top of the rampart. About four thousand were slain on the spot, and the rest obliged to retire into the town. Next day the gates were forced, no one offering to make the least resistance, and the army having taken possession of the place, the inhabitants, to the number of fifty-three thousand, were sold for slaves.

35. About the same time P. Crassus, whom Cæsar had sent with a legion against the Venetians, Unelians, Osismians, Curiosolitæ, Sesuvians, Aulerci, and Rhedones, maritime states inhabiting along the seacoast, despatched messengers to acquaint him

that all these nations had submitted to the dominion and authority of the Romans.

36. The campaign being ended, and all the provinces of Gaul subdued, such was the opinion conceived of this war among all the barbarians round about, that even the nations beyond the Rhine sent ambassadors to Cæsar, offering to give hostages and submit to his commands. But he being then in haste to return to Italy and Illyricum, ordered them to attend him the next spring. Meantime, having disposed his army into winter-quarters in the territories of the Andes, Turones, and Carnutes, which states lay the nearest to the provinces that had been the seat of the war, he himself set out for Italy. The senate, being informed of these successes by Cæsar's letters, decreed a thanksgiving of fifteen days; a number never allowed to any general before.

BOOK III.

1. CÆSAR, on his departure for Italy, sent Sergius Galba with the twelfth legion and part of the cavalry against the Nantuates, Veragrians, and Seduni, whose territories extend from the confines of the Allobrogians, the lake Lemanus, and the river Rhone, all the way to the top of the Alps. His design in this expedition was to open a free passage over those mountains to the Roman merchants, who had hitherto travelled them with great danger, and subject to many grievous exactions. Galba, whose orders also were to put the legion into winter-quarters in those parts, if he saw it necessary, after some successful encounters, and making himself master of several forts, was addressed by ambassadors from all nations round. Having settled the terms of peace, and received hostages for their

fidelity, he resolved to quarter two cohorts among the Nantuates, and himself, with the other cohorts, to winter in a town of the Veragrians, called Octodurus. This town, which is situated in the midst of a valley, on a plain of no great extent, is bounded on all sides by very high mountains. As it was divided into two parts by a river, he left one part to the Gauls, and assigned the other to his legion for their winter-quarters, commanding it to be fortified with a ditch and rampart.

2. After many days spent here, and that orders had been given for the bringing in of corn to supply the camp, he was suddenly informed by his spies that the Gauls had abandoned in the night that part of the city allotted to them, and that the impending mountains were covered with great multitudes of the Veragrians and Seduni. Many reasons conspired to induce the Gauls to this sudden resolution of renewing the war, and falling on our men. First, the small number of the Roman troops, who were therefore despised by the enemy, as not amounting in all to one legion; two entire cohorts having been detached, and even of those that remained with Galba, many being gone out in quest of provisions; and then their persuasion that by reason of the inequality of the ground, where it would be easy for them to pour on us from the tops of the mountains, and overwhelm us with their darts, our men would not be able to stand the very first assault. Add to all this, their inward regret at seeing their children torn from them under the name of hostages; and that they firmly believed it to be the design of the Romans, in seizing the summits of the mountains, not only to open a free passage over the Alps, but to secure to themselves the perpetual possession of those parts, and annex them to the adjoining province.

3. On this intelligence Galba, who had neither completed the fortifications of his camp, nor laid in sufficient store of corn and other provisions, as little

CÆS. VOL. I.—H

apprehending an insurrection of this kind among a people that had submitted and given hostages, having speedily assembled a council of war, began to ask their advice in the present exigence. As the danger which threatened them was sudden and unexpected, and as they saw the mountains on every side covered with multitudes of armed soldiers, insomuch that there was no room to hope either for succours or any convoys of provision, because the enemy were in possession of all the avenues to the camp; some believing the case to be altogether desperate, proposed to abandon the baggage, and attempt by a sally the recovery of their old quarters. But the greater number were for reserving this expedient to the last extremity, and in the mean time to wait the decision of fortune, and in the best manner they were able defend the camp.

4. After a short space, and even before there was sufficient time for putting in execution what had been resolved on, the enemy, at a signal given, came rushing on us from all parts, and began the assault by a shower of stones and darts. Our men at first made a brave and vigorous resistance, plying them with their javelins from the ramparts, whence not a single weapon was discharged in vain; and as any part of the camp appeared hard pressed for want of men to defend it, thither they ran, and made head against the assailants. But in this the Gauls had greatly the advantage, that when, fatigued with the length of the fight they found themselves under a necessity to retire, fresh men succeeded in their place; whereas on our side, by reason of the small number of troops, no resource of this kind was left: so that not only such as were wearied with fighting were yet obliged to continue at their posts, but we could not even permit the wounded to retire, or for a moment to abandon the charge.

5. The battle had now lasted upwards of six hours without intermission, insomuch, that the

Romans not only found their strength greatly exhausted, but even began to be in want of weapons wherewith to annoy the enemy. The Gauls, on the other hand, urged the combat with greater fury than ever, and meeting with but a faint resistance, fell to demolishing the rampart and filling up the ditch. All was giving way before them, when P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, the same who, as we have related above, received so many wounds in the battle against the Nervians, as likewise C. Volusenus, a military tribune, one equally distinguished for his conduct and bravery, came to Galba, and represented that the only refuge now left was by a sudden sally to put all on the issue of a bold attack. Accordingly Galba, calling the centurions together, by them gave immediate notice to the soldiers to keep for some time only on the defensive, and having provided themselves with the weapons thrown at them by the enemy, and a little recovered their strength, on a signal given to sally out of the camp, and place all their hopes of safety in their valour. These orders were exactly followed; and the Romans, rushing furiously on the enemy from all parts, neither gave them time to comprehend the meaning of so unexpected an attack, nor to recover out of the confusion into which it had thrown them. Thus fortune changing sides, they everywhere surrounded and put to the sword the Gauls, who had so lately entertained hopes of mastering our camp. Of thirty thousand armed troops, which number, as appeared afterward, were present in this assault, more than ten thousand perished in the field. The rest fled in great terror and confusion, and were even forced to abandon the summits of the mountains. The Romans, seeing the enemy entirely dispersed, and obliged everywhere to throw down their arms, quitted the pursuit, and retired within their intrenchments.

6. After this battle, Galba, unwilling a second time

to expose himself to the inconstancy of fortune, and besides, considering that he had met with an opposition he little expected when he first resolved to winter in these parts; above all, finding himself in great want of corn and forage, the next day set fire to the town, and began his march back into the province. As there was no enemy in the field to disturb or oppose him in his retreat, he brought the legion safe into the country of the Nantuates, and thence into the territories of the Allobrogi, where he put them into winter-quarters.

7. The insurrection being thus entirely quelled, Cæsar, for many reasons, believed that Gaul was now restored to a state of tranquillity. The Belgians had been overcome, the Germans expelled, and the Seduni and other inhabitants of the Alps forced to submit. He therefore, in the beginning of winter, ventured on a progress into Illyricum, from a desire he had to visit those nations, and acquaint himself with the country, when all on a sudden a new war broke out in Gaul. The occasion of it was as follows: the seventh legion, commanded by young Crassus, was quartered among the Andes, a people bordering on the ocean. As there was great scarcity of corn in these parts, Crassus sent some officers of the cavalry and military tribunes to solicit a supply from the neighbouring states. Of this number were T. Terrasidius, sent to the Eusubians; M. Trebius Gallus, to the Curiosolitæ; and Q. Velanius and T. Silius, to the Venetians.

8. This last state is by far the most powerful and considerable of all the nations inhabiting along the seacoast; and that not only on account of their vast shipping, wherewith they drive a mighty traffic to Britain, and their skill and experience in naval affairs, in which they greatly surpass the other maritime states; but because, lying on a large and open coast, against which the sea rages with great violence, and where the havens, being few in number,

are all subject to their jurisdiction, they have most of the nations that trade in those seas tributaries to their state. Among them the revolt began, by detaining Silius and Velanius, as by this means they hoped to recover the hostages they had put into the hands of Crassus. The neighbouring states, moved by their authority and example, as the Gauls are in general very sudden and forward in their resolves, detained for the same reason Trebius and Terrasidius, and speedily despatching ambassadors from one to another, they, by their princes, entered into a confederacy of acting in all things with common consent, and alike exposing themselves to the same issue of fortune, earnestly soliciting at the same time the other provinces rather to stand up in defence of that liberty they had received of their ancestors, than tamely submit to the ignominious yoke of the Romans. All the nations on the sea-coast coming readily into this alliance, they jointly sent ambassadors to Crassus, to acquaint him, "that if he expected to have his officers restored, he must first send them back their hostages."

9. Cæsar, having intelligence of these things from Crassus, and being then at a great distance from Gaul, ordered in the mean time that a number of galleys should be built on the Loire, a river which runs into the ocean; and that mariners, rowers, and pilots should be drawn together from the province. These orders being executed with great despatch, he himself, as soon as the season of the year permitted, came to the army. The Venetians, and other states in alliance with them, having notice of his arrival, and reflecting at the same time on the greatness of their crime, in detaining and loading with irons ambassadors, a name ever looked on among all nations as sacred and inviolable, began to make preparations proportioned to the danger that threatened them, more especially to provide themselves with all kinds of warlike stores; and that

with so much the greater alacrity and confidence, as the nature and situation of the country gave them good hopes of being able to defend themselves. They knew that the passes by land were everywhere cut asunder, by the many friths and arms of the ocean that run up in those parts; and that the approach by sea was not less difficult, on account of the small number of harbours and the little knowledge the Romans had of the coast. Neither did they imagine it possible for our army to continue long in that country, by reason of the great scarcity of corn; and should even all these expectations deceive them, they had still a mighty confidence in the strength and number of their shipping. The Romans, they were sensible, had but a very inconsiderable fleet; and were besides perfect strangers to the ports, islands, and shallows of the coast, where the chief weight of the war was like to fall. At the same time they foresaw that our pilots, accustomed only to the navigation of the Mediterranean, a sea bounded and shut in on all sides by the continent, must needs find themselves greatly at a loss, when they came to enter the vast and open spaces of the wide Atlantic Ocean. In consequence of these reflections, and the resolutions formed on them, they set about fortifying their towns, and conveying all their corn into places of strength, ordering as many ships as could be got together to rendezvous in the Venetian ports; it appearing that Cæsar intended to begin the war by attacking that state. They likewise brought over to their alliance the Osismians, Lexovians, Nannetes, Ambiani, Morini, Diablintes, and Menapians, and despatched ambassadors into Britain, which lies over-against their coast, to solicit assistance from thence.

10. All these difficulties before mentioned attended the prosecution of this war: but Cæsar was urged by many considerations to undertake and carry it on

with vigour: the insult offered to the commonwealth, in detaining the Roman knights; a revolt and insurrection, after submission and hostages given; the confederacy of so many states; above all, his fear lest by neglecting to oppose these first commotions he should give encouragement to the other provinces of Gaul to follow the example. Reflecting, therefore, on the genius and temper of the Gauls, fond of revolutions, and ever forward and ready to engage in new wars, and considering at the same time that it was the natural bent and disposition of mankind to aspire after liberty, and abhor the yoke of servitude, he determined, before the infection should spread wider, to divide his army, and distribute it into the several provinces of Gaul.

11. Pursuant to this design, T. Labienus, his lieutenant, was sent with the cavalry to Treves, whose territory extends along the banks of the Rhine. To him he gave it in charge to take a progress to Rheims, and the other Belgian states, in order to retain them in obedience, as likewise to oppose the Germans, should they attempt by force the passage of the river: a report then prevailing that they had been invited over by the Belgians. P. Crassus, with twelve legionary cohorts and a great body of horse, had orders to march into Aquitain, to prevent the arrival of any supplies from that quarter, and the junction of the forces of so many powerful nations. Q. Titurius Sabinus, at the head of three legions, entered the country of the Unellians, Curiosolitæ, and Lexovians, to find employment for the troops that had been drawn together in those parts. To young Brutus he gave the command of the fleet, and of all the vessels from Gaul, which he had ordered to be fitted out by the Santones, Pictones, and other provinces that continued in obedience; strongly recommending to him at the same time to use the greatest despatch, and sail with all expedition

for the Venetian coast. He himself, at the head of the land army, set out on his march thither.

12. The situation of most of the towns in those parts is such, that standing on the edges of promontories, or on points of land that run out into the sea, there is no approaching them with an army at high water, which happens always twice in twelve hours. Neither is it possible for a fleet to draw near; because, on the recess of the tide, the ships would be in danger of being dashed against the shallows and banks of sand. Both these reasons therefore concurred to secure their towns from assault; and if at any time, by the greatness of the works carried on against them, and huge artificial mounts, that served to prevent the ingress of the sea, and were raised to a height nearly equalling their walls, they saw themselves reduced to an extremity, then, by bringing up their ships, of which they had always a great number in readiness, they easily found means to carry off their effects, and withdraw into the nearest towns, where they again defended themselves by the same advantages of situation as before. In this manner did they elude all Cæsar's attempts during a great part of the summer, and that with so much the more success, because our fleet was kept back by tempests, and found the navigation extremely dangerous in that vast and boundless ocean, where the tides are great, and the havens both few in number, and at a considerable distance one from another.

13. For the Venetian ships were built and fitted out in this manner: their bottoms were somewhat flatter than ours, the better to adapt themselves to the shallows, and sustain without danger the regress of the tides. Their prows were very high and erect, as likewise their sterns, to bear the hugeness of the billows, and the violence of tempests. The body of the vessel was entirely of oak, to stand the shocks and assaults of that tempestuous ocean.

The benches of the rowers were made of strong beams of about a foot in breadth, and fastened with iron nails an inch thick. Instead of cables, they secured their anchors with chains of iron, and made use of skins, and a sort of thin pliant leather, by way of sails, either because they wanted canvass, and were ignorant of the art of making sail-cloth, or, which is more probable, because they imagined that canvass sails were not so proper to bear the violence of tempests, the rage and fury of the winds, and to govern ships of that bulk and burden. Between our fleet and vessels of such a make the nature of the encounter was this: that in agility, and a ready command of oars, we had indeed the advantage, but in other respects, regarding the situation of the coast, and the assaults of storms, all things ran very much in their favour; for neither could our ships injure them with their beaks, so great was their strength and firmness; nor could we easily throw in our darts, because of their height above us: which also was the reason that we found it extremely difficult to grapple the enemy, and bring them to close fight. Add to all this, that when the sea began to rage, and they were forced to submit to the pleasure of the winds, they could both weather the storm better, and more securely trust themselves among the shallows, as fearing nothing from the rocks and cliffs on the recess of the tide. The Romans, on the other hand, had reason to be under a continual dread of these and such-like accidents.

14. Cæsar, having taken many of their towns, and finding that he only fatigued his army to no purpose because he could neither prevent the retreat of the enemy, nor force their garrisons to a surrender, resolved to wait the arrival of his fleet; which, being accordingly come up, was no sooner descried by the Venetians, than about two hundred and twenty of their best ships, well equipped for

service, and furnished with all kind of weapons, stood out to sea, and drew up in order of battle against us. Neither Brutus, who commanded the fleet, nor the centurions and military tribunes who had the charge of particular vessels, knew what course to take, or in what manner to conduct the fight; for they were no strangers to the strength and firmness of the Venetian shipping, which rendered them proof against our beaks; and when they had even raised turrets on the decks, yet being still overtopped by the lofty sterns of the enemy, the Romans could not with any advantage throw in their darts; whereas those sent by the Gauls, coming from above, descended with great violence on our men. In this exigence, a particular kind of instrument, used by the mariners, proved of signal service in giving a favourable issue to the combat. They had provided themselves with long poles, armed at one end with long scythes, not unlike those made use of in attacking the walls of towns. With these they laid hold of the enemy's tackle, and drawing off the galley by the extreme force of oars, cut asunder the ropes that fastened the sail-yards to the mast. These giving way, the sail-yards necessarily came down; insomuch, that as all the hopes and expectations of the Gauls depended entirely on their sails and rigging, by depriving them of this resource, we at the same time rendered their vessels wholly unserviceable. The rest depended altogether on the valour of the troops, in which the Romans had greatly the advantage; and the rather, because they fought within view of Cæsar and the whole army, so that not a single act of bravery could pass unobserved; for all the adjoining hills and eminences which afforded a near prospect of the sea were covered with our men.

15. The enemy's sail-yards being, as we have said, cut down, and many of their ships singly surrounded by two or three of ours at a time, the Romans used

their utmost endeavours to board them: which the Venetians observing, and that we had already made ourselves masters of a great part of their fleet, as they could fall on no expedient to prevent so great a misfortune, they began to think of providing for their safety by flight. Accordingly they tacked about, in order to have the advantage of the wind, when all of a sudden so dead a calm ensued that not a vessel could stir out of its place: nor could any thing have fallen out more opportunely towards putting at once a final period to the war; for the Romans, attacking their ships one after another, took them with ease; insomuch, that of all that vast number that came out against us, but a very few, under favour of the night, escaped to land, after a conflict that continued from nine in the morning till sunset.

16. This battle put an end to the war with the Venetians, and all the nations on the seacoast: for as the entire body of their youth, and all those also of more advanced age who were capable of serving their country by their credit and counsels, were present in the action, and as they had likewise drawn together their whole naval strength; such as survived this defeat having neither any place of refuge whereunto to retire, nor means left of defending their towns, surrendered themselves and their all to Cæsar's mercy. But he thought it necessary to proceed against them with the greater severity, that he might impress on the minds of the Gauls for the future a more inviolable regard to the sacred character of ambassadors. Having therefore caused all their senators to be put to death, he ordered the rest to be sold for slaves.

17. During these transactions against the Venetians, Q. Titurius Sabinus entered the territories of the Unellians, at the head of the troops put under his command by Cæsar. Viridovix was invested with the supreme authority in these parts, and had

been appointed general-in-chief by all the states concerned in the revolt; out of which he had drawn together a very numerous and powerful army. Nay, but a very few days before, the Aulerci, Ebuovices, and Lexovians, having massacred their senate, because they refused to engage in the war, had shut their gates against the Romans, and joined themselves to Viridovix. Besides all this, he had very much strengthened his army by the great numbers that flocked to him from all parts of Gaul; men of desperate fortunes, or accustomed to live by robbery, whom the hopes of plunder and love of war had drawn off from the daily labours of their calling and the cares of agriculture.

18. Sabinus kept close within his camp, which was situated in a manner every way advantageous; while Viridovix, who had posted himself at the distance of about two miles, daily drew out his men, and offered him battle. This behaviour of the Roman general not only drew on him the contempt of the enemy, but occasioned also some murmuring among his own troops, and filled the Gauls with so high a conceit of his fear, that they even ventured to come up to his very trenches. The reason of his acting in this manner was, that he thought it not justifiable in a lieutenant, in the absence of the commander-in-chief, to hazard a battle with so superior an army, unless on terms of evident advantage.

19. Having confirmed them in this belief, that his reserve was the effect of fear, he made choice of a certain Gaul from among the auxiliaries, a man of address, and every way qualified for carrying on his design. Him he persuaded, by great rewards, and still greater promises, to go over to the enemy, instructing him at the same time in the part he was to act. This Gaul, coming to their camp as a deserter, laid before them the fear of the Romans, and the extremities to which Cæsar was reduced in the

war against the Venetians: nor did he fail to insinuate that there was great reason to believe Sabinus intended the next night privately to draw off his army, and march to Cæsar's assistance. No sooner was this heard by the Gauls than they all cried out with one voice that they ought not to lose so fair an occasion of success, but go and attack the Roman camp. Many reasons concurred to fix them in this resolution:—the reserve of Sabinus for some days past; the intelligence from the deserter, confirming their belief of his fear; the want of provisions, of which they had taken no great care to lay in a sufficient stock; the hopes conceived from the Venetian war; and, in fine, that readiness with which men are apt to believe what falls in with their expectations and wishes. Urged by these considerations, they would not suffer Viridovix and the rest of the general officers to dismiss the council before they had obtained their consent for the taking up of arms, and falling on the Roman camp. The proposal being at last agreed to, they provided themselves with fascines and hurdles to fill up the ditch, and joyfully began their march, as to a certain victory.

20. The Roman camp stood on an eminence, which rose with a gentle ascent for the space of about a mile. Hither the Gauls advanced with so much haste, in order to come on our troops unprepared, that by the time they were arrived, they had run themselves quite out of breath. Sabinus, having encouraged his men, whom he saw eager to engage, gave the word of onset. As the enemy were very much encumbered with the loads of fascines they had brought to fill the ditch, he ordered a sudden sally from the two several gates of the camp; and so well did it succeed, by reason of the advantage of the ground, the inexperience and weariness of the Gauls, the bravery of the Roman troops, and their ability acquired in former battles, that the enemy

CÆS. VOL. I.—I

could not sustain the very first charge of our men, but immediately betook themselves to flight. The Romans, who were fresh and vigorous, pursuing them under all these disadvantages, put great numbers to the sword, and the rest being followed by the cavalry, very few escaped the slaughter. Thus, at one and the same time, Sabinus had an account of the defeat of the Venetians by sea, and Cæsar of the victory obtained by Sabinus at land. All the several states in those parts readily submitted to Titurius: for, as the Gauls are very prompt and forward to undertake a war, so are they of a disposition that easily relents, and gives way to the strokes of adversity.

21. Much about the same time P. Crassus arrived in Aquitain; a country which, as we have before observed, for extent of territory and number of inhabitants, is deservedly counted a third part of Gaul. This general, understanding that he was to conduct a war in those parts, where but a few years before L. Valerius Præconinus had been slain, and his army put to the rout, and whence L. Manilius the proconsul had been driven with the loss of his baggage, soon became sensible that he must act with more than ordinary circumspection and vigour. Having therefore made provision of corn, assembled his auxiliary troops and cavalry, and strengthened his army with a choice body of volunteers, drawn together by name from Toulouse, Carcaso, and Narbonne, which states make up that part of the Roman province that lies the nearest to Aquitain, he advanced with all his forces into the territories of the Sotiates. These, on the first notice of his arrival, having levied a great army, and attacking him in his march with the whole body of their cavalry, in which their chief strength consisted, were nevertheless repulsed and pursued by our men. But all on a sudden their infantry appearing in a valley, where they had been designedly placed in

ambush, fell furiously on the Romans, disordered with the pursuit, and renewed the fight.

22. The battle was long and obstinate; for the Sotiates, proud of their former victories, imagined that the fate of all Aquitain depended singly on their bravery. The Romans, on the other hand, were ambitious of showing what they could achieve under a young leader, in the absence of their general, and unsupported by the rest of the legions. At length, however, the enemy, overpowered with wounds, betook themselves to flight; and a great slaughter ensuing, Crassus marched immediately and invested their capital; where, meeting with a brave resistance, he was forced to make his approaches by towers and mantelets. The enemy, sometimes sallying out, sometimes carrying on their mines to our very works (in which kind of service the Aquitains are particularly skilful, as inhabiting a country that abounds in veins of copper), when they saw that the diligence of the Romans enabled them to surmount all these difficulties, sent ambassadors to Crassus, and requested they might be admitted to a surrender; which being accordingly agreed to, they, in obedience to his desire, delivered up their arms.

23. But while the Romans were wholly intent on the execution of the treaty, Adiatomus, who commanded in chief, endeavoured to escape on the other side of the town, with a body of six hundred sworn friends, who, in the language of the country, are called Soldurians. Their condition and manner of life is this: to live in a perfect community of goods with those to whom they have engaged themselves in friendship: if any misfortune befalls them, to share in it, or make away with themselves: nor is there a single instance of any one on record who, on the death of him to whom he had vowed a friendship, refused to submit to the same fate. Adiatomus, as we have said, endeavouring to make his escape with his body of friends, and the alarm being given

on that side of the works, the soldiers immediately ran to arms, when a furious combat ensued, in which he was at last repulsed, and driven back into the town. He obtained, however, from Crassus, the same conditions of surrender as had been granted to the rest of the inhabitants.

24. Crassus, having received their arms and hostages, led his troops into the territories of the Vocatians and Tarusatians. But now the Gauls, roused by the unexpected progress of the Romans, who had in a few days after their arrival made themselves masters of a town strongly fortified both by art and nature, began to send ambassadors into all parts, to join in a mutual league, to ratify their engagements by an exchange of hostages, and to levy troops. Ambassadors were likewise despatched to all the states of Hither Spain that bordered on Aquitain, to solicit a supply of troops and leaders: on whose arrival they immediately took the field, with great confidence and a numerous and well appointed army. None were suffered to command but such as had served under Sertorius, and were therefore accounted men of consummate ability and experience in the art of war. These, according to the custom of the Romans, made it their study to choose a camp to advantage, to secure themselves by lines and intrenchments, and to intercept our convoys. Crassus, perceiving their design, as his own army was not strong enough to admit of sending out detachments, and as the Gauls could on all occasions employ numerous parties, possess themselves of the passes, and at the same time have a sufficient number of troops to guard the camp, by which means he foresaw he must soon be reduced to great straits for want of provisions, while the enemy would be every day growing more powerful, he for all these reasons, resolved not to delay coming to an engagement. Having laid his design before a council of war, and finding them unanimous in their approba-

tion of it, he appointed the next day for the engagement.

25. Early in the morning he drew all his forces out of the camp, and disposing them in two lines, with the auxiliary troops in the centre, stood expecting what resolution the enemy would take. But the Gauls, though they believed they might safely hazard a battle on account of their numbers, their former renown in war, and the handful of men they were to oppose, yet thought it would be still better, by seizing the passes, and intercepting our convoys, to secure the victory without expense of blood; and should the want of provisions at length force the Romans to think of a retreat, they might then fall on them, embarrassed in their march, encumbered with their baggage, and dejected by their misfortunes. This resolution being approved by all their leaders, they kept within their camp, though our men appeared before them in order of battle.

26. Crassus, perceiving their design, and that this delay served rather to abate the courage of the enemy, and add fresh spirits to his own men, among whom a universal cry arose that he ought no longer to put off the engagement, but march directly to their camp, having encouraged his troops, he resolved to give way to their present ardour, and accordingly led them to the assault. There were some employed in filling up the ditch, others in driving the enemy with their darts from the works; while the auxiliaries, in whom Crassus had no great confidence, yet that they might appear to have some share at least in the engagement, were appointed to carry stones and darts to them that fought, and to supply materials for raising the mount. At the same time the enemy fought with great constancy and resolution, and made no small havoc with their darts, which came on us from above. During this warmth of opposition, the cavalry, having taken a

compass round the camp, came and told Crassus that the intrenchments were not fortified with the same care in all parts, and that it would be easy to force an entrance by the postern gate.

27. Crassus, having exhorted the officers of the cavalry to encourage their men by great rewards and promises, instructed them in the part they were to act. They, in consequence of the orders they had received, drawing out four cohorts, which having been left to guard the camp, were quite fresh and fit for action, and fetching with them a large compass, that they might not be seen from the enemy's camp, while the eyes and minds of all were intent on the combat, fell suddenly on that part of the intrenchments of which we have spoken above; and having forced their way through, were actually got within the camp before they were so much as seen by the enemy, or any apprehension entertained of what they were about. On this a great uproar being heard on that side, our men redoubled their efforts; and, as always happens to troops animated with the hopes of victory, began to push the Gauls with greater fury than ever. The enemy, thus surrounded on all sides, and without hopes of retrieving their affairs, endeavoured to make their escape over the rampart, and save themselves by flight; but being pursued by the cavalry, who soon came up with them in these open and level plains, of fifty thousand men that had been drawn together out of Spain and Aquitain, scarce a fourth part escaped; nor did the horse return to the camp until very late in the evening, after they had quite tired themselves with the slaughter.

28. On the report of this defeat, the greatest part of Aquitain immediately submitted to Crassus, and of their own accord sent him hostages. Of this number were the Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Preciani, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Garites, Ausci, Garumni, Siburzates, and Cocasates. Only a few nations, and

those the most remote, relying on the season of the year, because the winter was at hand, neglected to take this step.

29. Much about the same time Cæsar, though the summer was now almost spent, yet because all the rest of Gaul being subdued, the Morini and Menapians were still in arms, and had not sent ambassadors to treat about a peace, resolved to lead his army against them, hoping he should soon be able to put an end to that war. Their manner of opposing him was very different from that of the other Gauls: for, understanding that the most powerful nation, when it came to a battle, had always been overthrown and put to rout, and inhabiting themselves in a country that abounded in woods and marshes, they retired thither with all their effects. Cæsar, coming to the entrance of the wood, began to intrench himself: and although no enemy in the mean time appeared, yet no sooner had our men dispersed themselves in order to set about fortifying the camp, than on a sudden they came pouring on us from all parts of the wood, and charged with great briskness. The Romans immediately flew to their arms, and drove them back with considerable slaughter; but, adventuring a little too far into the wood, lost some men.

30. Cæsar spent the remaining days in cutting down the wood; and to screen his men from any sudden and unexpected attack, ordered the trees that had been felled to be placed on each side the army, that they might serve as a barricade against the attempts of the enemy. Having with incredible despatch advanced a great way into the wood in a few days, insomuch that all their cattle and baggage fell into our hands, they themselves retired into the thicker and more covered spaces of the forest. The season growing bad, we were forced to intermit the work; and the rains soon became so violent and continual, that the soldiers could no longer endure

to lie in their tents. Wherefore Cæsar, having laid waste their lands, and set fire to their towns and houses, led back his army, and disposed it into winter-quarters among the Aulerci, Lexovians, and other states whom he had last subdued.

BOOK IV.

1. THE following winter, being that in which Cneius Pompey and M. Crassus were consuls, the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, German nations, passed the Rhine in a great body, not far from its mouth. The cause of their taking this step was, that being much exposed to the hostilities of the Suevians, they had for many years been harassed with continual wars, and hindered from cultivating their lands.

2. The Suevians are by far the most warlike and considerable of all the German nations. They are said to be composed of a hundred cantons, each of which sends yearly into the field a thousand armed men. The rest, who continue in their several districts, employ themselves in cultivating their lands, that they may furnish a sufficient supply both for themselves and for the army. These again take up arms the following campaign, and are succeeded in the care of the lands by the troops that served the year before. Thus they live in the continual exercise both of agriculture and war. They allow of no such thing as property or private possession in the distribution of their lands; their residence, for the sake of tillage, being confined to a single year. Corn is not much in use among them, because they prefer a milk or flesh diet, and are greatly addicted to hunting. Thus the quality of their food, their perpetual exercise, and free unconfined manner of life (because

being from their childhood fettered by no rules of duty or education, they acknowledge no law but will and pleasure) contribute to make them strong, and of an extraordinary stature. They have likewise accustomed themselves, though inhabiting a climate naturally very cold, to bathe in their rivers, and clothe themselves only with skins; which, as they are very small, leave great part of their bodies quite uncovered. Merchants indeed resort to them, but rather to purchase their spoils taken in war, than import any goods into the country; for even beasts of carriage, in which the Gauls take so much delight that they are ready to purchase them at any price, are yet very little valued by the Germans, when brought among them: and though those of their own country are both small and very ill shaped, yet, by daily exercise, they make them capable of all kinds of service. Their cavalry often dismount in time of action, to fight on foot; and their horses are so trained, that they stir not from the place where they are left, but wait the return of their riders, who betake themselves to them again in case of necessity. Nothing is more dishonourable, in their account, or more opposite to their customs, than the use of horse-furniture; and therefore, however few themselves, they scruple not to attack any number of their enemies whom they see so equipped. They suffer no wine to be imported into their territories, as imagining that it both enervates the mind and unfits the body for exercise and labour. It is accounted much to the honour of the nation to have the country for a great way round them waste and uninhabited; for by this they think is intimated that the united force of many states has been found insufficient to withstand their single valour. And hence it is that, on one side, the country is said to lie desolate for the space of six hundred miles.

3. On the other side they are bounded by the

Ubians, heretofore a flourishing and potent people, and somewhat more civilized than the other German nations; because, inhabiting along the banks of the Rhine, they are much resorted to by merchants; and have, besides, by bordering on the states of Gaul, given into many of their customs. The Suevians having tried the strength of this people in many wars, and finding them too numerous and potent to be driven out of their territories, prevailed yet so far as to impose a tribute on them, and very much reduce and weaken their power.

4. The Usipetes and Tenchtheri, of whom we have spoken above, were likewise engaged in this quarrel; and after withstanding the power of the Suevians for many years, were nevertheless at length driven from their territories. Having wandered over many regions of Germany during the space of three years, they arrived at last on the banks of the Rhine, towards those parts inhabited by the Menapians, who had houses, lands, and villages on both sides the river. But alarmed at the approach of so prodigious a multitude, they abandoned all their habitations beyond the Rhine; and having disposed their troops on this side the river, set themselves to oppose the passage of the Germans. These having tried every expedient, and finding they could neither force the passage, because of their want of shipping, nor steal over privately, by reason of the guards kept by the Menapians, counterfeited a retreat into their own country, and after three days' march, suddenly turned back; when their cavalry, recovering all this ground in the space of one night, easily overpowered the Menapians, little expecting or prepared for such a visit: for having been apprized by their scouts of the departure of the Germans, they had returned, fearless of danger, to their habitations beyond the Rhine. These being all put to the sword, and their shipping seized, before the Menapians on this side had intelligence of their approach, they

passed the river; and seizing all their towns and houses, supported themselves the rest of the winter with the provisions there found.

5. Cæsar, being informed of these things, and dreading the levity of the Gauls, who are very changeable in their counsels, and fond of novelties, determined to trust nothing to their resolves: for it is the custom of that people to stop travellers even against their will, and inquire of them what they have heard or know relating to any affair; and in their towns, on the arrival of a foreign merchant, they gather round him in crowds, and oblige him to tell what country he comes from, and how things stood at his departure. Moved by these reports, they often enter on the most important deliberations, and concert measures they soon have cause to repent, as being founded wholly on vain rumours, and answers feigned for the most part designedly to please them. Cæsar, who was aware of this custom, fearing the war, if neglected, might become formidable, made all the haste he could to join the army. On his arrival he found that things were fallen out exactly as he had foreseen. Some of the states of Gaul had sent ambassadors to the Germans, inviting them to leave the banks of the Rhine, and assuring them that all their demands should be readily complied with. The Germans, allured by these hopes, were already extending their incursions on all sides, and had penetrated into the territories of the Eburones and Condrusians, both which nations are under the protection of the Treviri. Cæsar, having assembled the chiefs of the Gauls, dissembled his knowledge of their secret designs; and endeavouring rather to win them over, and confirm them in their alliance with the people of Rome, demanded a certain number of cavalry of them, and prepared to march against the Germans.

6. Having provided himself with corn, and drawn together a select body of horse, he began his march

towards those parts where he understood the Germans then were. When he had come within a few days' journey of their camp, ambassadors arrived from them, who addressed him to this effect: "That the Germans had no design of being the first to begin a war with the people of Rome; but neither, if they were attacked, would they decline having recourse to arms: that it was the custom of their nation, handed down to them by their ancestors, rather to oppose the efforts of their enemies than expect relief from remonstrances; but thus far they were however willing to own, that it was against their inclination they were come into those parts, having been driven from their habitations: that if the Romans were disposed to accept of their friendship, they might become very useful and serviceable allies, and would rest satisfied either with such lands as they should think proper to assign them, or in the quiet possession of those they had already obtained by force of arms: that they yielded in valour to the Suevians alone, for whom the immortal gods themselves were not an equal match; but knew of no other nation under heaven able to resist the efforts of their bravery." Cæsar made such a reply as best suited his present views, but the conclusion of his speech was to this purpose: "That he could enter into no treaty of friendship with them so long as they continued in Gaul; that men who had been unable to defend their own territories were not likely to gain countries by force from others; that there were no uncultivated lands in Gaul sufficient to satisfy so great a multitude, without invading the properties of others; but that, if they pleased, they might incorporate themselves with the Ubians, whose ambassadors were then in his camp to complain of the injuries of the Suevians, and request his aid against their encroachments: this he promised to obtain for them of the Ubians." The ambassadors replied, they would report this to their

countrymen, and in three days return with an answer; requesting in the mean time that he would not advance with his army. But this Cæsar refused, as knowing that a few days before they had sent a great body of cavalry over the Meuse, to forage and plunder in the territories of the Ambivariti. He therefore concluded that they only waited the return of this party, and with that view were for interposing delays.

7. The Meuse rises in the mountains of Vause, in the territories of the Lingones, and receiving a certain branch of the Rhine, called the Vahal, forms with it the island of the Batavians, about fourscore miles below which it discharges itself into the sea. The Rhine itself takes its rise in the territories of the Lepontians, who inhabit the Alps; and after a long and rapid course through the country of the Nantuates, Helvetians, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Treboci, and Treviri, divides itself as it approaches nearer the sea into several channels, and forming a great number of very large islands, inhabited for the most part by fierce and savage nations, some of whom are reported to feed only on fish and the eggs of birds, it at last discharges itself into the ocean by many different mouths.

8. Cæsar, being now only twelve miles distant from the enemy, was met on his way by the ambassadors on the day appointed. They were very earnest in their requests that he would advance no farther; but not being able to prevail, entreated that he would send to the cavalry who made the advance-guard, to restrain them from beginning the fight; and in the mean time permit them to send ambassadors to the Ubians; from whose senate and magistrates, if they could obtain the conditions offered them by Cæsar, under the sanction of a solemn oath, they declared themselves ready to accept them; requiring only that he would allow them the space of three days to bring matters to a final issue. But

CÆS. VOL. I.—K

Cæsar, imagining all these proffers to have no other tendency than the delay of a few days, until their cavalry should arrive, told them, nevertheless, that he would advance that day only four miles farther, for the sake of water ; but desired their chiefs to attend him the day after, that he might know their demands. Meantime he sent orders to the officers of the cavalry, who were gone before, not to attack the enemy ; and in case they should be attacked themselves, only to maintain their ground until he should come up with the rest of the army.

9. But the enemy, on seeing our horse advance, whose number amounted to five thousand, whereas they themselves did not exceed eight hundred, by reason of the absence of those who had been sent to forage beyond the Meuse ; yet falling suddenly on the Romans, who had no apprehension of their design, because they knew their ambassadors had been with Cæsar a little before, and obtained a day's truce, they easily put them into disorder. And when our men, recovering a little, began to make resistance, they, according to custom, dismounted, and stabbing our horses under the belly, and by that means overthrowing many of the riders, in a very short time put the rest to flight ; and so great was the consternation, that they continued driving them before them, until at last they came within sight of the army. In this skirmish we lost seventy-four men, and among them Piso of Aquitain, a man of distinguished valour and illustrious descent, whose grandfather had been sovereign magistrate in his own state, and been honoured by the senate of Rome with the title of friend. This brave officer, seeing his brother surrounded by the enemy, ran to his assistance, and rescued him ; but his own horse being wounded, and he overthrown, the enemy fell on him, against whom nevertheless he made a brave resistance ; till at last, surrounded on all sides, he fell, overpowered with wounds ; which his brother

perceiving, who was by this time out of danger, and had got a considerable distance, setting spurs to his horse, he rushed among the thickest of the enemy, and was slain.

10. After this battle, Cæsar resolved neither to give audience to their ambassadors nor admit them to terms of peace, seeing they had treacherously applied for a truce, and afterward of their own accord broke it. He likewise considered that it would be downright madness to delay coming to an action until their army should be augmented, and their cavalry join them ; and the more so, because he was perfectly well acquainted with the levity of the Gauls, among whom they had already acquired a considerable reputation by this successful attack, and to whom it therefore behooved him by no means to allow time to enter into measures against him. On all these accounts he determined to come to an engagement with the enemy as soon as possible, and communicated his design to his questor and lieutenants. A very lucky accident fell out to bring about Cæsar's purpose ; for the day after, in the morning, the Germans, persisting in their treachery and dissimulation, came in great numbers to the camp ; all their nobility and princes making part of their embassy. Their design was, as they pretended, to vindicate themselves in regard to what had happened the day before ; because, contrary to engagements made and come under at their own request, they had fallen on our men ; but their real motive was to obtain if possible another insidious truce. Cæsar, overjoyed to have them thus in his power, ordered them to be secured, and immediately drew his forces out of the camp. The cavalry, whom he supposed terrified with the late engagement, were commanded to follow in the rear.

11. Having drawn up his army in three lines, and made a very expeditious march of eight miles, he appeared before the enemy's camp, before they had

the least apprehension of his design. All things conspiring to throw them into a sudden consternation, which was not a little increased by our unexpected appearance, and the absence of their own officers ; and hardly any time left them either to take counsel or fly to arms, they were utterly at a loss what course to take, whether to draw out their forces and oppose the enemy, or content themselves with defending the camp : or, in fine, to seek for safety in flight. As this fear was evident from the tumult and uproar we perceived among them, our soldiers, instigated by the remembrance of their treacherous behaviour the day before, broke into the camp. Such as could first provide themselves with arms made a show of resistance, and for some time maintained the fight amid the baggage and carriages. But the women and children (for the Germans had brought all their families and effects with them over the Rhine) betook themselves to flight on all sides. Cæsar sent the cavalry in pursuit of them.

12. The Germans, hearing the noise behind them, and seeing their wives and children put to the sword, threw down their arms, abandoned their ensigns, and fled out of the camp. Being arrived at the confluence of the Rhine and the Meuse, and finding it impossible to continue their flight any farther, after a dreadful slaughter of those that pretended to make resistance, the rest threw themselves into the river ; where, what with fear, weariness, and the force of the current, they almost all perished. Thus our army, without the loss of a man, and with very few wounded, returned to their camp, having put an end to this formidable war, in which the number of the enemy amounted to four hundred and thirty thousand. Cæsar offered those whom he had detained in his camp liberty to depart ; but they, dreading the resentment of the Gauls, whose lands they

had laid waste, chose rather to continue with him, and obtained his consent for that purpose.

13. The war with the Germans being ended, Cæsar for many reasons resolved to carry his army over the Rhine. But what chiefly swayed with him was, that as he found the Germans were easily prevailed on to transport their forces into Gaul, he thought it might be of no small service to alarm them on their own account, by letting them see that the Romans wanted neither ability nor resolution to pass the Rhine with an army. Add to all this, that the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, who, as we have related above, had passed the Meuse for the sake of forage and plunder, and by that means escaped the disaster of the late fight, on hearing of the defeat of their countrymen, had repassed the Rhine, retired into the territories of the Sicambrians, and joined their forces to theirs. And on Cæsar's sending deputies to require that these troops, which had presumed to make war on him and the Gauls, might be delivered up, he had received for answer, "that the Rhine was the boundary of the Roman empire: that if he thought it unjustifiable in the Germans to pass over into Gaul without his leave, on what pretence could he claim any power or authority beyond the Rhine?"

14. But the Ubians, who alone of all the nations beyond the Rhine had sent ambassadors to Cæsar, entered into an alliance with him, and given him hostages, earnestly entreated him to come over to their assistance, they being very hard pressed by the Suevians: "or, if the affairs of the commonwealth would not allow of his being there in person, that he would only order his army to cross the Rhine, which would both be sufficient for the present support, and also secure them for the time to come. Because such was the reputation and opinion conceived of a Roman army, even among the most remote German nations, from their defeating Ariovis-

K 2

tus, and the success of the last battle, that their friendship and name would alone be a sufficient defence. They promised likewise a great number of ships for the transporting of the army."

15. Cæsar, for all these reasons above mentioned, determined to cross the Rhine. But to make use of shipping appeared to him neither safe nor suitable to the dignity of the Roman name. Wherefore, although he understood that the making of a bridge would be attended with very great difficulties, on account of the breadth, and depth, and rapidity of the river, yet was he of opinion that in this manner alone ought he to carry over his army, or lay aside the design altogether. The form therefore and contrivance of the bridge was thus: two beams, each a foot and a half thick, sharpened a little towards the lower end, and of a length proportioned to the depth of the river, were joined together at the distance of about two feet. These were sunk into the river by engines, and afterward strongly driven with rammers, not perpendicularly, but inclined according to the direction of the stream. Directly opposite to these, at the distance of forty feet lower down, were placed two other beams joined together like the former, but sloping against the current of the river. These stakes were kept firm by a large beam, extended from one to the other, and which, being two feet in thickness, exactly filled the interval of the two stakes, and was strongly fastened at either end with iron nails, so contrived that the violence of the stream served only to bind the work faster together. This being continued through the whole breadth of the river, he ordered planks to be laid across, which, for the greater convenience of passing, were farther covered with hurdles. Towards the lower part of the stream other stakes were sunk, in the form of buttresses, which supported the bridge against the violence of the current; and above, at some distance, there were others; that if trunks of

trees or vessels should be sent down the river by the enemy to destroy the work, the shock might be broken by these defences, and the bridge thereby secured from damage.

16. The bridge being finished within ten days from the time they began to fetch the materials, Cæsar led over his army; and leaving a strong guard on each side of the river, marched directly into the territories of the Sicambri. Meantime ambassadors arriving from several states to desire peace and court his alliance, he gave them a very favourable reception, and appointed them to send hostages. The Sicambri, when they understood that the bridge was begun, by advice of the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, who had taken shelter among them, resolved on a retreat; and having abandoned their territories, and carried off all their effects, withdrew into the neighbouring woods and deserts.

17. Cæsar, after a short stay in their country, having burned all their houses and villages, and cut down their corn, marched into the territories of the Ubians. As he had promised these last his assistance against the attempts of the Suevians, he understood from them that the Suevians, being informed by their spies of the bridge built on the Rhine, had, according to their custom, called a council, and despatched orders into all parts for the people to forsake their towns and convey their wives, children, and effects into the woods, commanding, at the same time, that all such as were able to bear arms should meet at the place of general rendezvous, which they had appointed towards the middle of the country, resolving there to wait the arrival of the Romans, and give them battle. Cæsar, on this intelligence, having accomplished all he intended in carrying his army over the Rhine, by spreading a universal terror among the Germans, taking vengeance of the Sicambri, and setting the Ubians at liberty, after a stay of only eighteen days beyond the Rhine, think-

ing he had done enough both for his own reputation and the service of the republic, led back his army into Gaul, and broke down the bridge.

18. Though but a small part of the summer now remained, for in those regions, Gaul stretching very much to the north, the winters begin early, Cæsar, nevertheless, resolved to pass over into Britain, having certain intelligence, that in all his wars with the Gauls, the enemies of the commonwealth had ever received assistance from thence. He indeed foresaw that the season of the year would not permit him to finish the war; yet he thought it would be of no small advantage, if he should but take a view of the island, learn the nature of the inhabitants, and acquaint himself with the coast, harbours, and landing-places, to all which the Gauls were perfect strangers: for almost none but merchants resort to that island, nor have even they any knowledge of the country, except the seacoast, and the parts opposite to Gaul. Having therefore called together the merchants from all parts, they could neither inform him of the largeness of the island, nor what or how powerful the nations were that inhabited it, nor of their customs, art of war, or the harbours fit to receive large ships. For these reasons, before he embarked himself, he thought proper to send C. Volusenus with a galley, to get some knowledge of these things, commanding him, as soon as he had informed himself in what he wanted to know, to return with all expedition. He himself marched with his whole army into the territories of the Morini, because thence was the nearest passage into Britain. Here he ordered a great many ships from the neighbouring ports to attend him, and the fleet he had made use of the year before in the Venetian war.

19. Meanwhile, the Britons having notice of his design, by the merchants that resorted to their island, ambassadors from many of their states came

to Cæsar, with an offer of hostages, and submission to the authority of the people of Rome. To these he gave a favourable audience, and exhorting them to continue in the same mind, sent them back into their own country. Along with them he despatched Comius, whom he had constituted king of the Atrebatians, a man in whose virtue, wisdom, and fidelity he greatly confided, and whose authority in the island was very considerable. To him he gave it in charge to visit as many states as he could, and persuade them to enter into an alliance with the Romans, letting them know at the same time that Cæsar designed as soon as possible to come over in person to their island. Volusenus, having taken a view of the country, as far as was possible for one who had resolved not to quit his ship, or trust himself in the hands of the barbarians, returned on the fifth day, and acquainted Cæsar with his discoveries.

20. While Cæsar continued in those parts, for the sake of getting ready his fleet, deputies arrived from almost all the cantons of the Morini, to excuse their late war with the people of Rome, as proceeding wholly from a national fierceness, and their ignorance of the Roman customs, promising likewise an entire submission for the future. This fell out very opportunely for Cæsar, who was unwilling to leave any enemies behind him, nor would the season of the year have even allowed him to engage in a war; besides, he judged it by no means proper so far to entangle himself in these trivial affairs, as to be obliged to postpone the expedition into Britain. He therefore ordered them to send him a great number of hostages, and on their being delivered, received them into his alliance. Having got together about eighty transports, which he thought would be sufficient for the carrying over two legions, he distributed the galleys he had over and above to the questor, lieutenants, and officers of the cavalry. There were, besides, eighteen transports detained

by contrary winds at a port about eight miles off, which he appointed to carry over the cavalry. The rest of the army, under the command of Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Arunculeius Cotta, were sent against the Menapians, and those cantons of the Morini which had not submitted. P. Sulpicius Rufus had the charge of the harbour where he embarked, with a strong garrison to maintain it.

21. Things being in this manner settled, and the wind springing up fair, he weighed anchor about one in the morning, ordering the cavalry to embark at the other port, and follow him. But as these orders were executed but slowly, he himself about ten in the morning reached the coast of Britain, where he saw all the cliffs covered with the enemy's forces. The nature of the place was such, that the sea being bounded by steep mountains, the enemy might easily launch their javelins on us from above. Not thinking this therefore a convenient landing-place, he resolved to lie by till three in the afternoon, and wait the arrival of the rest of his fleet. Meanwhile, having called the lieutenants and military tribunes together, he informed them of what he had learned from Volusenus, instructed them in the part they were to act, and particularly exhorted them to do every thing with readiness, and at a signal given, agreeable to the rules of military discipline, which in sea affairs especially required expedition and despatch, because of all others the most changeable and uncertain. Having dismissed them, and finding both the wind and tide favourable, he made the signal for weighing anchor, and after sailing about eight miles farther, stopped over-against a plain and open shore.

22. But the barbarians, perceiving our design, sent their cavalry and chariots before, which they frequently make use of in battle, and following with the rest of their forces, endeavoured to oppose our landing: and indeed we found the difficulty very

great on many accounts; for our ships, being required a great depth of water; and the soldiers who were wholly unacquainted with the places, and had their hands embarrassed and laden with a weight of armour, were at the same time to leap from the ships, stand breast high amid the waves, and encounter the enemy while they, fighting on dry ground, or advancing only a little way into the water, having the free use of all their limbs, and in places which they perfectly knew, could boldly cast their darts, and spur on their horses, well inured to that kind of service. All these circumstances serving to spread a terror among our men, who were wholly strangers to this way of fighting, they pushed not the enemy with the same vigour and spirit as was usual for them in combats on dry ground.

23. Cæsar, observing this, ordered some galleys, a kind of shipping less common with the barbarians, and more easily governed and put in motion, to advance a little from the transports towards the shore, in order to set on the enemy in flank, and by means of their engines, slings, and arrows drive them to some distance. This proved of considerable service to our men, for what with the surprise occasioned by the make of our galleys, the motion of the oars, and the playing of the engines, the enemy were forced to halt, and in a little time began to give back. But our men still demurring to leap into the sea, chiefly because of the depth of the water in those parts, the standard-bearer of the tenth legion, having first invoked the gods for success, cried out aloud, "Follow me, fellow-soldiers, unless you will betray the Roman eagle into the hands of the enemy: for my part, I am resolved to discharge my duty to Cæsar and the commonwealth." On this he jumped into the sea, and advanced with the eagle against the enemy; whereat, our men exhorting one another to prevent so signal a disgrace, all that were in the ship followed him; which being perceived by those

in the nearest vessels, they also did the like, and boldly approached the enemy.

24. The battle was obstinate on both sides; but our men, as being neither able to keep their ranks, nor get firm footing, nor follow their respective standards, because, leaping promiscuously from their ships, every one joined the first ensign he met, were thereby thrown into great confusion. The enemy, on the other hand, being well acquainted with the shallows, when they saw our men advancing singly from the ships, spurred on their horses, and attacked them in that perplexity. In one place great numbers would gather round a handful of the Romans; others, falling on them in flank, galled them mightily with their darts, which Cæsar observing, ordered some small boats to be manned, and play about with recruits. By this means the foremost ranks of our men, having got firm footing, were followed by all the rest, when, falling on the enemy briskly, they were soon put to the rout. But as the cavalry were not yet arrived, we could not pursue or advance far into the island, which was the only thing wanting to render the victory complete.

25. The enemy, being thus vanquished in battle, no sooner got together after their defeat, than they despatched ambassadors to Cæsar to sue for peace, offering hostages, and an entire submission to his commands. Along with these ambassadors came Comius, the Atrebatian, whom Cæsar, as we have related above, had sent before him into Britain. The natives seized him as soon as he landed, and though he was charged with a commission from Cæsar, threw him into irons. But on their late defeat, they thought proper to send him back, throwing the blame of what had happened on the multitude, and begged of Cæsar to excuse a fault proceeding from ignorance. Cæsar, after some complaints of their behaviour, in that having of their own accord sent am-

bassadors to the continent to sue for peace, they had yet without any reason begun a war against him, told them at last he would forgive their fault, and ordered them to send a certain number of hostages. Part were sent immediately, and the rest, as living at some distance, they promised to deliver in a few days. Meantime they disbanded their troops, and the several chiefs came to Cæsar's camp, to manage their own concerns, and those of the states to which they belonged.

26. A peace being thus concluded four days after Cæsar's arrival in Britain, the eighteen transports appointed to carry the cavalry, of whom we have spoken above, put to sea with a gentle gale. But when they had so near approached the coast as to be even within view of the camp, so violent a storm all on a sudden arose, that being unable to hold on their course, some were obliged to return to the port whence they set out, and others driven to the lower end of the island westward, not without great danger, there they cast anchor; but the waves rising very high, so as to fill the ships with water, they were again in the night obliged to stand out to sea, and make for the continent of Gaul. That very night it happened to be full moon, when the tides on the seacoast always rise highest, a thing at that time wholly unknown to the Romans. Thus at one and the same time, the galleys which Cæsar made use of to transport his men, and which he had ordered to be drawn up on the strand, were filled with the tide, and the tempest fell furiously on the transports that lay at anchor in the road: nor was it possible for our men to attempt any thing for their preservation. Many of the ships being dashed to pieces, and the rest having lost their anchors, tackle, and rigging, which rendered them altogether unfit for sailing, a general consternation spread itself through the camp; for there were no other ships to carry back the troops, nor any materials to repair those

CÆS. VOL. I.—L

that had been disabled by the tempest. And as it had been all along Cæsar's design to winter in Gaul, he was wholly without corn to subsist the troops in those parts.

27. All this being known to the British chiefs, who after the battle had repaired to Cæsar's camp, to perform the conditions of the treaty, they began to hold conferences among themselves; and as they plainly saw that the Romans were destitute both of cavalry, shipping, and corn, and easily judged, from the smallness of the camp, that the number of their troops was but inconsiderable,—in which notion they were the more confirmed, because Cæsar, having brought over the legions without baggage, had occasion to enclose but a small spot of ground,—they thought this a convenient opportunity for taking up arms, and by intercepting the Roman convoys, to protract the affair till winter; being confidently persuaded that by defeating these troops, or cutting off their return, they should effectually put a stop to all future attempts on Britain. Having therefore entered into a joint confederacy, they by degrees left the camp, and began to draw the islanders together: but Cæsar, though he was not yet apprized of their design, yet guessing in part at their intentions, by the disaster which had befallen his fleet, and the delays formed in relation to the hostages, determined to provide against all events. He therefore had corn daily brought into his camp, and ordered the timber of the ships that had been most damaged to be made use of in repairing the rest, sending to Gaul for what other materials he wanted. As the soldiers were indefatigable in this service, his fleet was soon in a condition to sail, having lost only twelve ships.

28. During these transactions, the seventh legion being sent out to forage, according to custom, as part were employed in cutting down the corn, and part in carrying it to the camp, without suspicion

of attack, news was brought to Cæsar that a greater cloud of dust than ordinary was seen on that side where the legion was. Cæsar, suspecting how matters went, marched with the cohorts that were on guard, ordering two others to succeed in their room, and all the soldiers in the camp to arm and follow him as soon as possible. When he was advanced a little way from the camp, he saw his men overpowered by the enemy, and with great difficulty able to sustain the fight, being driven into a small compass, and exposed on every side to the darts of their adversaries. For as the harvest was gathered in everywhere else, and one only field left, the enemy, suspecting that our men would come thither to forage, had hid themselves during the night in the woods, and waiting till our men had quitted their arms, and dispersed themselves to fall a reaping, they suddenly attacked them, killed some, put the rest into disorder, and began to surround them with their horses and chariots.

29. Their way of fighting with their chariots is this: first they drive their chariots on all sides, and throw their darts; insomuch, that by the very terror of the horses, and noise of the wheels, they often break the ranks of the enemy. When they have forced their way into the midst of the cavalry, they quit their chariots, and fight on foot: meantime the drivers retire a little from the combat, and place themselves in such a manner as to favour the retreat of their countrymen, should they be overpowered by the enemy. Thus in action they perform the part both of nimble horsemen and stable infantry; and by continual exercise and use have arrived at that expertness, that in the most steep and difficult places they can stop their horses on a full stretch, turn them which way they please, run along the pole, rest on the harness, and throw themselves back into their chariots with incredible dexterity.

30. Our men being astonished and confounded with this new way of fighting, Cæsar came very timely to their relief; for on his approach the enemy made a stand, and the Romans began to recover from their fear. This satisfied Cæsar for the present, who, not thinking it a proper season to provoke the enemy, and bring on a general engagement, stood facing them for some time, and then led back the legions to the camp. The continual rains that followed for some days after both kept the Romans within their intrenchments, and withheld the enemy from attacking us. Meantime the Britons despatched messengers into all parts, to make known to their countrymen the small number of the Roman troops, and the favourable opportunity they had of making immense spoils, and freeing their country for ever from all future invasions, by storming the enemy's camp. Having by this means got together a great body of infantry and cavalry, they drew towards our intrenchments.

31. Cæsar, though he foresaw that the enemy, if beaten, would in the same manner as before escape the danger by flight, yet having got about thirty horse, whom Comius, the Atrebatian, had brought over with him from Gaul, he drew up the legions in order of battle before the camp; and falling on the Britons, who were not able to sustain the shock of our men, soon put them to flight. The Romans, pursuing them as long as their strength would permit, made a terrible slaughter, and setting fire to their houses and villages a great way round, returned to the camp.

32. The same day ambassadors came from the enemy to Cæsar to sue for peace. Cæsar doubled the number of hostages he had before imposed on them, and ordered them to be sent over to him into Gaul, because the equinox coming on, and his ships being leaky, he thought it not prudent to put off his return till winter. A fair wind offering, he set sail a little after midnight, and arrived safe in Gaul. Two

of his transports, not being able to reach the same port with the rest, were driven into a haven a little lower in the country.

33. In these two vessels were about three hundred soldiers, who having landed, and being on their march to the camp, the Morini, who had submitted to Cæsar on his setting out for Britain, drawn by the hopes of plunder, surrounded them at first with only a few men, and ordered them to lay down their arms, under pain of being put to the sword. But they, casting themselves into an orb, stood on their defence, when all on a sudden six thousand more of the enemy appeared, roused by the noise of the combatants. Cæsar, having notice of what passed, sent all his cavalry to the assistance of the Romans; meanwhile our men withstood all the attacks of the enemy, and bravely maintained the fight for upwards of six hours, having slain great numbers of the Morini, while on their side only a few were wounded; but no sooner did our cavalry appear than the enemy, throwing down their arms, betook themselves to flight, and were almost all slain in the pursuit.

34. The day after, Cæsar sent T. Labienus with the legions returned out of Britain against the rebellious Morini, who, being deprived by the drought of the benefit of their marshes, which had served them for shelter the year before, almost all fell into his power. Meantime Q. Titurius and L. Cotta, who had been sent against the Menapians, having laid waste their territories with fire and sword, and plundered their habitations, returned to Cæsar, not being able to come up with the Menapians themselves, who had retired into impenetrable forests. Cæsar quartered all his troops among the Belgians. Only two of the British states sent hostages into Gaul, the rest neglecting to perform the conditions of the treaty. For these successes a thanksgiving of twenty days was decreed by the senate.

BOOK V.

1. IN the consulship of Lucius Domitius and Ap-
pius Claudius, Cæsar, leaving his winter-quarters to
go into Italy, as was his yearly custom, gave orders
to his lieutenants, who had the charge of the legions,
to build as many ships as possible during the winter,
and to repair such as were old. He prescribed the
form and manner of building, ordering them to be
somewhat lower than was usual in the Mediterranean,
for the convenience of embarking and landing his
men, which he judged the more necessary, as he
had observed, that by reason of the frequent returns
of the tide there was less depth of water on the
British coast. He likewise commanded them to be
built broader than ordinary, that they might receive
the greater number of horses and carriages, and to
be contrived for lightness and expedition, to which
the lowness of their decks greatly contributed. He
sent to Spain for the materials necessary in building
and equipping them; and having finished the diet of
Cisalpine Gaul, set out for Illyricum, on advice that
the Pirustæ were laying waste the province by their
incursions. When he arrived there he ordered the
several states to furnish their contingents, and ap-
pointed a place of general rendezvous. The report
of this no sooner spread among the Pirustæ, than
they sent ambassadors to inform him that nothing
had been done against the province by public au-
thority, and that they were ready to make what
satisfaction he required. Cæsar, pleased with their
submission, ordered them to bring him hostages, and
named the day by which they were to be delivered,
threatening them with a fierce war in case of dis-
obedience. These being accordingly brought by the

day prefixed, he appointed arbitrators between the contending states, to estimate the damages, and determine what reparation was to be made.

2. Having despatched these affairs, and held a general diet of the province, he returned again into Cisalpine Gaul, and thence went to the army. On his arrival, he visited all the quarters of the legions, and found, that by the singular diligence of the soldiers, notwithstanding the greatest scarcity of materials, no less than six hundred transports, such as we have described above, and twenty-eight galleys, were in such forwardness that in a few days they would be ready to be launched. Having praised his soldiers, and those whom he had set over the works, he gave them what further instructions he thought necessary, and ordered the whole fleet to rendezvous at port Itius, whence he knew lay the most commodious passage to Britain; it being there not above thirty miles distant from the continent. Leaving what soldiers he thought necessary for this purpose, he advanced at the head of four legions, without baggage, and eight hundred horse, into the country of the Treviri, because they neither appeared at the general diets of Gaul, nor submitted to the orders of the commonwealth; and were, besides, reported to be soliciting the Germans beyond the Rhine.

3. This state is by far the most powerful of all Gaul in horse; they have likewise a very strong and numerous infantry; and, as we have before observed, border on the Rhine. Two of their principal men, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, were at this time competitors for the supreme authority. Cingetorix, as soon as he heard of the arrival of Cæsar and the legions, came to him and assured him that he and all his party would continue firm to their duty, and never abandon the interest of the Romans: at the same time he informed him of all that had passed among the Treviri. But Indutiomarus, drawing

together great numbers of horse and foot, and securing such as were unable to bear arms in the forest of Arden, which extends from the Rhine quite across the country of Treves, to the territories of the Rhemi, resolved to try the fortune of war. But soon after,—as several of the leading men of the state, partly out of attachment to Cingetorix, partly terrified by the approach of the Roman army, came to Cæsar to solicit in their own behalf, since they found themselves incapable of effectually serving their country,—Indutiomarus, fearing a universal defection, sent likewise ambassadors to him, to acquaint him “that he had chosen to stay at home, and forbear coming to the Roman camp, with no other view but to keep the state in its duty, lest, in the absence of the nobility, the people might have been drawn into some rash step: that the whole country was now at his command, and he ready, with Cæsar’s permission, to attend him in person, and put his own concerns, as well as those of the state, under his protection.” Though Cæsar well understood the reason of his present submission, and by what considerations he had been deterred from the prosecution of his first design, yet, unwilling to waste the whole summer in the country of Treves, when every thing was in readiness for his expedition into Britain, he ordered Indutiomarus to attend him with two hundred hostages. These being accordingly brought, and among them the son and all the nearest relations of Indutiomarus, whom he had specified by name, Cæsar encouraged and exhorted him to continue firm in his duty. Nevertheless, assembling all the principal men of Treves, he reconciled them one after another to Cingetorix, as well on account of his singular merit, as because he thought it of the greatest importance to establish thoroughly the authority of a man of whose steady and inviolable attachment he had such convincing proof. Indutiomarus highly resented this

proceeding, which tended so much to the diminution of his power; and as he had all along been an enemy to the Romans, this new affront provoked him still more.

4. These affairs being settled, Cæsar arrived with his legions at the port of Itius. There he found that about forty of his ships, built in the country of the Belgians, having been attacked by a storm, and disabled from continuing their voyage, had been obliged to put back. The rest were all equipped and rigged, ready to obey the first signal. All the cavalry of Gaul, about four thousand in number, and the prime nobility of the several states, met him likewise, by order, at this place. His design was, to leave only a few of these nobles behind him in Gaul, on whose fidelity he could rely, and to take the rest with him to Britain as hostages, the better to prevent any commotions during his absence.

5. Dumnorix, the Æduan, of whom we have spoken above, was one of those that attended him on this occasion. Him, in particular, he resolved to carry along with him, as he knew him to be a lover of novelties, ambitious, enterprising, and of great interest and authority among the Gauls. Besides all this, he had publicly said, in an assembly of the Æduans, that Cæsar had invested him with the sovereignty of their state; which resolution, though by no means pleasing to the Æduans, they yet durst not send ambassadors to Cæsar, either to oppose or get reversed; nor was Cæsar otherwise informed of the matter, but by those whom he had placed about Dumnorix, to have an eye over his conduct. Dumnorix, at first, earnestly petitioned to be left in Gaul, sometimes pretending he was unused to sailing, and afraid of the sea, sometimes urging religious engagements, which required him to stay at home. But finding all his endeavours to no purpose, he began to solicit the chiefs of the Gauls,

discoursing them apart, and advising them not to leave the continent. The more to awaken their fears, he told them "that Cæsar had his particular reasons for carrying with him all the nobility of Gaul; because, not daring to despatch them in their own country, he was in hopes of finding a favourable opportunity to execute his cruel purpose in Britain." He therefore exhorted them to join in a mutual alliance, and oblige themselves by a solemn oath to pursue with common consent such measures as should appear necessary for the preservation of Gaul.

6. Though Cæsar was fully informed of these practices, yet, in consideration of his singular regard for the Æduans, he contented himself with endeavouring to check and traverse his designs; determined, notwithstanding, to continue inflexible, and at all hazards to prevent any misfortune to himself and the commonwealth, from a spirit which he found every day growing more hardy and intrepid. Being therefore detained in this place about five-and-twenty days, during which the north-west wind, very common on that coast, hindered him from sailing, he studied, by the ways of gentleness and persuasion, to keep Dumnorix in his duty, without neglecting, however, to watch all his motions. At last, the wind springing up fair, he ordered the horse and foot to embark. As this universally engaged the attention of the camp, Dumnorix, unknown to Cæsar, drew off the Æduan cavalry, and began his march homeward. Cæsar, being informed of it, immediately put a stop to the embarkation; and, postponing every other consideration, ordered out a strong party of horse to pursue and bring him back. If he made resistance, or refused to obey, they had orders to kill him; for he judged that a man who had slighted his personal authority would not pay any great regard to his commands in his absence. When they had overtaken him, he refused to return;

and, defending himself sword in hand, implored the assistance of his followers ; often calling out that he was free, and the subject of a free state. The Romans, according to the orders they had received, surrounded and slew him ; on which all the Æduan cavalry returned to Cæsar.

7. This affair concluded, and Labienus being left in Gaul with three legions and two thousand horse to defend the port, provide corn, have an eye on the transactions of the continent, and take measures accordingly, Cæsar weighed anchor about sunset with five legions, and the same number of horse he had left with Labienus, and advancing with a gentle south wind, continued his course till midnight, when he found himself becalmed ; but the tide still driving him on, at daybreak he saw Britain on his left. When again following the return of the tide, he rowed with all his might to reach that part of the island which he had marked out the summer before as most convenient for landing ; and on this occasion the diligence of the soldiers cannot be enough commended ; who, labouring incessantly at the oar, urged the transports and ships of burden so swiftly, that they equalled the course of the galleys. The whole fleet reached the coast of Britain about noon ; nor did any enemy appear in view : but, as Cæsar afterward understood from the prisoners, though a great army of Britons had repaired to the coast, yet, terrified by the vast number of ships, which, together with those of the last year's expedition, and such as had been fitted out by particular persons for their own use, amounted to upwards of eight hundred, they retired hastily from the shore, and hid themselves behind the mountains.

8. Cæsar having landed his army, and chosen a proper place for his camp, as soon as he understood from the prisoners where the enemy's forces lay, leaving ten cohorts on the coast, together with three hundred horse, to guard his fleet, he set out about

midnight in quest of the enemy, being under the less concern for his ships, because he had left them at anchor on a smooth and open shore, under the charge of Q. Atrius. After a march of twelve hours, during the night, he came within sight of the enemy; who, having posted themselves behind a river, with their cavalry and chariots, attacked us from the higher ground, in order to oppose our passage; but being repulsed by our horse, they retreated towards the woods, into a place strongly fenced both by nature and art; and which, in all probability, had been fortified before on occasion of some domestic war; for all the avenues were secured by strong barricadoes of felled trees. They never sallied out of the wood but in small parties, thinking it enough to defend the entrance against our men. But the soldiers of the seventh legion, advancing under cover of their shields, and having cast up a mount, forced the intrenchments with little loss, and obliged the enemy to abandon the wood. Cæsar forbade all pursuit, both because he was unacquainted with the nature of the country, and the day being far spent, he resolved to employ the rest of it in fortifying the camp.

9. Early the next morning he divided his troops, both horse and foot, into three bodies, and sent them out in pursuit of the enemy. They were advanced but a little way, and just come within sight of the rear of the Britons, when a party of horse from Atrius came to Cæsar, and informed him "that a dreadful storm arising the night before had fallen violently on the fleet, and driven almost all the ships ashore; that neither anchors, nor cables, nor all the address of the mariners and pilots had been able to resist the fury of the tempest, which had done unspeakable damage to the fleet, by reason of the ships running foul of one another." Cæsar, on this intelligence, recalled his legions and cavalry, commanding them to give over their pursuit. He him-

self returned to his ships, and found every thing according to the reports and letters he had received ; forty of them being entirely destroyed, and the rest so damaged that they were hardly reparable. He therefore set all the carpenters of the army to work, and wrote for others to Gaul, ordering Labienus at the same time, with the legions under his command, to build what ships he could. He thought it likewise safest, though a work of great labour and difficulty, to draw all his ships on shore, and enclose them within the fortifications of his camp. Ten days were spent in the service, during which the soldiers had no intermission of fatigue, not even in the night. The ships being in this manner secured, and the camp strongly fortified, he left the same troops to guard it as before, and returned to the place where he had quitted the pursuit of the enemy. On his arrival he found the forces of the Britons considerably increased. The chief command and administration of the war was, by common consent, conferred on Cassibelanus, whose territories were divided from the maritime states by the Thames, a river eighty miles distant from the sea. This prince had hitherto been engaged in almost continual wars with his neighbours ; but the terror of our arrival making the Britons unite among themselves, they intrusted him with the whole conduct of the war.

10. The inland parts of Britain are inhabited by those whom fame reports to be the natives of the soil. The seacoast is peopled with the Belgians, drawn thither by the love of war and plunder. These last, passing over from different parts, and settling in the country, still retain the names of the several states whence they are descended. The island is well peopled, full of houses built after the manner of the Gauls, and abounds in cattle. They use brass money, and iron rings of a certain weight. The provinces remote from the sea produce tin, and those on the coast iron ; but the latter in no great

CÆS. VOL. I.—M

quantity. Their brass is all imported. All kinds of wood grow here the same as in Gaul, except the fir and beech-tree. They think it unlawful to feed on hares, pullets, or geese; yet they breed them up for their diversion and pleasure. The climate is more temperate than in Gaul, and the cold less intense: The island is triangular, one of its sides facing Gaul. The extremity towards Kent, whence is the nearest passage to Gaul, lies eastward; the other stretches south-west. This side extends about five hundred miles. Another side looks towards Spain, westward. Over-against this lies Ireland, an island esteemed not above half as large as Britain, and separated from it by an interval equal to that between Britain and Gaul. In this interval lies the isle of Mona, besides several other lesser islands, of which some write that in the time of the winter solstice they have night for thirty days together. We could make out nothing of this on inquiry; only discovered by means of hour-glasses that the nights were shorter than in Gaul. The length of this side is computed at seven hundred miles. The last side faces the north-east, and is fronted by no part of the continent, only towards one of its extremities it seems to eye chiefly the German coast. It is thought to extend in length about eight hundred miles. Thus the whole island takes in a circuit of two thousand miles. The inhabitants of Kent, which lies wholly on the seacoast, are the most civilized of all the Britons, and differ but little in their manner from the Gauls. The greater part of those within the country never sow their lands, but live on flesh and milk, and go clad in skins. All the Britons in general paint themselves with woad, which gives a bluish cast to the skin, and makes them look dreadful in battle. They are long-haired, and shave all the rest of the body except the head and upper lip. Ten or twelve of them live together, having their wives in common, especially brothers, or parents and chil-

dren among themselves; but the issue is always ascribed to him who first espoused the mother.

11. The enemy's horse, supported by their chariots, vigorously charged our cavalry on their march, yet we everywhere had the better, and drove them to their woods and hills; but after making great slaughter, venturing to continue the pursuit too far, we lost some men. Some time after, sallying unexpectedly from the woods, and falling suddenly on our men while employed in fortifying their camp, a sharp conflict ensued between them and the advanced guard. Cæsar sent two cohorts to their assistance, whom the Britons charging in separate parties, so surprised with their new manner of fighting, that they broke through, routed them, and returned without loss. Q. Laberius Durus, a military tribune, was slain on this occasion: but some fresh cohorts coming up, the Britons were at last repulsed.

12. By this action, which happened within view of the camp, and of which the whole army were spectators, it evidently appeared that our heavy-armed legions, who could neither pursue those that retired, nor durst venture to forsake their standards, were by no means a fit match for such an enemy; nor could even the cavalry engage without great danger, it being usual for the Britons to counterfeit a retreat, until they had drawn them a considerable way from the legions, when suddenly quitting their chariots, they charged them on foot, and by this unequal manner of fighting made it alike dangerous to pursue or retire. Add to all this, that they never fought in a body, but in small parties, and with considerable intervals between. They had likewise their detachments so placed as easily to protect their flying troops, and send fresh supplies where needful.

13. The next day they stationed themselves among the hills, at a distance from our camp, and appeared only in small bodies, nor seemed so forward to skir-

mish with our cavalry as the day before. But about noon, Cæsar ordering out three legions to forage, with all the cavalry, under the command of C. Trebonius, his lieutenant, they fell suddenly on the foragers on all sides, and even attacked the legions and standards. Our men, vigorously returning the charge, repulsed them, and the cavalry, finding themselves supported by the foot, continued the pursuit till they had utterly broken them ; insomuch, that great numbers being slain, they could neither find an opportunity to rally, descend from their chariots, nor face about to make resistance. After this defeat the auxiliary troops, which had come in from all parts, returned severally to their own homes ; nor did the enemy from this time appear any more against us with their whole forces.

14. Cæsar, perceiving their design, marched towards the Thames, to penetrate into the kingdom of Cassibelanus. This river is fordable only in one place, and that not without great difficulty. When he arrived, he saw the enemy drawn up in great numbers on the other side. They had likewise secured the banks with sharp stakes, and driven many of the same kind into the bottom of the river, yet so as to be covered by the water. Cæsar, having intelligence of this from the prisoners and deserters, sent the cavalry before, ordering the legions to follow close after, which they did with so much expedition and briskness, though nothing but their heads were above the water, that the enemy, unable to sustain their charge, quitted the banks, and betook themselves to flight.

15. Cassibelanus, as we have before intimated, finding himself unable to keep the field, disbanded all his other forces ; and retaining only four thousand chariots, watched our motions, always keeping at some distance from us, and sheltering himself in woods and inaccessible places, whither he had likewise made such of the inhabitants with their cattle

retire, as lay on our route ; and if at any time our cavalry ventured on a freer excursion into the fields to plunder and lay waste the country, as he was perfectly acquainted with all the roads and defiles, he would sally from the woods with some of the chariots, and fall on our men, dispersed and in disorder. These frequent alarms obliged us to be much on our guard ; nor would Cæsar suffer the cavalry to remove to any distance from the legions, or to pillage and destroy the country, unless where the foot was at hand to sustain them.

16. Meantime the Trinobantes, one of the most powerful states in those parts, sent ambassadors to Cæsar. Of this state was Mandubratius, who had fled for protection to Cæsar in Gaul, that he might avoid the fate of his father Imānuentius, whom Cassibelanus had put to death. The ambassadors promised obedience and submission in the name of the province ; and withal entreated him to defend Mandubratius against the violence of Cassibelanus, and restore him to the government of their state. Cæsar ordered them to deliver forty hostages, and furnish his army with corn ; sending back at the same time Mandubratius. They yielded to his demands without delay, sent the appointed number of hostages, and supplied him with corn.

17. The protection granted to the Trinobantes securing them from the insults of the soldiers ; the Cenimagni, Segontiaci, Ancalites, Bibroci, and Cassi, send ambassadors to Cæsar, and submit. From them he had intelligence that he was not far from the capital of Cassibelanus, which was situated amid woods and marshes, and whither great numbers of men and cattle were retired. A town among the Britons is nothing more than a thick wood, fortified with a ditch and rampart to serve as a place of retreat against the incursions of their enemies. Thither he marched with his legions ; and though the place appeared to be extremely strong, both by art and nature, he

nevertheless resolved to attack it in two several quarters. The enemy, after a short stand, were obliged at last to give way and retire by another part of the wood. Vast numbers of cattle were found in the place; and many of the Britons were either made prisoners or lost their lives in the pursuit.

18. While these things passed beyond the Thames, Cassibelanus despatched messengers to Kent, which, as we have before observed, was situated along the seacoast. This country was then under the government of four kings,—Cingetorix, Carnilius, Taximagulus, and Segonax—who had orders to draw all their forces together, and fall suddenly on the naval camp of the Romans. But our men, sallying on them as they approached, made great slaughter of their troops, took Cingetorix, one of their leaders, prisoner, and returned safe to the camp. Cassibelanus, on the news of this battle, discouraged by so many losses, the devastation of his territories, and, above all, the revolt of the provinces, sent ambassadors to Cæsar to sue for peace, by the mediation of Commius of Arras.

19. Cæsar, designing to pass the winter in Gaul, because of the frequent commotions in that country, and reflecting that but a small part of the summer remained, during which it would be easy to protract the war, demanded hostages, and appointed the yearly tribute which Britain was to pay to the Romans. At the same time he strictly charged Cassibelanus to offer no injury to Mandubratius or the Trinobantes. Having received the hostages, he led his troops back to the seaside, where he found his fleet repaired. Orders were immediately given to launch it; and because the number of prisoners was exceeding great, and several ships had been destroyed by the tempest, he resolved to carry over his men at two embarkations. Happily it so fell out, notwithstanding the great number of ships, and their fre-

quent passing and repassing, that not one perished either this or the preceding year which had any soldiers on board; whereas those sent empty to him from the continent, as well the ships concerned in the first embarkation as others built afterward by Labienus, to the number of sixty, were almost all driven back or lost. Cæsar, having waited for them a considerable time to no purpose, and fearing to lose the proper season for sailing, as the time of the equinox drew near, chose to stow his men on board the few ships he had; and taking the opportunity of an extraordinary calm, set sail about ten at night, and by daybreak brought his whole fleet safe to the continent of Gaul.

20. Having laid up his fleet, and held a general assembly of the Gauls at Samarobriua, as the crop had been very indifferent this year, by reason of the great droughts, he was obliged to quarter his legions otherwise than in former winters, and canton them one by one in the several provinces of Gaul. One legion he quartered on the Morini, under the command of C. Fabius; another among the Nervians, under Q. Cicero; a third with the Æduans, under L. Roscius; and a fourth in the country of the Rhemi, on the borders of the Treviri, under Labienus. Three were sent into Belgium, over whom he appointed three commanders,—M. Crassus, his questor, L. Munatius Plancus, and C. Trebonius. The eighth and last, which Cæsar had newly raised on the other side of the Po, was sent, together with five cohorts, among the Eburones, between the Rhine and the Meuse, where Ambiorix and Cativulcus reigned. At the head of this body were two commanders,—Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Arunculeius Cotta. By this distribution of his legions he thought he had found an easy remedy against the scarcity of corn; and yet they all lay within the compass of a hundred miles, except that under L. Roscius, for which he was in no pain, as being quartered in a very quiet

and friendly country. He resolved, however, not to leave Gaul till he had received advice from all his lieutenants, and was assured that their quarters were established, fortified, and secured.

21. Among the Carnutes lived Tasgetius, a man of distinguished birth, and whose ancestors had been possessed of the sovereignty in that state. Cæsar had restored him to the dignity of his forefathers, in consideration of his virtue and affection to him, and the many signal services he had done him in all his wars. It was now the third year of his reign, when his enemies, many of whom were of his own state, conspiring against him, openly assassinated him. The affair was laid before Cæsar; who, fearing lest the great number concerned in the plot might draw the state into a revolt, ordered L. Plancus, with a legion from Belgium, to march speedily into the country of the Carnutes, fix his winter-quarters in that province, and seizing all who had been concerned in the murder of Tasgetius, send them prisoners to him. Meantime he was informed by his lieutenants and questors, to whom he had committed the care of the legions, that they were severally arrived at their appointed quarters, and had fortified themselves in them.

22. About fifteen days after the arrival of the legions in their winter-quarters, a sudden insurrection and revolt broke out among the Eburones by the secret practice of Ambiorix and Cativulcus. These two princes had been to meet Sabinus and Cotta on their frontiers, and in a friendly manner had supplied them with corn: but now, instigated by Indutiomarus of Treves, they excited their people to take up arms; and having surprised some soldiers that were gone to cut wood, came with a great body of troops to attack the Roman camp. Our men immediately flew to arms, ascended the rampart, and sending out a detachment of Spanish horse, put their cavalry to the rout. On this, despairing of success,

they drew off their men from the attack; and, according to their custom, demanded a conference; pretending they had something to say which concerned the common interest, and might serve to put an end to the present differences.

23. Accordingly, C. Arpinus, a Roman knight, the friend of Q. Titurius, and Q. Junius of Spain, who had frequently before been sent by Cæsar to Ambiorix, were deputed to treat. Ambiorix addressed them in words to this effect: "That he had in no sort forgot the many obligations he lay under to Cæsar, who had freed him from the tribute he had been wont to pay the Atuatici; and who had restored him his son and nephew, whom that people, after receiving them as hostages, had treated as slaves: that the hostilities he had just committed were not the effect of his own private animosity to the Romans, but in consequence of a resolution of the state, where the government was of such a nature that the people had as much power over him as he over the people; that even the state itself had been in a manner forced into this war by a sudden confederacy of all Gaul; that he could appeal to his own weakness for the truth of what he said, being not so very unskilled in affairs as to imagine that the forces of the Eburones were a match for the power of the Romans; that it was a project formed by all the states of Gaul in common, who had agreed to storm in one day, the very day on which he spoke, all the quarters of the Roman army, so that no one might be able to succour another; that it was not easy for Gauls to resist the importunity of those of their own nation, especially in a proposal to act in concert for the recovery of their liberty; but that, after having performed what the common voice of his country demanded, he thought he might now listen to that of gratitude; that he found himself compelled by his attachment to Cæsar, and by his friendship for Sabinus, to give notice of the extreme danger to

which the legion was exposed ; that a great body of Germans had actually passed the Rhine, and would be there in two days at farthest ; that Sabinus and Cotta were to consider whether it would not be proper to retire with their troops before the neighbouring states could be apprized of their design, and go and join Labienus or Cicero, who were neither of them distant much above fifty miles. That as far as regarded himself, he engaged by all that was sacred to secure their retreat through his territories ; and undertook it the more readily, as he should thereby not only discharge his duty to his country, in delivering it from the inconvenience of wintering the Romans, but at the same time manifest his gratitude to Cæsar." Having made this speech, he withdrew.

24. Arpinus and Junius reported what they had heard to the lieutenants ; who, alarmed at the suddenness of the thing, thought the information not to be neglected, though it came from an enemy : nor were they a little moved by this consideration, that it appeared to them altogether incredible that the Eburones, a weak and inconsiderable state, should of their own accord presume to take up arms against the Romans. They therefore laid the matter before a council of war, where a warm debate arose. L. Arunculeius, with a great number of military tribunes, and centurions of the first rank, were against undertaking any thing hastily, or quitting their winter-quarters before they had received orders to that purpose from Cæsar. They alleged, "that having strongly fortified their camp, they were able to defend themselves, even against all the forces of the Germans : that the late attempt of the Gauls was a sufficient proof of this, whom they had not only withstood with courage, but repulsed with loss : that they had provisions in abundance, and might therefore securely wait the arrival of relief from Cæsar and the neighbouring legions : in fine, that nothing could be more dis-

honourable, or argue greater want of judgment, than in affairs of the highest moment to take measures on the information of an enemy." Titurius, on the other hand, exclaimed, "that it would then be too late to think of retiring, when the enemy in greater numbers, and strengthened by the accession of the Germans, should come up against them; or when the quarters next them should have received some signal check: that the time for deliberation was short: that Cæsar, he made no question, was gone into Italy, it not being likely that either the Carnutes would have formed the design of assassinating Tasgetius, or the Eburones in so contemptuous a manner assaulted the Roman camp, had they not been assured of his departure: that the information of an enemy weighed not with him, but the real circumstances of things. The Rhine was not far off. The Germans were much exasperated by the death of Ariovistus, and their late frequent defeats. Gaul burned with impatience to throw off the Roman yoke, avenge the many losses they had sustained, and recover their former glory in war, of which now scarce a shadow remained. In short, who could imagine that Ambiorix, without a certainty of being supported, would have embarked in so dangerous an enterprise? That his opinion was in all respects safe; because, if no such confederacy had been formed, they had nothing to apprehend in marching to the nearest legion: if, on the contrary, all Gaul and Germany were united, expedition alone could save them from destruction; whereas, by following the advice of Cotta and those who were against a retreat, though the danger perhaps might not prove immediate, yet were they sure in the end of perishing by famine." The dispute continued for some time; Cotta and the principal officers strongly opposing the march of the troops. At last Sabinus, raising his voice that he might be heard by the soldiers without, "Be it so then," said he, "since you seem so resolved: I am

not he among you who is most afraid of death; but if any misfortune happens, those who hear me will know whom to blame. In two days, did not you oppose it, we might easily reach the quarters next us; and there in conjunction with our fellow-soldiers, confront the common danger; whereas, by keeping the troops separate, and at a distance, you reduce them to the necessity of perishing by sword or famine."

25. The council was then going to rise; but the officers, surrounding their generals, conjured them not to put all to hazard by their dissension and obstinacy. They told them, "that whatever resolution was taken, whether to go or stay, the danger was by no means great, provided they acted with union among themselves; but their disagreement threatened the troops with inevitable destruction." The debate continued till midnight: when at length Cotta, vanquished by importunity, yielded to the opinion of Sabinus. Orders were given for marching by break of day. The remainder of the night was none of it employed in sleep; each man being taken up in choosing what things to carry along with him, and what of his winter necessities to leave behind. In short, they did every thing to make their stay more dangerous; and, by their fatigue and want of rest incapacitate themselves for a vigorous defence on their march. At daybreak they left their camp, not like men acting by the advice of an enemy, but as if Ambiorix had been their particular friend; marching in a very extended column, and followed by a great train of baggage.

26. The enemy, judging from the hurry and motion in the camp, that the Romans intended to leave it, placed themselves in ambuscade in two bodies, in a wood; where, well sheltered and covered from view, they waited, at about two miles' distance, their arrival; and when the greatest part of the army had entered a large valley, suddenly appearing on

both sides of it, they attacked them at the same time in front and rear, and obliged them to fight in a place of great disadvantage.

27. Then at length Titurius, like one who had neglected all the necessary precautions, unable to hide his concern, ran up and down among the troops, and began to dispose them in order of battle; but with an air so timid and disconcerted, that it appeared he had no hopes of success; as happens for the most part to those who leave all to the last moment of execution. But Cotta, who had foreseen that this might happen, and had therefore opposed the departure of the troops, omitted nothing in his power for the common safety; calling to and encouraging the men like an able general, and at the same time fighting with the bravery of a common soldier; and, because the great length of the column rendered it difficult for the lieutenants to remedy all disorders, and repair expeditiously enough to the places where their presence was necessary, orders were given to quit the defence of the baggage, and form into an orb. This disposition, though not improper in these circumstances, was nevertheless attended with very unhappy consequences; for being considered as the effect of terror and despair, it discouraged our men, and augmented the confidence of the enemy. Besides, as unavoidably happens on such occasions, many of the soldiers, quitting their ensigns, hastened to fetch from the baggage what they had most of value, and filled all parts with uproar and lamentation.

28. The Gauls meanwhile conducted themselves with great prudence: their officers proclaimed through the ranks "that not a man should stir from his post: that the booty was theirs, and every thing belonging to the Romans must certainly fall into their hands; but that all depended on securing the victory." Our men were not inferior to the enemy, either in valour, number, or way of fighting.

CÆS. VOL. I.—N

Though they had neither general nor fortune on their side, they hoped still by their bravery to surmount all difficulties; and whenever any of the cohorts sallied out, so as to join the enemy hand to hand, a considerable slaughter of the Gauls ensued. This being perceived by Ambiorix, he ordered his men to cast their darts at a distance, to avoid a close fight, retire before the Romans whenever they advanced, and pursue them as they returned to their standards: in which way of fighting they were become so expert, by the lightness of their arms, and daily exercise, that it was impossible to do them any hurt. These orders were exactly followed; insomuch, that when any cohort left the orb, and came forward to attack the enemy, they retreated and dispersed in a moment: meanwhile it uncovered its own flanks, and exposed them to the darts on either side. The danger was still greater when they returned; for then not only the troops that stood next them, but those who had retired before them, surrounded and charged them on all hands. If, on the contrary, they chose to continue in their post, neither could their valour any thing avail them, nor was it possible for men standing so close together to avoid the darts of so great a multitude. And yet, notwithstanding all these disadvantages, and the many wounds they had received, they still maintained their ground; and though much of the day was now spent, the fight having continued from sunrise till two in the afternoon, they did nothing in all that time unworthy the dignity of the Roman name. At length T. Balventius, who the year before had been made first centurion of a legion, a man of distinguished courage, and great authority among the troops, had both his thighs pierced with a dart. Q. Lucanius, an officer of the same rank, endeavouring to rescue his son, whom he saw surrounded by the enemy, was killed after a brave resistance. And L. Cotta, the lieuten-

ant, encouraging the several cohorts and companies, received a blow on the mouth from a sling.

29. So many misfortunes quite dispirited Titurius; who, perceiving Ambiorix at a distance animating his troops, sent Cn. Pompey, his interpreter, to beg quarter for himself and his soldiers. Ambiorix replied, "that he was ready to grant him a conference if he desired it: that he hoped to prevail with the multitude to spare the Romans; and that as to Sabinus himself, he gave his word no hurt should be done him." Sabinus communicated this answer to Cotta, proposing that they should leave the battle, and go and confer with Ambiorix, from whom he was in hopes of obtaining quarter both for themselves and their men. Cotta absolutely refused to treat with an armed enemy, and persisted in that resolution. Sabinus ordered the military tribunes and principal centurions that were about his person to follow him, and when he drew near to Ambiorix, being commanded to lay down his arms, obeyed; charging those that were with him to do the same. Meanwhile, as they were treating about the conditions, Ambiorix spinning out the deliberations on purpose, he was by degrees surrounded and slain. Then the Gauls, according to their custom, raising a shout and calling out victory, charged our troops with great fury, and put them into disorder. L. Cotta, fighting manfully, was slain, with the greatest part of the soldiers. The rest retreated to the camp they had quitted in the morning; of whom L. Petrosidius, the standard-bearer, finding himself sore pressed by the enemy, threw the eagle within the intrenchments, and was killed fighting bravely before the camp. Those that remained with much ado sustained the attack till night; but finding themselves without hope, they killed one another to the last man. A few who escaped out of the fight got by different ways to Labienus's camp, and brought him the news of this sad event.

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30. Ambiorix, elated with this victory, marched immediately at the head of his cavalry into the country of the Atuatici, which bordered on his territories; and travelling day and night without intermission, left orders for the infantry to follow him. Having informed them of his success and roused them to arms, he the next day arrived among the Nervians, and urged them not to lose the favourable opportunity of freeing themselves for ever from the yoke of slavery, and avenging the injuries they had received from the Romans. He told them "that two of their lieutenants had been slain, and a great part of their army cut to pieces: that it would be an easy matter suddenly to attack and destroy the legion quartered in their country under Cicero; and that he was himself ready to assist them in the enterprise." By this speech he easily drew in the Nervians.

31. Accordingly, having forthwith despatched messengers to the Centrones, Grudii, Levaci, Pleumosians, and Gorduni, who are all subject to their state, they assembled what forces they could, and came unexpectedly on Cicero's quarters, who as yet had heard nothing of the fate of Titurius. Here likewise it unavoidably fell out that the soldiers sent to cut wood for firing and the fortifications of the camp were intercepted by the sudden arrival of their cavalry. Having put all these to the sword, the Eburenese, Atuatici, and Nervians, with their allies and tributaries, amounting to a formidable army, came and attacked the camp. Our men immediately flew to arms, ascended the rampart, and with great difficulty sustained the day's assault; for the enemy placed all their hopes in despatch, and firmly believed that if they came off conquerors on this occasion, they could not fail of victory everywhere else.

32. Cicero's first care was to write to Cæsar, promising the messengers great rewards if they carried his letters safe. But as all the ways were beset by

the enemy's troops, his couriers were continually intercepted. Meanwhile, of the materials brought for fortifying the camp, a hundred and twenty towers were built, during the night, with incredible despatch, and the works about the rampart completed. Next day the enemy, with a much greater force than before, attacked the camp, filled the ditch, but were again repulsed by our men. This continued for several days together. The night was wholly employed in repairing the breaches made by day; insomuch that neither the sick nor wounded were permitted to rest. Whatever might be of use to resist the next day's assault was prepared with great diligence during the night. Stakes were hardened in the fire, pallisades planted in great number, towers raised on all parts of the rampart, and the whole strengthened with a parapet and battlements. Cicero himself, though much out of order, would take no rest, even during the night; so that the soldiers were obliged to force him from time to time to take some repose.

33. Meantime such of the Nervian chiefs and leaders as had any intimacy or friendship with Cicero desired a conference. This being agreed to, they addressed him in the same strain as Ambiorix had before used towards Sabinus: "that all Gaul was in arms; that the Germans had passed the Rhine; that Cæsar and the rest of the troops were besieged in their winter-quarters." They told him likewise of the fate of Sabinus; and, to gain credit, produced Ambiorix; adding, "that it was in vain to expect relief from those who were themselves in the utmost distress: that they meant not however any injury to Cicero and the people of Rome, but merely to prevent their wintering in the country, and establishing that practice into a custom: that he was therefore at liberty to leave his quarters without molestation, and retire in safety where he pleased." To this Cicero only answered, "that it was not usual with the people of Rome to accept conditions from

an armed enemy: but if they would lay down their arms, he promised to interpose his mediation, and permit them to send ambassadors to Cæsar, from whose justice they might reasonably expect redress."

34. The Nervians, driven from this hope, surrounded the camp with a line, whose rampart was eleven feet high, and ditch fifteen feet deep. They had learned something of this in their former wars with Cæsar, and the prisoners they had made gave them further instructions. But being unprovided with the tools necessary in this kind of service, they were obliged to cut the turf with their swords, dig up the earth with their hands, and carry it in their cloaks. And hence it will be easy to form some judgment of their number; for in less than three hours they completed a line of fifteen miles in circuit. The following days were employed in raising towers, proportioned to the height of our rampart, and in preparing scythes and wooden galleries, in which they were again assisted by the prisoners.

35. On the seventh day of attack, a very high wind arising, they began to throw red-hot balls of clay, and burning javelins, on the barracks of the Romans, which, after the manner of the Gauls, were thatched with straw. These soon took fire, and the flames were in a moment spread by the wind into all parts of the camp. The enemy, falling on with a mighty shout, as if already secured of victory, advanced their towers and galleries, and prepared to scale the rampart. But such was the constancy and presence of mind of the soldiers, that though the flames surrounded them on every side, and they were oppressed with the multitude of the enemy's darts,—though they saw their huts, their baggage, and their whole fortunes in a blaze,—yet not only did they continue firm in their posts, but scarce a man offered so much as to look behind him; so intent were they on fighting and repelling the enemy. This was much the hardest day for our troops; but had nevertheless this fortunate issue, that far the greatest number of the

enemy were on that day wounded or slain ; for as they had crowded close up to the rampart, those behind prevented the front ranks from retiring. The flames abating by degrees, and the enemy having brought forward one of their towers to the very foot of the rampart, the centurions of the third cohort drew off their men a little, beckoning to the Gauls, and challenging them to enter : but as not a man would run the hazard, they attacked them on all sides with stones, drove them from the tower, and set it on fire.

36. In this legion were two centurions of distinguished valour, T. Pulvio, and L. Varenus, who stood fair for being raised to the first rank of their order. These were perpetually disputing with one another the pre-eminence in courage, and at every year's promotion contended with great eagerness for precedence. In the heat of the attack before the rampart, Pulvio addressing Varenus, "What hinders you now," says he, "or what more glorious opportunity would you desire of signalizing your bravery ? This, this is the day for determining the controversy between us." At these words he sallied out of the camp, and rushed amid the thickest of the Gauls. Nor did Varenus decline the challenge ; but thinking his honour at stake, followed at some distance. Pulvio darted his javelin at the enemy, and transfixed a Gaul that was coming forward to engage him ; who falling dead of the wound, the multitude advanced to cover him with their shields, and all poured their darts on Pulvio, giving him no time to retire. A javelin pierced his shield, and stuck fast in his belt. This accident entangling his right hand, prevented him drawing his sword, and gave the enemy time to surround him. Varenus, his rival, flew to his assistance, and endeavoured to rescue him. Immediately the multitude quitting Pulvio, as fancying the dart had despatched him, all turned on Varenus. He met them with his sword drawn, charged

them hand to hand, and having laid one dead at his feet, drove back the rest; but pursuing with too much eagerness, stepped into a hole, and fell down. Pulfio, in his turn, hastened to extricate him; and both together, after having slain a multitude of the Gauls, and acquired infinite applause, retired unhurt within the intrenchments. Thus fortune gave such a turn to the dispute, that each owed his life to his adversary; nor was it possible to decide to which of them the prize of valour was due.

37. As the defence every day became more difficult and hazardous, chiefly by the great multitude of killed and wounded, which considerably lessened the number of defendants, Cicero sent letter on letter to inform Cæsar of his danger. Many of these couriers, falling into the enemy's hands, were tortured to death within view of our soldiers. There was at that time in the Roman camp a Nervian of distinction, by name Vertico, who in the beginning of the siege had fled to Cicero, and given ample proofs of his fidelity. This man, by the hopes of liberty, and a promise of great rewards, engaged one of his slaves to carry a letter to Cæsar. Having concealed it in his javelin, and passed through the camp of the Gauls without suspicion, as being himself of that nation, he arrived safe at Cæsar's quarters, who by this means was informed of the danger of Cicero and the legion.

38. Cæsar, receiving the letter about five in the afternoon, immediately despatched a messenger to M. Crassus, who was quartered among the Bellovaci, twenty-five miles off, ordering him to draw out his legion at midnight, and march with all the expedition he could to join him. Crassus, according to his orders, came along with the courier. He sent likewise to C. Fabius, directing him to lead his legion into the country of the Atrebatians, which lay in the way to Cicero. He wrote to Labienus, if it could be done with safety, to meet him on the

frontiers of the Nervians. He himself, in the mean time, assembled about four hundred horse from the nearest garrisons, resolving not to wait for the rest of the army, which lay at too great a distance.

39. At nine in the morning he had notice from his scouts of the arrival of Crassus. That day he marched twenty miles, leaving Crassus with a legion at Samarobriua, where he had deposited the baggage, hostages, public papers, and all the provisions which had been laid up for the winter. Fabius, in consequence of his instructions, having made all the haste he could, met him with his legion. Labienus, who had been informed of the death of Sabinus, and the destruction of the troops under his command, and who saw all the forces of Treves advancing against him, fearing lest if he should quit his quarters the enemy might construe it as a flight, and that it would be impossible for him to sustain their attack, especially as they were flushed with their late success, wrote to Cæsar, informing him of the danger that would attend the quitting his camp, of the disaster that had happened among the Eburones, and that all the forces of the Treviri, both horse and foot, were encamped within three miles of him.

40. Cæsar, approving his reasons, though he thereby found himself reduced from three to two legions, was yet sensible that all depended on expedition. He made forced marches; and reaching the territories of the Nervians, learned from some prisoners the state of the siege, and the danger the legion was in. Immediately he engaged a Gaulish horseman, by the promise of great rewards, to carry a letter to Cicero. It was written in Greek characters that if it fell into the enemy's hands, it might not be intelligible to them. The messenger had orders, in case he found it impracticable to penetrate himself into the Roman camp, to tie the letter to a javelin, and throw it in. In this letter Cæsar sent Cicero word that he was already on the march to

relieve him, and would be up very soon; exhorting him in the mean time to defend himself with his wonted bravery. The Gaul, dreading a discovery, threw the letter into the camp as had been ordered; but the javelin, by accident sticking in a tower, remained there two days unperceived. On the third, a soldier saw it, took it down, and brought it to Cicero, who immediately read it in full assembly, and diffused the common joy through the whole camp. At the same time they perceived the smoke of the villages fired by Cæsar, in his march, which put the arrival of the succours beyond all doubt.

41. The Gauls, having notice of it also by their scouts, thought proper to quit the siege, and go to meet Cæsar. Their army consisted of about sixty thousand men. Cicero, now at liberty, applied again to Vertico for the slave spoken of above; and having admonished him to use the utmost diligence and circumspection, despatched him with a letter to Cæsar, informing him that the enemy had raised the siege, and were advancing against him with all their forces. Cæsar received the letter about midnight, communicated the contents to his army, and exhorted them to meet the enemy with courage. Next day he decamped early; and after a march of four miles, discovered the Gauls on the other side of a large valley, with a river in front. It was dangerous to engage so great a force on unequal ground. Knowing therefore that the siege of Cicero's camp was raised, and having no longer any reason to be in a hurry, he encamped in the most convenient spot he could find, and completed his intrenchments. His army, consisting of no more than seven thousand men, without baggage, required at best but a very small camp; yet he purposely contracted it as much as possible, to inspire the enemy with the greater contempt of him. Meantime, sending out scouts on all sides, he endeavoured to find where he might cross the valley with most safety.

42. The rest of the day passed in slight skirmishes between the cavalry near the brook ; but the main body of the army on both sides kept within their lines ; the Gauls, in expectation of more forces, which were not yet come up ; Cæsar, that by pretending fear, he might draw the enemy on this side the valley, and engage them before his camp ; or, if that could not be effected, that having discovered the passes, he might be enabled to cross the valley and rivulet with less danger. Early next morning the enemy's cavalry, coming up to our camp, charged our horse ; who, by Cæsar's orders, purposely gave ground, and retired behind the works. At the same time he caused the ramparts to be raised higher, the gates to be barricaded, and cautioned the soldiers, in the execution of these orders, to run up and down tumultuously, and affect an air of timidity and concern. The enemy, invited by all these appearances, crossed the valley, and drew up in a very disadvantageous post. Our men meanwhile retiring from the rampart, they approached still nearer, cast their darts on all sides within the trenches, and sent heralds round the camp to proclaim, that if any of the Gauls or Romans had a mind to come over to them, they should be at liberty so to do till nine o'clock, after which no quarter would be granted. Nay, so far did they carry their contempt, that thinking they could not break in by the gates (which, to deceive them, were stopped up with single rows of turf), some began to scale the rampart, others to fill up the ditch. But then Cæsar, sallying by all the gates at once, and charging them briskly with his cavalry, put them so precipitately to flight, that not a man offered to make the least resistance. Great numbers of them were slain, and the rest obliged to throw down their arms.

43. Not caring to pursue them far, on account of the woods and marshes that lay in his way, and finding that considerable execution had been done on

the spot, he the same day joined Cicero with all his forces; where, beholding the towers, galleries, and other works of the Gauls, he could not help being struck with admiration. He then reviewed Cicero's legion, and found that not a tenth man had escaped without wounds, which gave him a just idea of the greatness of the danger to which they had been exposed, and of the vigorous defence they had made. He bestowed great commendations on the legion, and its commander; and addressed himself to the centurions and military tribunes by name, of whose valour Cicero made honourable mention. He learned particularly from the prisoners all the circumstances of the unhappy affair of Sabinus and Cotta; and calling the soldiers together next day, gave them an account of the whole transaction, comforted them, confirmed their courage, and told them that a disaster occasioned by the imprudence and rashness of the lieutenant ought to give them the less disturbance; as, by the favour of the immortal gods, and their valour, vengeance had followed so suddenly, that neither had the joy of the enemy for the victory continued any time, nor their grief for the loss remained long without allay.

44. Meantime the report of Cæsar's victory flew with incredible speed through the country of the Rhemi to Labienus; for though he lay at the distance of fifty miles from Cicero's camp, whither Cæsar did not arrive till past three in the afternoon, yet before midnight a shout was raised at the gates of his camp; by which the Rhemi signified to him Cæsar's victory, and their own congratulation on that success. The report of this being carried to the Treviri, Indutiomarus, who the next day had determined to attack Labienus's camp, made off in the night, and retired with all his forces into his own country. Cæsar sent back Fabius with his legion to his former quarters, resolving to winter himself near Samarobriva with three legions, distributed in the three differ-

ent cantonments ; and, as all Gaul was in motion, to continue with the army in person ; for the defeat and death of Sabinus spreading everywhere, almost all the states of Gaul were meditating a revolt ; and with this view sent messengers and deputies into all parts to concert measures, and contrive where to begin the war. Nay, they held assemblies by night in desert places ; insomuch that, during the whole winter, scarce a day passed but Cæsar had intelligence of some new resolves or insurrections of the Gauls. Among the rest L. Roscius, his lieutenant, who commanded the thirteenth legion, sent him word that great numbers of Gauls from the several states of Armorica had assembled to attack him, and advanced within eight miles of his camp ; but on hearing of Cæsar's victory, had separated so hastily that their retreat had all the appearance of a flight.

45. But Cæsar, summoning the principal noblemen of every state to attend him, partly by menaces, making them sensible he was no stranger to their designs, partly by exhortations, found means to keep the greatest part of Gaul in its duty. The Senones, however, a potent state, and of great authority among the Gauls, formed the design of publicly assassinating Cavarinus, whom Cæsar had given them for a king ; whose brother, Moritasgus, had held the sovereignty at Cæsar's arrival in Gaul, and whose ancestors had long been in possession of the same dignity. But he, having intelligence of the plot, thought proper to fly ; whereon, pursuing him to the very frontiers, they drove him from his palace and his throne ; and sending ambassadors to Cæsar to justify their conduct, on his ordering their whole senate to repair to him, they refused to submit. So powerful was this example among the barbarians, that some at last were found of courage enough to begin the war ; and so great a change did it produce in the inclinations of all, that except the Æduans and Rhemi, who had been always particularly distin-

CÆS. VOL. I.—O

guished and favoured by Cæsar,—the first on account of their ancient and inviolable fidelity to the people of Rome, the last for their late services in the Gallic war,—scarce was there a single state in all Gaul that did not incur suspicion. Nor is this, in truth, so much to be wondered at; as, for many other reasons, so particularly for this, that a people famed above all nations for their military virtues could not with patience bear to see themselves so far stripped of their former renown as to be forced to submit to the yoke of the Romans.

46. Indutiomarus and the Treviri ceased not during the whole winter to send ambassadors over the Rhine, soliciting the German states, offering them money, and urging that a great part of our army having already been cut off, much the least considerable remained. But no part of that country could be persuaded to come into their designs; because, having twice before tried their fortune with the Romans, in the war with Ariovistus and in the defeat of the Tenchtheri, they were resolved, they told them, to run no more hazards. Indutiomarus, disappointed of this hope, was not less active in drawing forces together, soliciting recruits from the neighbouring states, providing horses, and encouraging even outlaws and convicts, by the promise of great rewards, to engage in his service. And so great an authority had he by this means acquired in Gaul, that ambassadors flocked from all parts, some publicly, others in a private manner, to request his protection and friendship.

47. Finding himself thus voluntarily applied to,—on one side by the Senones and Carnutes, impelled by a consciousness of the guilt they had incurred, on the other by the Nervians and Atuatici, who were preparing for a war with the Romans,—and that if he once took the field, forces would not be wanting, he called an assembly of the states in arms. This, according to the custom of the Gauls, implies an

actual commencement of war, and by a standing law obliges all their youth to appear at the diet in arms ; in which they are so extremely strict that whosoever has the misfortune to come last is put to death in sight of the multitude, with all manner of torments. In this assembly Cingetorix, the head of the opposite faction, and son-in-law of Indutiomarus, who, as we have related above, had declared for Cæsar, and still continued firm to him, was proclaimed a public enemy, and his estate confiscated. After which, Indutiomarus acquainted the council that the Senones, Carnutes, and several other states of Gaul had solicited his assistance ; that he accordingly intended to join his forces with theirs, taking his route through the territories of the Rhemi, and giving up their lands to be plundered ; but that before he began his march he was desirous of mastering the camp of Labienus. To that end he gave the necessary directions.

48. Labienus, whose camp, both by the nature of the ground and the fortifications he had added, was extremely strong, feared nothing, either for himself or the legion ; but nevertheless was intent how he might give the enemy some considerable blow. Having therefore been informed by Cingetorix and his adherents of the speech made by Indutiomarus in the council of Gaul, he sent deputies to the neighbouring states, solicited cavalry from all parts, and appointed them a day of rendezvous. Meantime Indutiomarus, with all his cavalry, appeared almost every day within sight of the camp ; one while to examine its situation, another to intimidate Labienus, or invite him to a conference. On these occasions it was usual for the enemy to cast their darts over the rampart. Labienus kept his men within the works, and used all the methods he could think of to make the Gauls believe he was afraid of them.

49. Indutiomarus approaching the trenches every day with greater contempt than before, Labienus re-

ceived into his camp by night all the cavalry he had sent for from the neighbouring states; and was so careful to restrain his men within their lines, by guards planted at all the outlets, that it was impossible for the Treviri to get intelligence of the reinforcement he had received. Meantime Indutiomarus, according to custom, came up to the camp, and continued there the greater part of the day. The cavalry discharged their darts over the rampart, and in opprobrious language challenged our men to fight. The Romans making no answer, they retired towards night, but dispersed and without order. Then Labienus, ordering a sudden sally with all the cavalry, strictly cautioned and charged his men, that as soon as they had put the Gauls to flight (which happened according to his expectation), they should all single out Indutiomarus, nor offer to wound a man of the enemy till they saw him slain; for he was unwilling that any delay occasioned by the slaughter of the rest should give him an opportunity to escape. He promised great rewards to the man that should kill him, and sent the cohorts after to sustain the horse. The design succeeded; for as all were intent on Indutiomarus alone, he was overtaken and slain in passing a river, and his head brought back to the camp. Our cavalry, in their return, put all to the sword that came in their way. On the news of this defeat, the forces of the Eburones and Nervians returned home, and Gaul was somewhat quieter the rest of the winter.

BOOK VI.

1. CÆSAR, for many reasons expecting greater commotions in Gaul, ordered his lieutenants, M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus, and T. Sextius, to levy troops. At the same time he desired of Cn. Pompey, the proconsul, that since he was himself detained by public affairs at Rome, he would set on foot the legion he had enlisted in Cisalpine Gaul during his consulship, and send it to him; for he considered it as of the utmost importance towards securing a proper respect from the Gauls for the time to come, to give them such an idea of the power of Italy as might convince them that it was not only able speedily to repair any losses sustained, but even to bring a greater force into the field. Friendship and the good of the commonwealth equally determined Pompey to yield to this request; and the levies being completed with great diligence by the lieutenants, three new legions were formed and brought into Gaul before the end of winter. Thus, having doubled the number of cohorts lost under Titurius, he soon made the enemy sensible, both by his expedition and the strength of the reinforcement, of what they had to apprehend from the power and discipline of the Romans.

2. Indutiomarus being slain, as we have related above, the Treviri conferred the command on his relations. They persisted likewise in soliciting the Germans, and making them offers of money; but not being able to prevail with those that lay nearest them, they applied to some of the more remote states; and finding them inclined to treat, entered into a solemn engagement with them, giving hostages for security of the money stipulated, and asso-

ciating Ambiorix into the confederacy. Cæsar, informed of these things, and finding that he was threatened with war on all sides ; that the Nervians, Atuatici, and Menapians, with all the Germans on this side the Rhine, were actually in arms ; that the Senones refused to attend him according to orders, and were tampering with the Carnutes and other neighbouring states, and that the Treviri were soliciting the Germans by frequent embassies, he judged it would be necessary to open the campaign early. Accordingly, without waiting till the winter was at an end, he drew together the four nearest legions, and fell unexpectedly into the territories of the Nervians, before they could either assemble in a body or find means to save themselves by flight. Having carried off a great number of men and cattle, enriched his soldiers with the booty, and laid waste the country, he compelled them to submit and give hostages, and then led back his legions to their winter-quarters.

3. Early in the spring, having summoned a general assembly of Gaul, pursuant to his design, as all the other states but the Senones, Carnutes, and Treviri appeared, looking on this as the beginning of a revolt, and willing to postpone every thing else, he adjourned the diet to Paris. This city was on the borders of the Senones, and had been united with them about an age before ; but was thought to have no share in their present revolt. Having declared the adjournment to the assembly, he the same day set out with his legions against the Senones, and by great marches reached their territories. Acco, who was at the head of the confederacy, hearing of his approach, ordered the multitude to shelter themselves in the towns ; but before that could be done the Romans appeared. This obliged them to change their measures, and send deputies to Cæsar to implore forgiveness. They were seconded by the Æduans, the old and faithful allies of the Romans, at

whose request Cæsar readily pardoned them; and the rather, because the summer being now come, he had no mind to spend the season for action in proceeding formally against the guilty. He ordered them to send a hundred hostages, whom he committed to the custody of the Æduans. The Carnutes too, at the intercession of the Rhemi, under whose protection they were, having sent deputies and hostages, obtained the same conditions. Cæsar then went to the assembly of the states, put an end to the diet, and ordered the Gauls to provide him cavalry.

4. Tranquillity being restored in these parts, Cæsar turned all his thoughts to the management of the war with Ambiorix and the Treviri. He ordered Cavarinus to attend him with the cavalry of the Senones, to prevent any new commotions in his absence, either in consequence of the resentment of that prince, or the hatred he had incurred of the state. And having thus settled all things to his mind, as he knew Ambiorix was determined not to hazard a battle, he set himself to watch his other designs.

5. The Menapians, whose territories border on those of the Eburones, are secured by woods and morasses on every side, and were the only people of Gaul who had not sent ambassadors to Cæsar to desire a peace. He knew Ambiorix was in good intelligence with them; and that by means of the Treviri, he had also entered into an alliance with the Germans. He therefore thought it best to deprive him of these resources before he attacked him in person; lest, despairing of being able to defend himself, he should either retire among the Menapians, or throw himself into the arms of the Germans beyond the Rhine. This resolution being taken, he sent the baggage of the whole army to Labienus, in the country of the Treviri, ordered him a reinforcement of two legions, and marched himself against

the Menapians with five legions, who carried nothing with them but their arms. That nation, trusting to their situation, instead of assembling forces, retreated to their woods and morasses, and carried all their effects along with them. Cæsar, dividing his forces with C. Fabius, his lieutenant, and M. Crassus, his questor, and having speedily finished his bridges, entered their country in three bodies, set all their houses and villages on fire, and carried off such numbers of men and cattle that the Menapians were at last constrained to sue for peace. He granted it, on condition they sent him hostages, and engaged not to admit Ambiorix or any one from him into their territories; threatening to treat them as enemies if they did. These things settled, he left Commius of Arras there, with a body of horse, to keep them in awe, and set out himself against the Treviri.

6. While Cæsar was thus employed, the Treviri, having drawn together a great number of horse and foot, were preparing to attack the legion which had wintered in their territories, under Labienus. They were now advanced within two days' march of the lieutenant's camp, when they learned that he had received a reinforcement of two legions from Cæsar. On this, encamping at about fifteen miles' distance, they resolved to wait for the auxiliaries they expected from Germany. Labienus, having intelligence of their design, and hoping their rashness might furnish him with an opportunity of fighting, left the baggage under a guard of five cohorts, and with the twenty-five remaining, and all his cavalry, marched towards the enemy, and pitched his camp about a mile from them.

7. Between Labienus and the enemy was a river, with steep banks, and difficult to pass: and, indeed, neither was Labienus himself minded to try the passage, nor did he expect the enemy would offer at such an attempt. The hope of being joined by

the auxiliaries grew stronger in the camp of the Gauls every day. Labienus declared publicly, in a council of war, "that as the Germans were said to be on the march, he was determined not to expose himself and the army to danger, but would decamp early next morning." This was soon carried to the enemy; for, as our cavalry consisted mostly of Gauls, it was natural for some of them to favour their countrymen. Labienus, assembling the military tribunes and principal centurions during the night, laid before them his real design; and the better to betray the enemy into a suspicion of his being afraid, gave orders for decamping with more noise and tumult than was usual in a Roman army. By this means his march had all the appearance of a flight; and the enemy, whose camp was so very near, had notice of it before daybreak from their spies.

8. Scarce had our rear got without the trenches when the Gauls, encouraging one another not to lose a fair prey, or stay in expectation of the Germans, at a time the Romans were retreating in such a panic, and considering it as an indignity, with so great a superiority of forces, to forbear attacking a handful of men already put to flight and encumbered with their baggage, resolved to pass the river, and engage the Romans, notwithstanding the disadvantage of the ground. Labienus, who had foreseen this, that he might draw them all over the river, continued the feint of his march, and went on quietly. Then sending the baggage a little before, and ordering it to be placed on a rising ground, "Behold, fellow-soldiers," says he, "the opportunity you so much desired: you have the enemy at a disadvantage, and in a place where they cannot sustain the onset: show only under my command the valour you have so often manifested to our general; think him present, and that he sees and observes you." At the same time he ordered them

to face about, and form in line of battle ; and detaching a few troops of horse to guard the baggage, drew up the rest on the two wings. Our men gave a sudden shout, and threw their javelins. The enemy, contrary to their expectation, seeing those whom they imagined put to flight marching against them with displayed banners, could not sustain the very first shock ; but, betaking themselves immediately to flight, took refuge in the nearest woods. Labienus, pursuing with his cavalry, put many of the enemy to the sword, and took a great number of prisoners ; insomuch that, within a few days, the whole state was obliged to submit : for the Germans, who were coming to their assistance, on hearing of their defeat, returned home. The relations of Indutiomarus, who had been the authors of the revolt, chose likewise to retire with them, and abandon their country. Cingetorix, who had always continued faithful to the Romans, was thereon invested with the supreme authority.

9. Cæsar, after his arrival in Treves, from among the Menapians, resolved for two reasons to pass the Rhine : one, because the Germans had assisted the Treviri against the Romans ; the other, to deprive Ambiorix of a retreat into those parts. In consequence of this resolution, he set about making a bridge on the river, but somewhat higher up than before. As the form and manner was known, the soldiers, by their extraordinary diligence, finished the work in a few days. Leaving a strong guard on the side of Treves, to prevent any sudden insurrection in that country, he carried over the rest of his army. The Ubians, who had before submitted and given hostages, sent ambassadors to him to vindicate their conduct, and assure him that they had neither sent troops to the assistance of the Treviri, nor in any instance departed from their engagements. They urged and requested that he would spare their territories, and not, out of a gene-

ral hatred to the Germans, involve the innocent in the punishment of the guilty. If he desired more hostages, they told him they were ready to send them. Cæsar, finding on inquiry, that the supplies had been sent by the Suevians, accepted the submission of the Ubians; and preparing to march against the Suevians, informed himself of the ways and accesses to their country.

10. A few days after, he had intelligence from the Ubians that the Suevians were drawing their forces to a general rendezvous, and had sent orders to all the nations under their jurisdiction to furnish their contingents of horse and foot. On this, having furnished himself with provisions, and chosen a proper place for his camp, he ordered the Ubians to retire into their towns, with their cattle and effects; hoping that so unskilful and barbarous an enemy might easily be drawn, by the want of provisions, to fight in a place of disadvantage. He further enjoined the Ubians to send spies into all parts, to learn the designs and motions of the Suevians. They readily complied: and in a few days brought him back word, "that the Suevians, on certain information of the arrival of the Roman army, had retired to the remotest part of the country, with all their own forces, and those of their allies: that there they had resolved to wait the coming up of the Romans, at the entrance of a forest of immense extent, called Baccenis, which reached a great way into the country, and served as a barrier between the Cherusci and Suevians to prevent their mutual incursions."

11. On this occasion it may not be improper to say somewhat of the manners of the Gauls and Germans, and the difference of customs between these two nations. A spirit of faction prevails throughout Gaul, and that not only in their several states, districts, and villages, but almost in every private family. The men of the greatest esteem and consideration among them are commonly at the head of these

factions, and give what turn they think proper to all public deliberations and councils. This custom is of long standing, and seems designed to secure those of lower rank from the oppression of the powerful ; for the leaders always take care to protect those of their party, otherwise they would soon lose all their authority. This equally obtains through the whole continent of Gaul, the provinces being in general divided into two factions.

12. When Cæsar arrived in the country the Æduans were at the head of one faction, and the Sequani of the other. These last being the weaker, because the Æduans had long borne the greatest sway, and had a number of considerable states in their dependence, they united with Ariovistus and the Germans, whom by great presents and promises they drew over the Rhine to their assistance. This alliance made them so powerful, that having worsted their adversaries in several battles, and killed almost all their nobility, they forced the states dependent on the Æduans to have recourse to them for protection ; obliged the Æduans themselves to give the children of their principal nobility as hostages, swear publicly not to attempt any thing against the Sequani, and resign up to their possession a part of their territories ; and by this means rendered themselves in a manner sovereigns of all Gaul. Divitiacus, in this necessity, applied to the senate of Rome for relief ; but without effect. Cæsar's arrival soon changed the face of affairs. The Æduan hostages were sent back, their former clients restored, and new ones procured them by Cæsar's interest ; it appearing that such as were under their protection enjoyed a more equal and milder lot ; by all which, their fortune and authority being considerably enlarged, the Sequani were obliged to resign the sovereignty. The Rhemi succeeded in their place ; and as they were known to be in the same degree of favour with Cæsar, such as could not get over their old

animosity to the Æduans put themselves under their protection. The Rhemi were extremely attentive to the interests of their clients, and thereby both preserved their old authority and that which they had newly acquired. Such therefore was the then situation of Gaul, that the Æduans possessing indisputably the first rank, the Rhemi were next in consideration and dignity.

13. Over all Gaul there are only two orders of men in any degree of honour and esteem; for the common people are little better than slaves, attempt nothing of themselves, and have no share in the public deliberations. As they are generally oppressed with debt, heavy tributes, or the exactions of their superiors, they make themselves vassals to the great, who exercise over them the same jurisdiction as masters do over slaves. The two orders of men with whom, as we have said, all authority and distinctions are lodged are the druids and nobles. The druids preside in matters of religion, have the care of public and private sacrifices, and interpret the will of the gods. They have the direction and education of the youth, by whom they are held in great honour. In almost all controversies, whether public or private, the decision is left to them; and if any crime is committed, any murder perpetrated,—if any dispute arises touching an inheritance or the limits of adjoining estates,—in all such cases they are the supreme judges. They decree rewards and punishments; and if any one refuses to submit to their sentence, whether magistrate or private man, they interdict him the sacrifices. This is the greatest punishment that can be inflicted among the Gauls; because such as are under this prohibition are considered as impious and wicked: all men shun them, and decline their conversation and fellowship, lest they should suffer from the contagion of their misfortunes. They can neither have recourse to the law for justice, nor are capable

of any public office. The druids are all under one chief, who possesses the supreme authority in that body. On his death, if any one remarkably excels the rest, he succeeds; but if there are several candidates of equal merit, the affair is determined by plurality of suffrages. Sometimes they even have recourse to arms before the election can be brought to an issue. Once a year they assemble at a consecrated place in the territories of the Carnutes, whose country is supposed to be in the middle of Gaul. Hither such as have any suits depending flock from all parts, and submit implicitly to their decrees. Their institution is supposed to come originally from Britain, whence it passed into Gaul; and even at this day, such as are desirous of being perfect in it travel thither for instruction. The druids never go to war, are exempted from taxes and military service, and enjoy all manner of immunities. These mighty encouragements induce multitudes of their own accord to follow that profession; and many are sent by their parents and relations. They are taught to repeat a great number of verses by heart, and often spend twenty years in this institution; for it is deemed unlawful to commit their statutes to writing; though in other matters, whether public or private, they make use of Greek characters. They seem to me to follow this method for two reasons,—to hide their mysteries from the knowledge of the vulgar, and to exercise the memory of their scholars, which would be apt to lie neglected had they letters to trust to, as we find is often the case. It is one of their principal maxims that the soul never dies, but after death passes from one body to another; which, they think, contributes greatly to exalt men's courage, by disarming death of its terrors. They teach likewise many things relating to the stars and their motions, the magnitude of the world and our earth, the nature of things, and the power and prerogatives of the immortal gods.

14. The other order of men is the nobles, whose whole study and occupation is war. Before Cæsar's arrival in Gaul, they were almost every year at war, either offensive or defensive; and they judge of the power and quality of their nobles by the vassals, and the number of men he keeps in his pay; for they are the only marks of grandeur they make any account of.

15. The whole nation of the Gauls is extremely addicted to superstition; whence, in threatening distempers and the imminent dangers of war, they make no scruple to sacrifice men, or engage themselves by vow to such sacrifices; in which they make use of the ministry of the druids: for it is a prevalent opinion among them that nothing but the life of man can atone for the life of man; insomuch, that they have established even public sacrifices of this kind. Some prepare huge colossuses of osier twigs, into which they put men alive, and setting fire to them, those within expire amid the flames. They prefer for victims such as have been convicted of theft, robbery, or other crimes; believing them the most acceptable to the gods: but when real criminals are wanting, the innocent are often made to suffer. Mercury is the chief deity with them: of him they have many images, account him the inventor of all arts, their guide and conductor in their journeys, and the patron of merchandise and gain. Next to him are Apollo, and Mars, and Jupiter, and Minerva. Their notions in regard to him are pretty much the same with those of other nations. Apollo is their god of physic, Minerva of works and manufactures; Jove holds the empire of heaven, and Mars presides in war. To this last, when they resolve on a battle, they commonly devote the spoil. If they prove victorious, they offer up all the cattle taken, and set apart the rest of the plunder in a place appointed for that purpose: and it is common in many provinces to see these monuments of offerings piled up

in consecrated places. Nay, it rarely happens that any one shows so great a disregard of religion as either to conceal the plunder or pillage the public oblations; and the severest punishments are inflicted on such offenders.

16. The Gauls fancy themselves to be descended from the god Pluto; which it seems is an established tradition among the druids. For this reason they compute the time by nights, not by days; and in the observance of birthdays, new moons, and the beginning of the year, always commence the celebration from the preceding night. In one custom they differ from almost all other nations; that they never suffer their children to come openly into their presence until they are of age to bear arms: for the appearance of a son in public with his father before he has reached the age of manhood is accounted dishonourable.

17. Whatever fortune the woman brings, the husband is obliged to equal it out of his own estate. This whole sum, with its annual product, is left untouched, and falls always to the share of the survivor. The men have power of life and death over their wives and children; and when any father of a family of illustrious rank dies, his relations assemble, and on the least ground of suspicion, put even his wives to the torture like slaves. If they are found guilty, iron and fire are employed to torment and destroy them. Their funerals are magnificent and sumptuous, according to their quality. Every thing that was dear to the deceased, even animals, are thrown into the pile: and formerly, such of their slaves and clients as they loved most sacrificed themselves at the funeral of their lord.

18. In their best regulated states they have a law, that whoever hears any thing relating to the public, whether by rumour or otherwise, shall give immediate notice to the magistrate, without imparting it to any one else; for the nature of the people is such,

that rash and inexperienced men, alarmed by false reports, are often hurried to the greatest extremities, and take on them to determine in matters of the greatest consequence. The magistrates stifle things improper to be known, and only communicate to the multitude what they think needful for the service of the commonwealth; nor do the laws permit to speak of state affairs, except in public council.

19. The Germans differ widely in their manners from the Gauls; for neither have they druids to preside in religious affairs, nor do they trouble themselves about sacrifices. They acknowledge no gods but those that are objects of sight, and by whose power they are apparently benefited; the sun, the moon, fire. Of others they know nothing, not even by report. Their whole life is addicted to hunting and war; and from their infancy they are inured to fatigue and hardships. They esteem those most who continue longest strangers to women; as imagining nothing contributes so much to stature, strength, and vigour of body: but to have any commerce of this kind before the age of twenty is accounted in the highest degree ignominious. Nor is it possible to conceal an irregularity this way; because they bathe promiscuously in rivers, and are clothed in skins, or short mantles of fur, which leave the greatest part of their bodies naked.

20. Agriculture is little regarded among them, as they live mostly on milk, cheese, and the flesh of animals. Nor has any man lands of his own, or distinguished by fixed boundaries. The magistrates and those in authority portion out yearly to every canton and family such a quantity of land, and in what part of the country they think proper; and the year following remove them to some other spot. Many reasons are assigned for this practice: lest, seduced by habit and continuance, they should learn to prefer tillage to war; lest a desire of enlarging their possessions should gain ground, and prompt

the stronger to expel the weaker ; lest they should become curious in their buildings, in order to guard against the extremes of heat and cold ; lest avarice should get footing among them, whence spring factions and discords ; in fine, to preserve contentment and equanimity among the people, when they find their possessions nothing inferior to those of the most powerful.

21. It is accounted honourable for states to have the country all around them lie waste and depopulated ; for they think it an argument of valour to expel their neighbours, and suffer none to settle near them ; at the same time that they are themselves also the safer, as having nothing to apprehend from sudden incursions. When a state is engaged in war, either offensive or defensive, they make choice of magistrates to preside in it, whom they arm with a power of life and death. In time of peace there are no public magistrates ; but the chiefs of the several provinces and clans administer justice, and decide differences within their respective limits. Robbery has nothing infamous in it when committed without the territories of the state to which they belong : they even pretend that it serves to exercise their youth, and prevent the growth of sloth. When any of their princes in this case offers himself publicly in council as a leader, such as approve of the expedition rise up, profess themselves ready to follow him, and are applauded by the whole multitude. They who go back from their engagement are looked on as traitors and deserters, and lose all esteem and credit for the time to come. The laws of hospitality are held inviolable among them. All that fly to them for refuge, on whatever account, are sure of protection and defence ; their houses are open to receive them, and they plentifully supply their wants.

22. Formerly the Gauls exceeded the Germans in bravery, often made war on them ; and as they

abounded in people beyond what the country could maintain, sent several colonies over the Rhine. Accordingly, the more fertile places of Germany, in the neighbourhood of the Hercynian forest (which I find mentioned by Eratosthenes and other Greek writers, under the name of Orcinia), fell to the share of the Volcæ, who settled in those parts, and have ever since kept possession. They are in the highest reputation for justice and bravery, and no less remarkable than the Germans for poverty, abstinence, and patience of fatigue, conforming exactly to their customs, both in habit and way of living. But the neighbourhood of the Roman province, and an acquaintance with traffic, has introduced luxury and abundance among the Gauls; whence becoming by little and little an equal match for the Germans, and being worsted in many battles, they no longer pretend to compare with them in valour.

23. The Hercynian forest, of which we have been just speaking, is about nine days' journey in breadth; for as the Germans are ignorant of the use of measures, there is no other way of computing it. It begins from the confines of the Helvetians, Nemetes, and Rauraci, and following directly the course of the Danube, extends to the territories of the Anartes and Dacians. Thence turning from the river to the left, it runs through a multitude of different regions; and though there are many in the country who have advanced six days' journey into this forest, yet no one pretends to have reached the extremity of it, or discovered how far it extends. Many different species of animals, unknown in other countries, harbour here; the most remarkable of which, and that best deserve to be mentioned, are these:—

24. There is a bull that nearly resembles a stag, with only one horn rising from the middle of his forehead, taller and straighter than those of our cattle, and which at top divides into many large

branches. The males and females are shaped alike, and have horns the same in size.

25. Here are likewise a kind of wild asses, shaped and spotted like goats, but of a larger size, without horns, or joints in their legs, that never lie down to sleep, nor can raise themselves if by any accident they are overthrown. They lean against trees, which serve to support them when they sleep. Hence the huntsmen, after having discovered their haunts, either loosen the roots of the trees, or saw them almost quite off; so that when the animal, according to custom, reclines against them, they immediately give way, and both fall down together.

26. A third species of animals are the uri, nearly equalling the elephant in bulk; but in colour, shape, and kind resembling a bull. They are of uncommon strength and swiftness, and spare neither man nor beast that comes in their way. They are taken and slain by means of pits dug on purpose. This way of hunting is frequent among the youth, and serves to inure them to fatigue. They who kill the greatest number, and produce their horns in public as a proof, are in high reputation with their countrymen. It is found impossible to tame them or conquer their fierceness, though taken ever so young. Their horns, both in largeness, figure, and kind, differ much from those of our bulls. The natives preserve them with great care, tip their edges with silver, and use them instead of cups on their most solemn festivals.

27. Cæsar, understanding from the Ubian scouts that the Suevians were retired into their woods, and fearing the want of provisions, because, as we have already observed, the Germans are but little addicted to agriculture, resolved not to advance any farther. But to keep the enemy still under some awe of his return, and prevent their sending succours to Gaul, having repassed the Rhine, he only broke down about two hundred feet of his bridge, on the German side; and to secure the rest, built at the extremity

a tower of four stories, where he left a garrison of twelve cohorts, and strengthened the place with all manner of works. Young C. Volcatius Tullus had the charge of the fort and garrison. He himself, as soon as the corn began to be ripe, marched against Ambiorix; taking his way through the forest of Arden, which is much the largest in all Gaul, and reaches from the banks of the Rhine and the confines of Treves quite to the Nervians, through a space of more than five hundred miles. L. Minucius Basilus was sent before with all the cavalry, in hopes that the quickness of his march, and the opportunity of some lucky conjuncture, might enable him to do something considerable. He had orders to light no fires in his camp, the better to conceal his approach from the enemy; and Cæsar assured him he would follow with all expedition. Basilus exactly followed his instructions; and coming suddenly and unexpectedly on the Gauls, surprised great numbers of them in the field. Being informed by them of the place whither Ambiorix had retired with a few cavalry, he marched directly against him.

28. But as fortune has a considerable share in all human concerns, so particularly in those of war: for as it was a very extraordinary chance that he should thus come on Ambiorix unprepared, and surprise him with his personal arrival, before he had the least notice of it from fame or report, so was it an equal effect of fortune that the Gaul himself, after having lost his arms, horses, and chariots, should yet find means to escape. This was principally owing to the situation of his house, which was surrounded with a wood; it being customary among the Gauls, in order to avoid the heats, to build in the neighbourhood of woods and rivers. By this means his attendants and friends, possessing themselves of a defile, sustained for a time the attack of our cavalry; during which, one of his servants having provided him with a horse, he escaped into the woods.

Thus fortune remarkably played her part, both in bringing him into the danger, and delivering him out of it.

29. Ambiorix, after his escape, made no attempt to draw his forces together : nor is it known whether he acted in this manner out of choice, as not thinking it safe to hazard a battle, or because he thought he should not have sufficient time, being surprised by the sudden arrival of the cavalry, and believing that all the rest of the army followed. Despatching therefore messengers privately through the country, he counselled every one to provide for his own safety ; on which some took refuge in the forest of Arden, and some in the adjoining morasses. Those who lived on the seacoast hid themselves in the islands formed by the tide at high water ; and many, abandoning their country altogether, trusted themselves and their all to the faith of foreigners. Cativulcus, who, jointly with Ambiorix, was king of the Eburones, and had associated with him in all his designs, being of a very advanced age, and unable to bear the fatigues of war or flight, after many imprecations against Ambiorix, who had been the prime contriver of the revolt, poisoned himself with an extract of yew, a tree very common in Gaul and Germany. The Segni and Condrusi, originally German nations, whose territories lay between those of Treves and the Eburones, sent ambassadors to Cæsar to entreat “ that he would not consider them as enemies, nor look on all the Germans on this side the Rhine as equally obnoxious ; that they had harboured no thoughts of war, nor been any ways aiding to Ambiorix.” Cæsar, finding it to be so by the answers of the prisoners, ordered them to deliver up such of the Eburones as had fled to them for refuge ; and promised, on that condition, not to molest their territories.

30. Then dividing his army into three bodies, he sent all the baggage to Atuatuca, a castle situated

almost in the heart of the country of the Eburones, where Titurius and Arunculeius had been quartered during the winter. This place he chose, as, for other reasons, so likewise because the fortifications, raised the year before, were still entire, which would lessen the labour of his soldiers. He left the fourteenth legion to guard the baggage, being one of the three lately levied in Italy, and brought thence into Gaul. Q. Tullius Cicero had the charge both of the legion and fort, which was further strengthened with an additional guard of two hundred horse. The army being thus divided, he sent T. Labienus with three legions towards the seacoast and the provinces that border on the Menapians; C. Trebonius, with a like number of legions, to lay waste the country adjoining to the Atuatici; and resolved to march himself with the other three towards the Scheld, which flows into the Meuse, and to the extremities of the forest of Arden, whither he was informed Ambiorix had retired with a few horse. He promised, at his departure, to return in seven days, the legion he had left in garrison being provided with corn only for that time; and exhorted Labienus and Trebonius, if they found it consistent with the public advantage, to return likewise with their legions within the same space; that, joining counsel together, and taking their measures from the conduct of the enemy, they might resolve where next to carry the war.

31. There was, as we have already observed, no formed body of troops, no garrison, no fortified town to defend by arms, but a multitude dispersed on all sides. Wherever a cave, or a thicket, or a morass offered them shelter, thither they retired. These places were well known to the natives; and great care and caution were required on our part, not for the security of the whole army (which had no danger to fear while in a body, from enemies dispersed and full of terror), but for the preservation of each individual. And yet even this regarded not

a little the whole army ; for the desire of plunder drew many of the men to a great distance ; and the woods, full of defiles and hidden ways, hindered them from keeping together in a body. If Cæsar meant to terminate the war altogether, and extirpate this race of perfidious men, the soldiers must be divided into small parties, and detached on all sides. If, on the contrary, he kept his men together, as the rules of war and the Roman discipline required, the enemy were sheltered by their situation, nor wanted boldness to form ambuscades, and cut off stragglers. Amid these difficulties, all possible precautions were taken ; and although the soldiers were eagerly bent on revenge, yet Cæsar chose rather not to push the enemy too far, than expose his men to danger. He therefore sent messengers to the neighbouring states, inviting them all, by the hopes of plunder, to join in the destruction of the Eburones ; choosing rather to expose the lives of the Gauls in the woods than of the legionary soldiers ; and hoping, by the multitude employed against them, totally to extirpate the name and memory of a state whose revolt had rendered them so obnoxious. Accordingly, great numbers flocked suddenly thither from all parts.

32. Thus were the Eburones attacked on all sides ; and the havoc continued till the seventh day, which Cæsar had appointed for returning to his camp and baggage. It then evidently appeared what influence Fortune has over war, and how many accidents spring from her interposition. The enemy being dispersed and full of terror, as we have related above, there remained no body of troops in the field to give any the least ground of fear. A report spread among the Germans beyond the Rhine that the territories of the Eburones were given up to plunder, and all without distinction invited to share the spoil. The Sicambri, who inhabit on the Rhine, and had afforded a retreat to the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, as mentioned above, assembled immediately a body of

two thousand horse, passed the river in barks about thirty miles below Cæsar's bridge and fort, and advanced directly towards the territories of the Eburones. Many of those that fled, and had dispersed themselves up and down the country, fell into their hands; as likewise abundance of cattle, of which the barbarians are extremely covetous. Allured by this success, they advanced farther. Neither woods nor morasses proved any obstacles to men trained up from their infancy to wars and incursions. Inquiring of the prisoners concerning Cæsar, they understood that he was a great way off, and had left the country with his whole army. One, in particular, addressing them, "Why," said he, "do you lose time in pursuit of so slight and trifling a booty, when fortune offers one of so much greater value? In three hours you may reach Atuatuca, where the Romans have deposited all their wealth. The garrison is hardly sufficient to line the rampart, much less to sally out of their intrenchments." Urged by this hope, they left their present booty in a place of safety, and marched directly to Atuatuca, being conducted by the captive who had given them the information.

33. Cicero, who hitherto had kept his soldiers strictly within the camp, according to Cæsar's orders, nor suffered so much as a servant to straggle beyond the lines, seeing the seventh day arrive, began to despair of Cæsar's return; who, as he heard, was marched farther into the country, and had sent him no notice of his route. Wherefore, tired with the continual murmurs of the soldiers, who complained of his patience, and told him they were kept like men besieged, and not suspecting that any accident could befall him, within the small extent of three miles, especially as the enemy, opposed by nine legions and a very numerous cavalry, were in a manner totally dispersed and cut off, he sent out five cohorts to forage in an adjoining field, separated

CÆS. VOL. I.—Q

from the camp only by a single hill. A great many sick men had been left behind by Cæsar, of whom about three hundred, that were now pretty well recovered, joined the detachment. These were followed by almost all the servants of the camp, together with a vast number of carts and carriage-horses.

34. In that very instant, as fortune would have it, the German cavalry arrived; and, without discontinuing their course, endeavoured to force an immediate entrance by the Decuman gate. As their march had been covered by a wood, they were not discovered till they were just on the camp; inso-much that the sutlers, who keep their booths under the rampart, had not time to retire within the intrenchments. Our men were so surprised at this sudden and unexpected attack that the cohort on guard could scarce sustain the first onset. The enemy spread themselves on all sides to find a place of entrance. The Romans with difficulty defended the gates; the rampart securing them everywhere else. The whole camp was in an uproar, every one inquiring of another the cause of the confusion; nor could they determine which way to advance the standards, or where to post themselves. Some reported the camp was already taken; others, that the Germans, having destroyed Cæsar and his army, were come, victorious, to storm their trenches. The greater number, full of imaginary fears, when they considered the place in which they were encamped, called to mind the fate of Cotta and Titurius, who perished in that very fort. This universal consternation being perceived by the barbarians, confirmed them in the belief of what the prisoners had told them, that there was scarce any garrison within to defend the camp. They renewed their endeavours to force the intrenchments, and mutually exhorted one another not to let so fair a prize escape out of their hands.

35. Among the sick in garrison was P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, of whom mention has been made in former battles, and who had not tasted food for five days. This officer, anxious for his own safety, and that of the legion, rushed unarmed out of his tent. He saw the enemy at hand, and the danger extreme. Snatching the first arms that offered, he posted himself in the gate of the camp. The centurions of the cohort on guard followed the example, and for a while sustained the enemy's charge. Sextius expired under a number of wounds, and was with difficulty carried off by the soldiers. This short delay gave the rest time to resume their courage; so far at least as to mount the rampart, and make a show of defending themselves.

36. Meantime our foragers, returning, heard the noise at the camp. The cavalry, advancing before, were soon apprized of the danger. Here was no fortification to shelter the frightened troops. The new levies, inexperienced in matters of war, fixed their eyes on the tribunes and centurions, waiting their orders. Not a man was found so hardy and resolute as not to be disturbed by so unexpected an accident. The Germans, perceiving our ensigns at a distance, gave over the attack of the camp, imagining at first it was Cæsar and the legions, which the prisoners had informed them were marched farther into the country: but soon observing how few they were, they surrounded and fell on them on all sides.

37. The servants of the camp fled to the nearest rising ground; whence being immediately driven, they threw themselves among the ranks of the cohorts, and thereby increased their terror. Some were for drawing up in form of a wedge, and forcing their way through the enemy; for as the camp was so very near, they imagined that if some fell, the rest at least must escape. Others were for retiring to an eminence, and all sharing there the same fate. The veteran soldiers who had

marched out with the detachment could by no means relish this proposal: wherefore, mutually encouraging one another, and being led by C. Trebanus, a Roman knight, under whose command they were, they broke through the midst of the enemy, and all to a man arrived safe in the camp. The servants and cavalry, following them, and seconding their retreat, were likewise by their bravery preserved. But the troops who had retired to the hill, being inexperienced in military affairs, could neither persist in the resolution they had taken of defending themselves from the higher ground, nor imitate that brisk and vigorous effort which they saw had been so serviceable to their companions; but, endeavouring to gain the camp, quitted the advantage of their situation. The centurions, some of whom had been selected from veteran legions, and on account of their bravery promoted to higher stations among the new levies, fought resolutely to maintain the glory they had acquired, and endeavoured to sell their lives as dear as they could. Their valour obliging the enemy to fall back a little, part of the troops, contrary to expectation, reached the camp. The rest were surrounded and cut to pieces by the barbarians.

38. The Germans, despairing to carry the camp, as they saw our men now prepared to defend the works, repassed the Rhine with the booty they had deposited in the woods. But so great was the terror of the Romans even after their retreat, that C. Volusenus arriving in the camp the same night with the cavalry, could not persuade them that Cæsar and the army were safe: for fear had taken so thorough a possession of their minds, that, as if bereft of understanding, they persisted in believing the infantry was wholly destroyed, and that the cavalry alone had escaped: it seeming to them altogether incredible that the Germans would have dared to attack the camp had no misfortune befallen the Roman army. But Cæsar's arrival soon put an end to their fears.

39. On his return being informed of what had happened, he only complained of the sending out the cohorts to forage: observing, “that in war nothing ought to be left to fortune, whose power appeared evidently in the sudden arrival of the enemy, and much more in their coming up unperceived to the very gates of the camp.” But nothing in this whole affair appeared to him more wonderful than that the Germans, having crossed the Rhine with design to plunder the territories of Ambiorix, should, by falling on the Roman camp, do him a most acceptable service.

40. Cæsar marched a second time to harass the enemy, and having drawn a great number of troops together from the neighbouring states, sent them into all parts on this service. All the houses and villages were set on fire: the plunder was universal: the vast number of men and horses not only destroyed great quantities of corn, but the rains and advanced seasons made havoc of all that was left; insomuch, that if any of the enemy escaped for the present, it seemed yet likely, that after the retreat of the army, they must perish by famine. As the cavalry were divided into many parties, they often came to places where the prisoners not only informed them that they had seen Ambiorix flying, but that he could even yet be scarce out of view. The hope of coming up with him made them leave nothing unattempted, as imagining they would thereby gain the highest favour with Cæsar, whose good fortune wanted only this to render it complete. But all their endeavours were fruitless; for he still found means to hide himself in the woods and morasses; whence removing privately in the night, he escaped into other regions, accompanied with only four horsemen, in whom alone he durst confide.

41. Cæsar, having destroyed the whole country, led back his army into the territories of the Rhemi, with the loss of only two cohorts. There he

summoned a general assembly of Gaul, to examine into the affair of the Senones and Carnutes: and having passed a severe sentence against Acco, the contriver of the revolt, ordered him to be executed on the spot. Some fearing a like fate fled: whom having banished by a decree of the diet, he quartered two legions in Treves, two among the Lingones, and the remaining six at Agendicum, in the country of the Senones. And having provided the army with corn, he went, pursuant to his design, into Italy to hold the assemblies of Cisalpine Gaul.

BOOK VII.

1. CÆSAR, having quieted the commotions in Gaul, went, as he designed, into Italy, to preside in the assembly of the states. There he was informed of the death of P. Clodius: and understanding further that the senate had passed a decree ordering all the youth of Italy to take up arms, he resolved to levy troops over the whole province. The report of this soon spread into Farther Gaul; and the Gauls themselves, forward to encourage such rumours, added of their own accord what the case seemed to require, "that Cæsar was detained by a domestic sedition, and could not, while these disorders continued, come to head the army." Animated by this opportunity, they, who before lamented their subjection to the Romans, now began with more freedom and boldness to enter on measures of war. The leading men of the nation, concerting private meetings among themselves in woods and remote places, complained of the death of Acco; remonstrated that such might one time or other be their own fate; and after bemoaning the common fortune of their country, endeavoured by all manner of promises and rewards

to draw over some to begin the war, and with the hazard of their own lives pave the way to the liberty of Gaul. But chiefly they thought it incumbent on them, before their secret conferences should be discovered, to cut off Cæsar's return to the army. This appeared abundantly easy; because neither would the legions, in the absence of their general, dare to quit their winter-quarters, nor was it possible for the general to join the legions without a body of troops to guard him. In fine, they concluded it was better to die bravely in the field, than not recover their former glory in war, and the liberty they had received from their ancestors.

2. Such were the debates in the private councils of the Gauls: when the Carnutes, declaring their readiness to submit to any danger for the common safety, offered to be the first in taking up arms against the Romans. And because the present giving of hostages might endanger a too early discovery of their designs, they proposed that the other states should bind themselves by a solemn oath, in presence of the military ensigns, which is the most sacred obligation among the Gauls, not to abandon them during the course of the war. The offer of the Carnutes was received with universal applause, the oath required was taken by all present; and the time for action being fixed, the assembly separated.

3. When the appointed day came, the Carnutes, headed by Cotuatus and Conetodunas, men of desperate resolution, flew, on a signal given, to Genabum, massacred the Roman citizens settled there on account of trade, among the rest C. Fusius Cotta, a Roman knight of eminence, whom Cæsar had appointed to superintend the care of provisions, and plundered their effects. The fame of this soon spread into all the provinces of Gaul; for when any thing singular and extraordinary happens, they publish it from place to place by outcries, which, being

successively repeated by men stationed on purpose, are carried with incredible expedition over the whole country. And thus it was on the present occasion; for what had been done at Genabum about sunrise was known before nine at night in the territories of the Averni, a distance of one hundred and sixty miles.

4. Fired by this example, Vercingetorix, the son of Celtillus, of the nation of the Averni, a young nobleman of great power and interest, whose father had presided over Celtic Gaul, and for aiming at the sovereignty been put to death by his countrymen, calling his clients and followers together, easily persuaded them to a revolt. His design being discovered, the people immediately flew to arms; and Gobanitio, his uncle, with the other principal men of the state, dreading the consequences of so rash an enterprise, united all their authority against him, and expelled him the city Gergovia. Yet still he adhered to his former resolution, and assembling all the outlaws and fugitives he could find, engaged them in his service. Having by this means got together a body of troops, he brought all to whom he applied himself to fall in with his views; pressed them to take up arms for the common liberty; and finding his forces greatly increased, quickly drove those out of the territories of Auvergne who had so lately expelled him the city Gergovia. On this he was saluted king by his followers; and despatching ambassadors into all parts, exhorted them to continue firm to the confederacy. The Senones, Parisians, Pictones, Cadurci, Turones, Aulerci, Lemovices, Andes, and all the other nations bordering on the ocean, readily came into the alliance, and with unanimous consent declared him generalissimo of the league. Armed with this authority, he demanded hostages of the several states, ordered them to furnish a certain number of men immediately, appointed what quantity of arms each

was to prepare, with the time by which they must be in readiness; and, above all, applied himself to have on foot a numerous cavalry. To the most extreme diligence he joined an extreme rigour of command; and by the severity of his punishments obliged the irresolute to declare themselves: for in great faults the criminals, after having been tortured, were burnt alive; and for lighter offences, ordering the ears of the guilty to be cut off, or one of their eyes put out, he sent them, thus mutilated, home, to serve as an example to the rest, and by the rigour of their sufferings to keep others in awe.

5. Having by the terror of these punishments speedily assembled an army, he sent Luterius of Quercy, a bold and enterprising man, with part of the forces, against the Rutheni, and marched himself into the territories of the Biturigians. The Biturigians, on his arrival, despatched ambassadors to the Æduans, under whose protection they were, to demand succours against the enemy. The Æduans, by advice of the lieutenants Cæsar had left with the army, ordered a supply of horse and foot to the assistance of the Biturigians. This body of troops, advancing to the banks of the Loire, which divides the Biturigians from the Æduans, halted there a few days; and not daring to pass that river, returned again to their own country. The reason of this conduct, according to the report made to our lieutenants, was an apprehension of treachery from the Biturigians; for that people, as they pretended, had formed the design of surrounding them beyond the Loire, on one side with their own troops, on the other with those of Auvergne. Whether this was the real cause of their return, or whether they acted perfidiously in the affair, is what we have not been able to learn with certainty, and therefore cannot venture to affirm. The Biturigians, on their departure, immediately joined the forces of the Averni.

6. These things being reported to Cæsar, in Italy,

as the troubles in Rome were in a great measure quieted by the care and vigilance of Pompey, he set out immediately for Transalpine Gaul. On his arrival there he found it extremely difficult to resolve after what manner to rejoin the army. For should he order the legions to repair to the province, he foresaw they would be attacked on their march in his absence; and should he himself proceed to the quarters of the legions, he was not without apprehensions of danger, even from those states that seemingly continued faithful to the Romans.

7. In the mean time Luterius of Quercy, who had been sent into the territories of the Rutheni, brought over that state to the alliance of the Averni: advancing thence among the Nitobrigians and Gabali, he received hostages from both nations; and having got together a numerous body of troops, drew towards Narbonne, to attack the Roman province on that side. Cæsar, being informed of his design, thought it first and principally incumbent on him to provide for the security of the province. With this view he flew to Narbonne, confirmed the wavering and timorous, placed garrisons in the towns of the Rutheni subject to the Romans; also in those of the Volcæans, Tolosatians, and other states bordering on the enemy; and having thus taken effectual measures against Luterius, ordered part of the provincial forces, with the recruits he had brought from Italy, to rendezvous on the frontiers of the Helvians, whose territories adjoin to those of the Averni.

8. These dispositions being made, and Luterius checked and forced to retire, because he did not think it advisable to venture among the Roman garrisons, Cæsar advanced into the country of the Helvians. Although the mountains of the Sevens, which separate the Helvians from Auvergne, by the great depth of the snow in that extreme rigorous season threatened to obstruct his march, yet having cleared away the snow, which lay to the depth of

six feet, and, with infinite labour to the soldiers opened a passage over the mountains, he at length reached the confines of the Averni. As they were altogether unprepared, regarding the Sevnennes as an impenetrable barrier, impassable at that season even to single men, he ordered the cavalry to spread themselves on all sides, and strike as universal a terror into the enemy as possible. Fame and messengers from the state soon informed Vercingetorix of the disaster befallen his country. All the Averni gathered round him in a body, and with looks full of dismay conjured him to regard their fortunes, and not abandon them to the ravages of the Roman army; more especially as he now saw the whole war pointed against them. Vercingetorix, moved by their entreaties, put his army on the march, and quitting the territories of the Biturigians, drew towards Auvergne.

9. This Cæsar had foreseen; and after a stay of two days in those parts, set out under pretence of fetching a reinforcement. He left young Brutus to command in his absence; charged him to disperse the cavalry as wide as he could, and promised to return, if possible, within three days. Then, deceiving the Romans themselves, that he might the better impose on the Gauls, he posted by great journeys to Vienne. There he found the new levied cavalry whom he had sent thither some time before; and travelling day and night without intermission through the country of the Æduans, to prevent, by his expedition, any designs they might form against him, he at length reached the confines of the Lingones, where two of his legions wintered. Thence sending immediately to the rest, he drew them altogether into a body, before the Averni could be apprized of his arrival.

10. Vercingetorix, on notice of this, led back his army into the territories of the Biturigians; and marching thence, resolved to invest Gergovia, a town

belonging to the Boii, where they had been settled by Cæsar after the defeat of the Helvetians, and made subject to the Æduan state. This step greatly perplexed the Roman general: if he continued encamped with his legion in one place during the rest of the winter, and abandoned the subjects of the Æduans to the attempts of the enemy, he had reason to apprehend that the Gauls, seeing him afford no protection to his friends, would universally give in to a revolt; if, on the contrary, he took the field early, he risked the want of provision and forage, by the great difficulty of procuring convoys. Resolving, however, at all hazards, not to submit to an affront that must for ever alienate the hearts of his allies, he pressingly enjoined the Æduans to be very careful in supplying him with provisions; and despatching messengers to the Boii, to inform them of his approach, exhorted them to continue firm to their duty, and sustain with courage the assaults of the enemy. Meanwhile, leaving two legions and the baggage of the whole army at Agendicum, he set out on his march to their relief.

11. Arriving the next day before Vellaunodunum, a city of the Senones, that he might leave no enemy behind him capable of obstructing his convoys, he resolved to besiege it, and in two days completed his circumvallation. On the third, deputies came from the town to treat about a surrender; when, ordering them to deliver up their arms, horses, and six hundred hostages, he left C. Trebonius, one of his lieutenants, to cause the articles to be put in execution; and continuing his march with all diligence, advanced towards Genabum. The Carnutes, to whom this city belonged, were drawing troops together for its defence; imagining that the siege of Vellaunodunum, of which they had just then received intelligence, would be a work of some time. Cæsar reached the place in two days, encamped before it, and finding it began to be late, deferred the assault till next morning.

Meanwhile he gave the necessary orders to his men; and because the town had a bridge over the Loire, by which the inhabitants might endeavour to escape in the night, he obliged two legions to continue under arms. A little before midnight the Genabians, as he had foreseen, stole silently out of the city, and began to pass the river. Notice being given of this by his spies, he set fire to the gates, introduced the legions whom he had kept in readiness for that purpose, and took possession of the place. Very few of the enemy escaped on this occasion, because the narrowness of the bridge and passages obstructed the flight of the multitude. Cæsar ordered the town to be plundered and burnt, distributing the spoil among the soldiers; and crossing the Loire with his whole army, advanced into the territories of the Biturigians.

12. Vercingetorix, on notice of his approach, quitted the siege of Gergovia, and marched directly to meet him. Cæsar, meanwhile, had sat down before Noviodunum, a city of the Biturigians, that lay on his route. The inhabitants, sending deputies to the camp to implore forgiveness and safety, that he might the sooner accomplish his designs, in which expedition had hitherto availed him so much, he ordered them to deliver up their arms, horses, and a certain number of hostages. Part of the hostages had been already sent; the other articles of the treaty were on the point of execution; and even some centurions and soldiers had entered the place to search for arms and horses, when the enemy's cavalry, who were a little advanced before the rest of the army, appeared at a distance. Immediately the besieged, on this prospect of relief, setting up a shout, flew to arms, shut the gates, and manned the walls. The centurions in the town, judging from the noise among the Gauls that they had some new project in view, posted themselves, with their swords drawn, at the gates; and getting

CÆS. VOL. I.—R

all their men together, retreated without loss to the camp. Cæsar, ordering the cavalry to advance, fell on the enemy's horse; and finding his troops hard pressed, sustained them with some squadrons of Germans, whom, to the number of about four hundred, he had all along retained in his service. The Gauls, unable to stand their charge, at length betook themselves to flight, and were driven with great slaughter to the main body of their army. On this, the people of Noviodunum, terrified anew by the defeat of their friends, seized all who had been instrumental in breaking the capitulation, sent them prisoners to Cæsar's camp, and delivered up the town. These affairs despatched, Cæsar directed his march towards Avaricum. As this was the strongest and most considerable city of the Biturigians, and situate in the finest part of the country, he easily persuaded himself that by the reduction of it he should bring the whole nation under subjection.

13. Vercingetorix, after so many successive losses, at Vellaunodunum, Genabum, Noviodunum, calling a general council of his followers, represented "that it was necessary to resolve on a very different plan of war from that which hitherto had been pursued; and above all things, make it their endeavour to intercept the Roman convoys and foragers; that this was both a sure and practicable scheme, as they themselves abounded in horse, and the season of the year greatly favoured the design; that the ground as yet affording no produce, the enemy must unavoidably disperse themselves in the villages for subsistence, and give them daily opportunities of cutting them off by means of their cavalry. That where life and liberty were at stake, property and private possession ought to be neglected; that therefore the best resolution they could take was, to set all their houses and villages on fire, from the territories of the Boii to wherever the Romans might extend their quarters for the sake of forage; that they

themselves had no reason to apprehend scarcity, as they would be plentifully supplied by those states whose territories should become the seat of the war; whereas the enemy must either be reduced to the necessity of starving, or making distant and dangerous excursions from their camp; that it equally answered the purpose of the Gauls to cut the Roman army to pieces, or seize on their baggage and convoys; because without these last it would be impossible for them to carry on the war; that they ought to set fire even to the towns themselves which were not strong enough by art or nature to be perfectly secure against all danger; as by this means they would neither become places of retreat to their own men, to screen them from military service, nor contribute to the support of the Romans, by the supplies and plunder they might furnish. In fine, that though these things were indeed grievous and terrible, they ought yet to esteem it still more terrible and grievous to see their wives and children dragged into captivity, and themselves exposed to slaughter, which was the unavoidable lot of the vanquished."

14. This proposal being approved by all, upwards of twenty cities of the Biturigians were burnt in one day. The like was done in other states. Nothing but conflagrations were to be seen over the whole country. And though the natives bore this desolation with extreme regret, they nevertheless consoled themselves with the hope that an approaching and certain victory would soon enable them to recover their losses. A debate arising in council about Avaricum, whether it would be proper to defend or set it on fire, the Biturigians, falling prostrate at the feet of the rest of the Gauls, implored "that they might not be obliged to burn, with their own hands, one of the finest cities of all Gaul, which was both the ornament and security of their state; more especially as the town itself, almost wholly surrounded by a river and morass, and affording but one very

narrow approach, was, from the nature of its situation, capable of an easy defence." Their request prevailed; Vercingetorix, though he at first opposed, afterward coming into the design; partly moved by the entreaties of the Biturigians, partly by the compassion of the multitude. A chosen garrison was immediately put into the place.

15. Vercingetorix followed Cæsar by easy marches, and chose for his camp a place surrounded with woods and marshes, about fifteen miles distant from Avaricum. There he had hourly intelligence by his scouts of all that passed before the town, and sent his orders from time to time to the garrison. Meanwhile he strictly watched our convoys and foragers; set on our dispersed parties, who were obliged to fetch provisions from a great distance; and in spite of all endeavours to prevent it, by choosing such times and routes as were most likely to deserve his vigilance, very much incommoded them by his attacks.

16. Cæsar, encamping on that side of the town where the intermission of the river and morass formed, as we have said, a narrow approach, began to raise a mount, bring forward his battering-engines, and prepare two towers of assault; without troubling himself about lines of circumvallation, which the nature of the ground rendered impossible. Meanwhile he was continually soliciting the Æduans and Boii for corn: but received no great supplies from either; partly occasioned by the negligence of the Æduans, who were not hearty in the affair; partly by the want of ability in the Boii, who, possessing only a small and inconsiderable territory, soon consumed all the produce of their own lands. But though the army laboured under the greatest scarcity of corn, through the inability of the Boii, the want of inclination in the Æduans, and the universal devastation of the country—though they were even for many days altogether without bread, and had nothing

to appease their extreme hunger but the cattle brought from distant villages—yet not an expression was heard over the whole camp unworthy the majesty of the Roman name, or the glory they had acquired by former victories. Nay, when Cæsar visited the different quarters of the legions in person, and offered to raise the siege, if they found the famine insupportable, they all with one voice requested him not to do it; adding, “that during the many years they had served under him, they never yet had met with any check, or undertaken aught in which they had not succeeded: that they could not but look on it as inglorious to relinquish a siege they had once begun; and had rather undergo the greatest hardships than not revenge the blood of the Roman citizens perfidiously massacred by the Gauls at Genabum.” The same they said to the centurions and military tribunes, entreating them to report their sentiments to Cæsar.

17. And now the towers began to approach the walls, when Cæsar was informed by some prisoners that Vercingetorix, having consumed all the forage round him, had removed his camp nearer to Avaricum, and was gone himself at the head of the cavalry and the light-armed troops accustomed to fight in their intervals to form an ambuscade for the Romans, in a place where it was supposed they would come next day to forage. On this intelligence, setting out about midnight in great silence, he arrived next morning at the enemy’s camp; but they, having had timely notice of his approach by their scouts, instantly conveyed their baggage and carriages into a thick wood, and drew up in order of battle on an open hill. Cæsar then ordered all the baggage to be brought together into one place, and the soldiers to prepare for an engagement.

18. The hill itself where the enemy stood, rising all the way with an easy ascent, was almost wholly surrounded by a morass, difficult and dangerous to

be passed, though not above fifty feet over. Here the Gauls, confiding in the strength of their post, and having broken down all the bridges over the morass, appeared with an air of resolution. They had formed themselves into different bodies, according to their several states ; and, planting select detachments at all the avenues and fords, waited with determined courage, that if the Romans should attempt to force their way through, they might fall on them from the higher ground while entangled in the mud. To attend only to the nearness of the two armies, they seemed as if ready to fight us on even terms ; but when the advantage of their situation was considered, all this ostentation of bravery was easily discerned to be mere show and pretence. Nevertheless, the Romans, full of indignation that the enemy should dare to face them with so small a space between them, loudly demanded to be led to battle. Cæsar checked their ardour for the present, and endeavoured to make them sensible that in attacking an army so strongly posted, the victory must cost extremely dear, and be attended with the loss of many brave men. To this he told them he was the more averse, because finding them prepared to face every kind of danger for his glory, he thought he could not be too tender of the lives of those who merited so highly at his hands. Having by this speech consoled the soldiers, he led them back the same day to their camp, and applied himself wholly to the carrying on of the siege.

19. Vercingetorix, on his return to the camp, was accused by the army of treason. The removal of his quarters nearer to those of the enemy, his departure at the head of all the cavalry, his leaving so many troops without a commander-in-chief, and the opportune and speedy arrival of the Romans during his absence,—all these, they said, could not easily happen by chance, or without design ; and gave great reason to believe, that he had rather owe

the sovereignty of Gaul to Cæsar's grant than to the favour and free choice of his countrymen. To this charge he replied, "that the removal of his camp was occasioned by the want of forage, and done at their own express desire: that he had lodged himself nearer to the Romans on account of the advantage of the ground, which secured him against all attacks: that cavalry were by no means wanted in a morass, but might have been extremely serviceable in the place to which he had carried them: that he purposely forbore naming a commander-in-chief at his departure, lest the impatience of the multitude should have forced him on a battle; to which he perceived they were all strongly inclined, through a certain weakness and effeminacy of mind that rendered them incapable of long fatigue: that whether accident or intelligence brought the Romans to their camp, they ought to thank, in the one case fortune, in the other the informer, for giving them an opportunity of discovering from the higher ground the inconsiderable number, and despising the feeble efforts of the enemy; who, not daring to hazard an engagement, ignominiously retreated to their camp: that, for his part, he scorned treacherously to hold an authority of Cæsar, which he hoped soon to merit by a victory, already in a manner assured both to himself and the rest of the Gauls: that he was willing even to resign the command, if they thought the honour done to him by that distinction too great for the advantages procured by his conduct. And," added he, "to convince you of the truth and sincerity of my words, hear the Roman soldiers themselves." He then produced some slaves, whom he had made prisoners a few days before in foraging, and by severity and hard usage brought to his purpose. These, according to the lesson taught them beforehand, declared "that they were legionary soldiers: that, urged by hunger, they had privately stolen out of the camp, to search for corn and cattle in the fields:

that the whole army laboured under the like scarcity, and was reduced to so weak a condition as no longer to be capable of supporting fatigue : that the general had therefore resolved, if the town held out three days longer, to draw off his men from the siege."

"Such," said Vercingetorix, "are the services you receive from the man whom you have not scrupled to charge with treason. To him it is owing that, without drawing a sword, you see a powerful and victorious army almost wholly destroyed by famine ; and effectual care taken, that when necessity compels them to seek refuge in a shameful flight, no state shall receive them into its territories."

20. The whole multitude set up a shout ; and striking, as their manner was, their lances against their swords to denote their approbation of the speaker, declared Vercingetorix a consummate general, whose fidelity ought not to be questioned, and whose conduct deserved the highest praises. They decreed that ten thousand men, chosen out of all the troops, should be sent to reinforce the garrison of Avaricum ; it seeming too hazardous to rely on the Biturigians alone for the defence of a place whose preservation, they imagined, would necessarily give them the superiority in the war.

21. And indeed, though the siege was carried on by our men with incredible bravery, yet were all their efforts in a great measure rendered ineffectual by the address and contrivances of the Gauls : for they are people of singular ingenuity, extremely quick of apprehension, and very happy in imitating what they see practised. They not only turned aside our hooks with ropes, and after having seized them, drew them into the town with engines, but likewise set themselves to undermine the mount ; in which they the more succeeded because the country abounding with iron mines, they are perfectly skilled in that whole art. At the same time they raised towers on all parts of the wall, covered

them carefully with raw hides, and continuing their sallies day and night, either set fire to the mount, or fell on the workmen. In proportion as our towers increased in height, by the continual addition to the mount, in like manner did they advance the towers on their walls, by raising one story perpetually over another; and counterworking our mines with the utmost diligence, they either filled them up with great stones, or poured melted pitch into them, or repulsed the miners with long stakes, burnt and sharpened at the end; all which very much retarded the approaches, and kept us at a distance from the place.

22. The fortified towns among the Gauls have their walls mostly built in the following manner: long massy beams of wood are placed on the ground, at the equal distance of two feet one from another, and so as to constitute by their length the thickness of the wall. These being again crossed over by others, which serve to bind them together, have their intervals on the inside filled up with earth, and on the outside with large stones. The first course thus completed and firmly joined, a second is laid over it; which, allowing the same openings between the beams, rests them, not immediately on those of the order below, but disposes them artfully above their intervals, and connects them, as before, with interjacent earth and stones. In this manner the work is carried on to a proper height, and pleases the eye by its uniform variety, the alternate courses of stones and beams running in even lines, according to their several orders. Nor is it less adapted to security and defence: for the stones are proof against fire, and the whole mass is impenetrable to the ram; because being strongly bound together by continual beams, to a depth of forty feet, it can neither be disjoined nor thrown down.

23. Such were the obstacles we met with in the siege. But the soldiers, though obliged to struggle

during the whole time with cold, dirt, and perpetual rains, yet, by dint of labour, overcame all difficulties; and, at the end of twenty-five days, had raised a mount three hundred and thirty feet broad, and eighty feet high. When it was brought almost close to the walls, Cæsar, according to custom, attending the works, and encouraging the soldiers to labour without intermission, a little before midnight it was observed to smoke, the enemy having undermined and fired it. At the same time they raised a mighty shout, and sallying vigorously by two several gates, attacked the works on both sides. Some threw lighted torches and dry wood from the walls on the mount, others pitch and all sorts of combustibles; so that it was hard to determine on which side to make head against the enemy, or where first to apply redress. But as Cæsar kept always two legions on guard in the trenches, besides great numbers employed in the works, who relieved one another by turns, his troops were soon in a condition, some to oppose those that sallied from the town, others to draw off the towers, and make openings in the mount; while the whole multitude ran to extinguish the flames.

24. The fight continued with great obstinacy during the remaining part of the night: the enemy still entertained hopes of victory, and persisted with the more firmness, as they saw the mantles that covered the towers burnt down, and the Romans unable to rescue them for want of shelter. At the same time fresh troops were continually sent to supply the place of those that were fatigued; the besieged believing that the safety of Gaul entirely depended on the issue of that critical moment. And here I cannot forbear mentioning a remarkable instance of intrepidity, to which I was myself a witness on this occasion. A certain Gaul, posted before the gate of the city, threw into the fire balls of pitch and tallow, to feed it. This man, being ex-

posed to the discharge of a Roman battery, was struck through the side with a dart, and expired. Another, striding over his body, immediately took his place. He also was killed in the same manner. A third succeeded : to the third a fourth. Nor was this dangerous post left vacant till the fire of the mount being extinguished, and the enemy repulsed on all sides, an end was put to the conflict.

25. The Gauls, having tried all methods of defence, and finding that none of them succeeded, consulted next day about leaving the town, in concert with, and even by the order of, Vercingetorix. This they hoped easily to effect in the night; as that general's camp was not far off, and the morass between them and the Romans would serve to cover their retreat. Night came, and the besieged were preparing to put their design in execution, when suddenly the women, running out into the streets, and casting themselves at their husbands' feet, conjured them, with many tears, not to abandon to the fury of an enraged enemy them and their common children, whom nature and weakness rendered incapable of flight. But finding their entreaties ineffectual (for in extreme danger fear often excludes compassion), they began to set up a loud cry, and inform the Romans of the intended flight. This alarmed the garrison, who, apprehending the passages would be seized by our horse, desisted from their resolution.

26. Next day Cæsar brought forward the tower, and gave the necessary directions about the works. A heavy rain chancing just then to fall, he thought it a favourable opportunity for effecting his design; as he observed the wall to be less strictly guarded. Wherefore, ordering the soldiers to abate a little of their vigour, and having instructed them in what manner to proceed, he exhorted the legions, who advanced under cover of the machines, to seize at last the fruit of a victory acquired by so many toils. Then, promising rewards to those who should first scale

the town, he gave the signal of attack. The Romans rushed suddenly on the enemy from all parts, and in a moment possessed themselves of the walls.

27. The Gauls, terrified at this new manner of assault, and driven from their towers and battlements, drew up triangle-wise in the squares and open places, that on whatever side our men should come to attack them they might face in order of battle. But observing that we still kept on the walls, and were endeavouring to get possession of their whole circuit, they began to fear they should have no outlet to escape by; and throwing down their arms, ran tumultuously to the farthest part of the town. There many fell within the city, the narrowness of the gates obstructing their flight; others were slain by the cavalry without the walls; nor did any one for the present think of plunder. The Romans, eager to revenge the massacre at Genabum, and exasperated by the obstinate defence of the place, spared neither old men, women, nor children; insomuch, that of all that multitude, amounting to about forty thousand, scarce eight hundred, who had quitted the town on the first alarm, escaped safe to Vercingetorix's camp. They arrived there late in the night, and were received in great silence; for Vercingetorix, fearing lest their entrance in a body, and the compassion it would naturally raise among the troops, might occasion some tumult in the camp, had sent out his friends, and the principal noblemen of each province, to meet them by the way, and conduct them separately to the quarters of their several states.

28. Next day, having called a council, he consoled and exhorted the troops not to be too much disheartened, or cast down, by their late misfortune: "that the Romans had not overcome by bravery, or in the field; but by their address and skill in sieges, with which part of war the Gauls were less acquainted: that it was deceiving themselves to hope for success in

every measure they might think fit to pursue: that himself, as they all knew, had never advised the defence of Avaricum, and could not but impute the present disaster to the imprudence of the Biturigians, and the too easy compliance of the rest: that he hoped, however, soon to compensate it by superior advantages, as he was using his utmost endeavours to bring over the other states, which had hitherto refused their concurrence, and to join one general confederacy of all Gaul, against whose united strength not the whole earth would be able to prevail: that he had even in a great measure effected his design, and in the mean time only required of them, for the sake of the common safety, that they would set about fortifying their camp, the better to secure them from the sudden attacks of the enemy." This speech was not displeasing to the Gauls; and the rather, as notwithstanding so great a blow, Vercingetorix seemed to have lost nothing of his courage; neither withdrawing from public view, nor shunning the sight of the multitude. They even began to entertain a higher opinion of his prudence and foresight, as from the first he had advised the burning of Avaricum, and at last sent orders to abandon it. And thus bad success, which usually sinks the reputation of a commander, served only to augment his credit, and give him greater authority among the troops. At the same time they were full of hopes, from the assurances he had given them, of seeing the other states accede to the alliance. And now, for the first time, the Gauls set about fortifying their camp; being so humbled by their late misfortune, that though naturally impatient of fatigue they resolved to refuse no labour imposed on them by their general.

29. Nor was Vercingetorix less active on his side to bring over the other provinces of Gaul to the confederacy, endeavouring to gain the leading men in each by presents and promises. For this purpose

CÆS. VOL. I.—S

he made choice of fit agents, who, by their address, or particular ties of friendship, were most likely to influence those to whom they were sent. He provided arms and clothing for the troops that had escaped from Avaricum; and, to repair the loss sustained by the taking of that place, gave orders to the several states to furnish a certain number of men, and send them to the camp by a day prefixed. At the same time he commanded all the archers, of which there were great numbers in Gaul, to be sought out and brought to the army. By these measures he soon replaced the men whom he lost at the siege of Avaricum. Meanwhile Theutomatus, the son of Ollovico, and king of the Nitobrigians, whose father had been styled friend and ally by the senate of Rome, came and joined him with a great body of horse, which he had raised in his own territories and in the province of Aquitain.

30. Cæsar, finding great plenty of corn and other provisions at Avaricum, staid there several days to refresh his men, after the fatigue and scarcity they had so lately undergone. Winter was now drawing towards a period; and as the season itself invited him to take the field, he resolved to march against the enemy, either to draw them out of the woods and marshes, or besiege them in their fastnesses. While he was full of these thoughts, deputies arrived from the Æduans to beg his interposition and authority for settling the differences of their state. "Every thing there," they told him, "threatened an intestine war. For whereas it had all along been the custom to be governed by a single magistrate, who possessed the supreme power for the space of one year, they had now two disputing for that title, each pretending his election was according to law: that the one was Convictolitanis, an illustrious and popular young nobleman; the other Cotus, of an ancient family, great authority, and powerful relations, whose brother Videliacus had exercised the same

office the year before; that the whole state was in arms, the senate divided, and each party backed by their clients among the people; nor had they any other hopes of escaping a civil war but in his care and timely endeavours to put an end to the controversy."

31. Although Cæsar was sensible it would greatly prejudice his affairs to quit the pursuit of the war and the enemy, yet, reflecting on the mischiefs that often arise from divisions, and desirous if possible to prevent so powerful a state, in strict amity with the people of Rome, and which he had always in a particular manner cherished and befriended, from having recourse to the method of violence and arms, which might drive the party that least confided in his friendship to seek the assistance of Vercingetorix, he resolved to make it his first care to put a stop to the progress of these disorders: and because, by the constitution of the Æduans, it was not lawful for the supreme magistrate to pass beyond the limits of the state, that he might not seem to detract from their privileges, he resolved to go in person thither, and summoned the senate and two candidates to meet him at Decise. The assembly was very numerous; when finding on inquiry that Cotus had been declared chief magistrate by his own brother, in presence of only a few electors privately called together, without regard to time or place, and even contrary to the express laws of the state, which forbid two of the same family, while yet both alive, either to hold the supreme dignity, or so much as sit together in the senate, he obliged him to resign in favour of Convictolitanis, who, on the expiration of the office of the preceding magistrate, had been elected in all the forms by the priests. ↩

32. This sentence being passed, and having exhorted the Æduans to lay aside their quarrels and divisions, and apply themselves solely to the business of the present war—to expect with confidence

the full recompense of their services as soon as the reduction of Gaul was completed, and to send him immediately all their cavalry, with ten thousand foot, to form a chain of posts for the security of his convoys, he divided his army into two parts. Four legions, under the conduct of Labienus, were sent against the Senones and Parisians. Six, headed by himself in person, marched along the banks of the Allier towards the territories of the Averni, with design to invest Gergovia. Part of the cavalry followed the route of Labienus, part remained with Cæsar. Vercingetorix, having notice of this, broke down all the bridges on the Allier, and began his march on the other side of the river.

33. As both armies were continually in view, encamped almost over-against each other, and the enemy's scouts so stationed that it was impossible for the Romans to make a bridge for carrying over their forces, Cæsar began to be uneasy lest he should be hindered the greatest part of the summer by the river, because the Allier is seldom fordable till towards autumn. To prevent this inconvenience, he encamped in a place full of woods, over-against one of those bridges which Vercingetorix had caused to be broken down; and remaining there privately next day, with a good body of troops, formed by draughting every fourth cohort, that the number of legions might still appear complete, he sent forward the rest of the army with all the baggage as usual, ordering them to march as far as they could. When, by the time of the day, he judged they might be arrived at the place of their encampment, he set about rebuilding the bridge, making use of the old piles, whose lower part the enemy had left standing. Having soon completed the work, marched over the troops he had with him, and chosen a proper place for his camp, he recalled the rest of the forces. Vercingetorix, on intelligence of this, advanced be-

fore by long marches, that he might not be obliged to fight against his will.

34. Cæsar, after five days' march, came before Gergovia, where he had a slight engagement with the enemy's horse ; and, having taken a view of the place, which he found situated on a very high mountain, all whose approaches were extremely difficult, he not only despaired of reducing it by storm, but resolved even to forbear investing it until he had secured the necessary supplies for his army. Vercingetorix meanwhile was encamped near the town on the hill, where he had disposed the forces of the several states around him, in different divisions, separated from one another by moderate intervals. As his army possessed all the summits of the mountain whence there was any prospect into the plains below, they made a very formidable appearance. Every morning by daybreak the chiefs of each state, who composed his council, assembled in his tent to advise with him, or receive his orders ; nor did he suffer a single day to pass without detaching some cavalry, intermixed with archers, to skirmish with the Romans, that he might make trial of the spirit and courage of his men. There was a rising ground that joined to the foot of the mountain on which the town stood, excellently well fortified by nature, as being very steep on all sides, and of extreme difficult access. This hill, though of such importance to the enemy, that by our getting possession of it we could in a great measure deprive them of water and forage, was yet but very indifferently guarded. Cæsar, therefore, leaving his camp about midnight, before any assistance could arrive from the town, dislodged the enemy, seized the hill, and having placed two legions on it to defend it, drew a double ditch, twelve feet deep from the greater to the lesser camp, that the soldiers might pass and repass in safety, even single and without a guard.

35. While things were in this posture before Ger-
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govia, Convictolitanis the Æduan, to whom, as we have related above, Cæsar had adjudged the supreme magistracy, being strongly solicited by the Averni, and at length gained over by their money, addressed himself to some young noblemen, the chief of whom were Litavicus and his brothers, of the most distinguished family of the province. With these he shared the reward he had received, and exhorted them to consider "that they were subjects of a free state, and born to command; that liberty and victory were retarded by the Æduans alone, whose authority restrained the other states, and whose concurrence in the common cause would take from the Romans all possibility of supporting themselves in Gaul; that though he was himself under some obligation to Cæsar, at least so far as a just and equitable decision deserved that name, he thought he owed still more to his country, and could see no reason why the Æduans should rather have recourse to the Roman general, in what regarded their laws and customs than the Romans in the like case to the Æduans." The representations of the magistrate, and the rewards he bestowed, soon prevailed: they even offered to become the chief conductors of the enterprise; and nothing was wanting but to consult of proper means for accomplishing the design, as it was easily foreseen that the state would not be induced without great difficulty to engage in so dangerous a war. At last it was agreed that Litavicus should have the command of the ten thousand foot appointed to join Cæsar; that he should begin his march, that his brothers should be sent before to the Roman camp, and that the rest of the project should be then executed according to a plan previously concerted among them.

36. Litavicus, having received the command of the army, when he was within about thirty miles of Gergovia, suddenly called the troops together, and addressing them with tears, "Whither, fellow-sol-

diers," said he, "are we going? All our cavalry, all our nobility are slain. Eporedorix and Viridumarus, men of the first quality in the state, being accused by the Romans of treason, are put to death without trial. Learn these things of those who have escaped this general massacre: for as to me, overwhelmed as I am with grief for the loss of my brothers and kinsmen, I have neither strength nor voice to utter our calamities." He then produced some whom he had beforehand instructed for that purpose, and who, joining in the same story, told the multitude "that the greatest part of the Æduan cavalry had been put to the sword, under pretence of holding intelligence with the Averni, and that themselves had escaped only in the crowd by withdrawing during the general slaughter." On this the whole army called aloud to Litavicus, entreating him to provide for their safety. "As if," said he, "there was room for counsel; or any choice left but that of marching directly to Gergovia, and joining the Averni. Can we doubt, after so black an instance of Roman perfidy, but that they are already on their way to complete the massacre? Let us therefore, if aught of spirit or courage remains in our breasts, revenge the death of our countrymen, so undeservedly slain, and put these inhuman spoilers to the sword." He then presented some Roman citizens who had taken the opportunity of their march for conducting a large convoy of corn and provisions to the camp. Instantly the convoy was plundered, the Romans themselves put to death with the most cruel torments, and messengers despatched through all the territories of the Æduans to spread the same forgery of the massacre of their cavalry and princes, and thereby rouse them to a like vengeance.

37. Eporedorix the Æduan, a young nobleman of distinguished birth and great interest in the state, as likewise Viridumarus, of equal age and authority, though not so well descended, whom Cæsar, on the

recommendation of Divitiacus, had raised from a low condition to the highest dignities, were both at this time in the Roman camp, having come along with the cavalry, at Cæsar's express desire. Between these two was a competition for greatness ; and in the late dispute about the magistracy, the one had declared warmly for Convictolitanis, the other for Cotus. Eporedorix, getting notice of Litavicus's design, came about midnight to Cæsar's tent, discovered the whole plot, and entreated him to obviate the mischievous counsels of a few young noblemen, and not suffer the state to fall off from the alliance of the Romans, which he foresaw must happen, should so many thousand men once join the enemy. For it was by no means probable that either their own relations would neglect their safety, or the state itself make light of so great a part of its forces.

38. This piece of intelligence gave Cæsar extreme concern, because he had always manifested a particular regard to the Æduans. He therefore drew out immediately four legions, without baggage, together with all the cavalry : and because the affair seemed to depend wholly on despatch, would not even take time to contract his camp, but left C. Fabius, his lieutenant, with two legions, to defend it against the enemy. Finding that Litavicus's brothers, whom he ordered to be seized, had some time before gone over to Vercingetorix, he began his march, exhorting the soldiers to bear the fatigue cheerfully in so pressing a conjuncture. They followed with great alacrity, and advancing about five-and-twenty miles from Gergovia, came at last within sight of the Æduans. Cæsar immediately detached the cavalry against them to retard and stop their march ; but with strict charge to abstain from bloodshed. He ordered Eporedorix and Virdumarus, whom they believed slain, to ride up and down among the squadrons, and call to their countrymen. As they were soon known, and Litavicus's forgery

thereby discovered, the Æduans stretched out their hands, made signs of submission, and throwing down their arms, began to beg their lives. Litavicus, with his clients, who, by the customs of the Gauls, cannot without infamy abandon their patrons, even in the greatest extremities of fortune, escaped safe to Gergovia.

39. Cæsar, having despatched messengers to the Æduans, to inform them that his lenity and regard for their state had prevailed with him to spare troops whom by the right of war he might have put to the sword, after allowing the army three hours' rest during the night, marched back to Gergovia. About half-way he was met by a party of horse, sent by Fabius, to give him notice of the danger that threatened his camp. They told him "that the enemy had attacked it with all their forces, and by sending continual supplies of fresh men, were like in the end to overpower the Romans, whose fatigue admitted of no relaxation, because the vast extent of ground they had to defend obliged them to be perpetually on the rampart; that the multitude of arrows and darts discharged by the Gauls had wounded many of the soldiers, notwithstanding the protection received from the engines, which yet had been of good service in beating off the assailants; that Fabius, on the retreat of the enemy, had closed up all the gates of the camp but two, carried a breastwork quite round the rampart, and made preparation for sustaining a like assault the next day." Cæsar, informed of these things, hastened his march with all diligence, and seconded by the unusual ardour of the troops, arrived in the camp before sunrise.

40. While these things passed at Gergovia, the Æduans, on receipt of the first despatches from Litavicus, staid for confirmation of the report; but prompted, partly by avarice, partly by revenge, and many by a native rashness, to which the Gauls in general are extremely addicted, being ready to catch

up every flying rumour as a certain truth, flew immediately to arms, plundered the Roman citizens of their effects, slaughtered their persons, or dragged them into servitude. Convictolitanis fomented to the utmost this fury, which had already taken but too fast hold of the multitude; that by plunging them into some desperate act of violence he might render a retreat the more difficult and shameful. At his instigation they obliged M. Aristius, a military tribune, who was on his way to join the army, to quit Cabillonum, promising not to molest him in his journey. The same they did by several Roman merchants who had stopped there on account of traffic; and attacking them treacherously on the road, stripped them of their baggage, invested day and night those that made resistance; and many being killed on both sides, drew together a great number of men to effect their design. Meanwhile coming to understand that all their troops were in Cæsar's power, they ran to Aristius, assured him that nothing had been done by public authority, ordered informations to be brought against those who had been concerned in pillaging the Romans, confiscated the estates of Litavicus and his brothers, and sent ambassadors to Cæsar to excuse what had happened. All this they did with a view to the recovery of their troops: but conscious of guilt, loath to part with the plunder, in which great numbers had shared, and dreading the punishment so gross an outrage deserved, they began privately to concert measures of war, and by their ambassadors solicited other states to join them. Though Cæsar was not ignorant of these practices, he spoke with the greatest mildness to the Æduan deputies, assuring them of the continuance of his favour, and that he would not consider as the crime of the whole nation what was owing only to the imprudence and levity of the multitude. Apprehending, however, a universal revolt of Gaul, and that he might be surrounded by

the forces of all the states at once, he began to think of retiring to Gergovia, and drawing his whole army again into a body; yet in such manner that a retreat occasioned by the fear of an insurrection might not carry with it the appearance of a flight.

41. While he was full of these thoughts an opportunity seemed to offer of acting against the enemy with success. For, coming into the lesser camp to take a view of the works, he observed a hill, that for some days before was scarce to be seen for the multitudes that covered it, now quite naked and destitute of troops. Wondering what might be the cause, he inquired of the deserters, who flocked daily in great numbers to the Roman camp. They all agreed with our scouts that the back of the hill was almost an even ground, but narrow and woody in that part where the passage lay to the other side of the town; that the enemy were mightily afraid of losing this post, because the Romans, who had already possessed themselves of one hill, by seizing the other likewise, would in a manner quite surround them; and being masters of all the outlets, might entirely cut off their forage: that Vercingetorix had therefore drawn all his forces on that side, with design to fortify the passage.

42. Cæsar, on this intelligence, despatched some squadrons of cavalry thither about midnight, ordering them to ride up and down the place with as much noise as possible. At daybreak he drew a great number of mules and carriage-horses out of the camp, sent away their usual harness, and furnishing the grooms and wagoners with helmets, that they might resemble horsemen, commanded them to march quite round the hill. With these he joined a few cavalry, who, for the greater show, were to expatiate a little more freely; and the whole detachment had orders to move towards the same parts, taking a very large circuit. All these dispositions were seen from the town, which commanded

a full view of the Roman camp, though the distance was too great to distinguish objects with certainty. At the same time Cæsar, the more effectually to deceive the enemy, detached a legion towards the same eminence, and when it was advanced a little way, stationed it at the foot of the hill, affecting to conceal it in the woods. This increased the jealousy of the Gauls to such a degree that they immediately carried all their forces thither to defend the post. Cæsar, seeing their intrenchments abandoned, made his soldiers cover the military ensigns and standards, and file off in small parties from the greater to the lesser camp, that they might not be perceived from the town. He then opened his design to his lieutenants, whom he had appointed to command the several legions, counselling them above all things to moderate the ardour of the soldiers, that the hope of plunder or desire of fighting might not carry them too far. He represented particularly the disadvantage of the ground, against which there was no security but in despatch; and told them that it was not a regular attack, but a sudden onset, to be pursued no farther than opportunity served. These precautions taken, he gave the signal to engage, and at the same time detached the Æduans by another ascent to charge the enemy on the right.

43. The wall of the town had no breaks or hollows intervened, was about twelve hundred paces distant from the plain below, measuring in a direct line from the foot of the mountain. The circuit the troops were obliged to take to moderate the steepness of the ascent, added still to this space on the march. Half-way up the hill, as near as the nature of the ground would allow, the Gauls had run a wall of large stones, six feet high, the better to defend themselves against our attacks. All between this and the plain was left quite void of troops by the enemy; but the upper part of the hill, to the very walls of the town, was crowded with the camps of

their several states. The signal being given, the Romans immediately mounted the hill, scaled the outward wall, and possessed themselves of three of the enemy's camps. Such too was the expedition wherewith they carried them, that coming suddenly on Theutomatus, king of the Nitobrigians, as he was reposing himself in his tent about noon, he very narrowly escaped being taken; for he was obliged to fly away half-naked, and had his horse wounded under him.

44. Cæsar, having succeeded as far as his design required, ordered a retreat to be sounded; and the tenth legion, which fought near his person, obeyed. The other legions, not hearing the signal, because separated from the general by a large valley, were yet commanded to halt by the lieutenants and military tribunes, according to the instructions given by Cæsar in the beginning; but elated with the hopes of a speedy victory, the flight of the enemy, and the remembrance of former successes, they thought nothing impracticable to their valour, nor desisted from the pursuit, till they had reached the very walls and gates of the town. On this a great cry arising from all parts, those that were farthest from the place of assault, terrified by the noise and tumult, and imagining the enemy already within the gates, quitted the town with precipitation. The women, throwing their money and clothes from the walls, with naked breasts and extended arms conjured the Romans to spare their lives, and not, as at Avaricum, sacrifice all to their resentment, without distinction of age or sex. Some being let down by their hands from the wall, delivered themselves up to our soldiers. L. Fabius, a centurion of the eighth legion, was that day heard to say that he had not yet forgot the plunder of Avaricum, and was resolved no man should enter the place before him. Accordingly, having, with the assistance of three of

CÆS. VOL. I.—T

his company, got on the town-wall, he helped them one after another to do the like.

45. Meanwhile, the troops who, as we have related above, were gone to defend the post on the other side of the town, incited by the cries of the combatants, and the continual accounts brought that the enemy had entered the place, sending all the cavalry before to stop the progress of the Romans, advanced in mighty crowds to the attack. In proportion as they arrived, they drew up under the wall, and augmented the number of those who fought on their side. As they soon became formidable by their multitude, the women who a little before had implored the compassion of the Romans, now began to encourage their own troops, showing their dishevelled hair, and producing their children, according to the custom of the Gauls. The contest was by no means equal, either in respect of numbers, or of the ground; and the Romans, already fatigued with the march and length of the combat, were little able to sustain the attack of fresh and vigorous troops.

46. Cæsar, observing the disadvantage of the ground, and the continual increase of the enemy's troops, began to be apprehensive about the event; and sending T. Sextius, his lieutenant, whom he had left to guard the lesser camp, ordered him to bring forth the cohorts with all expedition, and post them at the foot of the hill, on the enemy's right; that if our men should give way, he might deter the Gauls from pursuing them. He himself, advancing a little with the tenth legion, waited the issue of the combat.

47. While the conflict was maintained with the utmost vigour on both sides—the enemy, trusting to their post and numbers, the Romans to their courage,—suddenly the Æduans, whom Cæsar had sent by another ascent on the right to make a diversion, appeared on the flank of our men. As they were armed after the manner of the Gauls, this sight

greatly terrified the Romans ; and though they extended their right arms in token of peace, yet still our men fancied it a stratagem to deceive them. At the same time L. Fabius, the centurion, and those who had got on the wall with him, being surrounded and slain, were thrown down by the enemy from the battlements. M. Petreius, a centurion of the same legion, who had endeavoured to force the gates, finding himself overpowered by the enemy, and despairing of safety, because he was already covered with wounds, turning to his soldiers that had followed him, said, "As I find it impossible to preserve both myself and you, I will at least do my best to further your escape, whom I have brought into this danger through too eager a desire of glory. Take advantage therefore of the present opportunity." Then throwing himself on the enemy, he killed two, drove the rest from the gate, and seeing his men run to his assistance, "In vain," said he, 'do you endeavour to preserve my life. My blood and strength forsake me. Go therefore, while you may, and rejoin your legion.'" Continuing still to fight, he expired soon after, preserving his followers by the loss of his own life.

48. Our men, thus pressed on all sides, were at length driven from the place, with the loss of forty-six centurions ; but the tenth legion, which had been posted a little more advantageously to cover their retreat, checked the impetuous pursuit of the Gauls ; being sustained by the cohorts of the thirteenth legion, who had quitted the lesser camp under Sextius, and possessed themselves of an eminence. The legions, having gained the plain, immediately halted, and faced about towards the enemy ; but Vercingetorix, drawing off his troops from the foot of the hill, retired within his intrenchments. The Romans lost that day about seven hundred men.

49. Cæsar, assembling the army next day, severely blamed the temerity and avarice of the soldiers ;

"That they had taken on themselves to judge how far they were to proceed, and what they were to undertake; regarding neither the signal to retreat, nor the orders of their officers. He explained the disadvantage of the ground, and reminded them of his own conduct at the siege of Avaricum, when, having surprised the enemy without a general and without cavalry, he had rather chosen to give up a certain victory, than by attacking them in a difficult post, hazard an inconsiderable loss; that as much as he admired the astonishing courage of men whom neither the intrenchments of several camps, nor the height of the mountain, nor the walls of the town could check; so much did he blame the licentiousness and arrogance of soldiers who thought they knew more than their general, and could see better than he the way to conquest, that he looked on obedience and moderation in the pursuit of booty as virtues no less essential to a good soldier than valour and magnanimity."

50. Having made this speech, and in the end exhorted his soldiers not to be discouraged by their late misfortune, nor ascribe that to the bravery of the enemy which was entirely owing to the disadvantage of the ground; as he still persisted in his design of retiring, he drew out his legions, and formed them in order of battle on the plain. But Vercingetorix not thinking proper to descend, after a small and successful skirmish between the cavalry, Cæsar returned again to his camp. The like he did the following day: when, thinking he had done enough to confirm the courage of his own men and abate the pride of the Gauls, he decamped towards the territories of the Æduans. As the enemy made no attempt to pursue him, he arrived the third day on the banks of the Allier, and having repaired the bridge, passed over with his whole army.

51. Here he was informed by Eporedorix and Virdumarus, that Litavicus was gone with all the

cavalry to solicit the Æduans; and it would be therefore necessary for themselves to set out, in order to prevent his designs, and confirm the state in their attachment to the Romans. Though Cæsar was by this time abundantly convinced of the perfidy of the Æduans, and plainly foresaw that their departure would only hasten their revolt, he yet did not think proper to detain them, that he might give no ground of offence, nor betray any suspicion of distrust. At parting he briefly enumerated the services he had done the Æduans; “how low and depressed he had found them, shut up in their towns, deprived of their lands, without troops, tributaries to their enemies, and obliged to submit to the ignominious demand of hostages: to what power and greatness they were now raised by his favour, so as not only to have recovered their former consideration in Gaul, but even to exceed in dignity and lustre all that appeared most flourishing in the ancient annals of their state.” With this charge he dismissed them.

52. Noviodunum was a town belonging to the Æduans, advantageously situated on the banks of the Loire. Here Cæsar had lodged all the hostages of Gaul, his provisions, his military chest, and great part of his own and his army’s baggage. Hither also he had sent many horses, brought up in Italy and Spain for the service of the war. When Eporedorix and Virdumarus arrived at this place, and were informed of the disposition of the state; “that Litavicus had been received with great marks of favour at Bibracte, the capital city of the province; that Convictolitanis, the chief magistrate, and almost all the senate, were gone thither to meet him; that ambassadors had been publicly sent to Vercingetorix to conclude a treaty of peace and alliance,” they thought the present favourable opportunity was by no means to be neglected. Having therefore put the garrison of Noviodunum, with all the Romans

found in the place, to the sword, they divided the money and horses between them, ordered the hostages to be conducted to Bibracte; and not thinking themselves strong enough to defend the town, set it on fire, that it might not be of any service to the Romans. All the corn they could, in so short a time, they carried away in barks, and burnt the rest, or threw it into the river. Then drawing together the forces of the neighbouring parts, they lined the banks of the Loire with troops; and to strike the greater terror, began to scour the country with their cavalry, hoping to cut off Cæsar's convoys, and oblige him, through want of provisions, to return into the Roman province. This appeared the easier as the Loire was considerably swelled by the melting of the snow, and gave little room to think that it could be anywhere forded.

53. On advice of these proceedings, Cæsar thought it necessary to use despatch; and if he must build a bridge, endeavour to come to an action with the enemy before they had drawn more forces together: for he did not even then think it necessary to return to the Roman province; not only as the retreat itself would be inglorious, and the mountains of the Se-vennes, and the badness of the ways, were almost insuperable obstacles; but chiefly because he was extremely desirous to rejoin Labienus, and the legions under his command. Wherefore, marching day and night with the utmost diligence, contrary to all men's expectations, he arrived on the banks of the Loire; and his cavalry very opportunely finding a ford, which however took the soldiers up to the shoulders, he placed the horse higher up to break the force of the stream, and carried over his army without loss; the enemy being so terrified by his boldness, that they forsook the banks. As he found a great deal of corn and cattle in the fields, the army was plentifully supplied, and he directed his march towards the country of the Senones.

54. While Cæsar was thus employed, Labienus, leaving the levies which had lately arrived from Italy at Agendicum to guard the baggage, marched with four legions to Lutetia, a city of the Parisians, situated in an island on the Seine. On notice of his approach, the enemy drew a great army together from the neighbouring states. The chief command was given to Camulogenus, an Aulercian, who, though in a very advanced age, was yet urged to accept of that honour, on account of his singular knowledge in the art of war. This general, observing there was a large morass, whose waters ran into the Seine, and obstructed all the passages round about, encamped there, to hinder the Romans from passing the river. Labienus at first endeavoured to force a passage, filling up the morass with hurdles and mould, to give firm footing to the army. But finding the attempt too difficult, he privately quitted his camp about midnight, and returned towards Melodunum. This city belongs to the Senones, and is also situated in an island on the Seine, as we before said of Lutetia. He found there about fifty boats, which he speedily drew together, and manned them with his soldiers. The inhabitants, terrified at this new manner of attack, and being too few to defend the place, because the greater part of them had joined the army of Camulogenus, yielded on the first summons. Having repaired the bridge which the enemy had cut down some days before, he crossed the Seine there; and, following the course of the river, marched back towards Lutetia. The enemy, having intelligence of this, by those who escaped from Melodunum, set fire to Lutetia, broke down its bridges, and, covering themselves with the morass, encamped on the opposite bank of the Seine, over-against Labienus.

55. It was now known that Cæsar had departed from Gergovia. The revolt of the Æduans, and the universal insurrection of Gaul, were everywhere spread

abroad by the voice of fame. The Gauls on all occasions gave out, that Cæsar, finding his march obstructed by the Loire, and being reduced to great straits for want of corn, had been forced to take the route of the Roman province. At the same time the Bellovaci, naturally prone to throw off the yoke, on hearing of the defection of the Æduans, began to raise forces, and openly prepare for war. Labienus, perceiving so great a change in the posture of affairs, soon saw the necessity of pursuing other measures; and that it was not now his business to make conquests, or give the enemy battle, but to secure his retreat to Agendicum. On the one side he was pressed by the Bellovaci, reputed the most warlike people of all Gaul; on the other side by Camulogenus, with a numerous and well appointed army. Add to all this, that the baggage of the troops and the detachment appointed to guard it, were separated from the legions by a great river. So many difficulties surrounding him at once, he saw no way to extricate himself but by his valour and presence of mind.

56. Accordingly, in the evening he called a council of war; and, having exhorted the officers to execute his orders with vigour and despatch, distributed the fifty boats he had brought from Melodunum to as many Roman knights, commanding them to fall down the river about nine at night, without noise, four miles below Lutetia, and there wait his coming. Five cohorts, such as appeared least fit for service, were left to guard the camp. The other five of the same legion, with all the baggage, had orders to march up the river at midnight, with much tumult and bustle, which was further increased by means of some small barks sent the same way, that made a mighty noise with their oars. He himself, setting out soon after with three legions, advanced silently to the boats that waited for him. There he surprised the enemy's scouts, who were stationed along the

river, and had been prevented by a sudden storm from discerning his approach. The whole army was quickly carried over, by the care and diligence of the Roman knights, to whom that affair had been given in charge. Almost at the same instant the enemy had notice that an unusual tumult was heard in the Roman camp; that a strong detachment had marched up the river, on which side likewise a great noise of oars was heard; and that a little below they were passing the river in boats. This intelligence made the Gauls conclude that the legions, alarmed at the revolt of the Æduans, were endeavouring to cross the Seine in three different places; for which reason they likewise divided their army into three bodies. For leaving one party to guard the passage over-against our camp, and detaching another towards Metiosedum, with orders to advance to the place where the boats had stopped, they marched with the rest of their forces against Labienus. By daybreak our troops had passed the river, and the enemy's army appeared in view. Labienus, exhorting his men to remember their wonted bravery, the many victories they had gained, and even to fancy themselves in the immediate presence of Cæsar, under whose conduct they had so often been successful, gave the signal of battle. At the very first charge the seventh legion, which formed the right wing of the Roman army, broke the enemy's left, and put it to rout. But the right wing of the Gauls, which was engaged with the twelfth legion, and where Camulogenus was present in person to encourage his men, though the first ranks were destroyed by the Roman javelins, still maintained its ground with the utmost bravery, and seemed determined to conquer. The dispute was long and dubious; when the tribunes of the seventh legion, having notice how matters went, faced about and attacked the enemy's rear. Even then not a man offered to fly: but at last, being surrounded on all

sides, they were cut to pieces with their general. The party left behind to watch our camp, hearing the noise of the battle, flew to the assistance of their countrymen, and posted themselves on a hill: but not being able to sustain the assault of the victorious Romans, they soon mingled with the rest of the fugitives, and were cut to pieces by the cavalry, those only excepted who sheltered themselves in the woods and mountains. After this victory Labienus retreated to Agendicum, where he had left the baggage of the whole army; and from thence, with all his forces, went and joined Cæsar.

57. The revolt of the Æduans gave new strength to the confederacy. Deputies were immediately despatched into all parts. Interest, money, and authority were employed in their turns, to procure the concurrence of the states that still continued quiet. The hostages seized at Noviodunum enabled the Æduans to compel such as were refractory. They sent to require of Vercingetorix that he would come and concert with them measures for carrying on the war; and, in particular, insisted on being at the head of the league. But this demand meeting with opposition, a general assembly of Gaul was held at Bibracte, whither the deputies of all the confederated nations repaired; and, after taking the affair into consideration, confirmed Vercingetorix in the title of generalissimo. The Rhemi, Lingones, and Treviri were not present at this assembly: the two first, because they had resolved to continue faithful to the Romans; and the Treviri, on account of their great distance, and the employment found them by the Germans; which was the reason that they took no part at all in this war, nor lent their assistance to either side. The Æduans were greatly mortified at seeing themselves excluded from the chief command: they complained of this change in their fortune, and began to regret the loss of Cæsar's favour. But as they were already too far engaged

in the revolt, they durst not think of detaching themselves from the confederacy. It was not, however, without reluctance that Eporedorix and Viridumarus, two young noblemen of the greatest hopes, consented to take orders from Vercingetorix.

58. As he was now invested with the supreme command, he enjoined the several states to send hostages; appointed a day for that purpose; and ordered all the cavalry, to the number of fifteen thousand, to assemble with the utmost expedition. He said, "he was sufficiently provided with infantry, as he had no mind to refer the decision of the war to fortune, or hazard an uncertain engagement; but, abounding in horse, judged it the easier and safer way to intercept the Roman convoys and foragers: that in the mean time they must resolve to destroy their corn, set fire to their houses, and patiently submit to a present and private loss, which was to be rewarded with liberty and perpetual empire." Having thus settled the plan of the war he commanded the Æduans and Segusians, who border on the Roman province, to raise ten thousand foot: to these he joined eight hundred horse, and put them under the conduct of Eporedorix's brother, with orders to attack the Allobrogiens. At the same time he commissioned the Gabali, and the nearest cantons of Auvergne to make an irruption into the territories of the Helvians; and the Rutheni and Cadurci, into those of the Volcæ Arecomici. He neglected not, however, by messengers and private emissaries, to sound the disposition of the Allobrogiens, whose minds he hoped were not yet thoroughly reconciled to the Roman yoke; endeavouring to gain the leading men by presents, and the state by an offer of the sovereignty of the Roman province.

59. To oppose all these attacks, two-and-twenty cohorts were drawn together, while L. Cæsar, lieutenant-general, levied in the province, and with them prepared to make head on all sides. The

Helvians, venturing to come to an engagement with the enemy, were defeated, and forced to shelter themselves in their walled towns, after having lost C. Valerius Donaturus, the son of Caburus, a man of principal rank in their state, and several other persons of distinction. The Allobrogians placing detachments at proper distances along the banks of the Rhone, guarded all the accesses to their country with great diligence and care. Cæsar, as he found the enemy superior in cavalry, and that his communication with Italy and the province was cut off, so as to deprive him of all hopes of succour from that quarter, had recourse to the German nations beyond the Rhine, which he had subdued in the preceding campaigns, and obtained from them a supply of horse, with some light-armed foot, accustomed to fight among them. On their arrival, perceiving they were but indifferently mounted, he took the horses from the military tribunes, centurions, Roman knights, and volunteers, and distributed them among the Germans.

60. While these things passed, the enemy's forces from Auvergne, and the cavalry of all the confederate states of Gaul, met at the general rendezvous, and formed a very numerous army. Cæsar marching through the frontiers of the Lingones, into the country of the Sequani, to be the nearer at hand to succour the Roman province; Vercingetorix lodged himself at about ten miles' distance, in three several camps; and having assembled the officers of the cavalry, told them "that the season of victory was at length arrived, when they saw the Romans obliged to abandon Gaul, and seek a retreat in the province: that this indeed served to secure liberty for the present, but was insufficient to future ease and tranquillity, as they would doubtless return with greater forces than before, and persist in the design of making war. It was therefore best to attack them now, while they marched encumbered with their baggage. If the infantry faced about, in order to assist the horse,

they would thereby be unable to advance : but if, as was more likely, they abandoned the baggage to provide for their own safety, they would be deprived of every convenience, and return covered with ignominy and reproach ; for as to the enemy's cavalry, it was not once to be imagined that any of them would so much as stir from the body of the army. That, to encourage them the more, and strike the greater terror into the enemy, he was resolved to have the whole army under arms before the camp." These words were followed by the acclamations of all the cavalry, who proposed taking an oath never to return to their homes, nor visit their parents, wives, and children, if they did not twice pierce through the Roman army from one end to the other.

61. The proposal being approved, and the oath administered to all, Vercingetorix next day divided his cavalry into three bodies ; two of which appeared on the flanks of the Roman army, while the third began to charge and harass it in front. Notice of this being given to Cæsar, he also formed his horse in three divisions, ordering them to advance against the enemy. They made head on all sides at once ; the infantry meanwhile continuing quietly under arms, with the baggage placed in the centre. Wherever the Romans gave way, or appeared hard pressed by the enemy, thither Cæsar sent detachments from the legions ; which both checked the progress of the Gauls, and confirmed the courage of our men, as they thus saw themselves sure of being supported. At last, the Germans on the right, having seized an eminence, drove the enemy before them, and pursued them with great slaughter as far as the river, where Vercingetorix was posted with the infantry. The rest of the Gauls, perceiving the defeat of their countrymen, and apprehensive of being surrounded, betook themselves likewise to flight. A dreadful slaughter ensued on all sides. Three Æduan noblemen of the first distinction were brought prisoners

CÆS. VOL. I.—U

to Cæsar: Cotus, general of the cavalry, who, the year before, had been competitor with Convictolitanis for the supreme magistracy; Cavarillus, who, after Litavicus's revolt, had been appointed to command the infantry; and Eporedorix, who was generalissimo of the Æduan troops in the war against the Sequani, before Cæsar's arrival in Gaul.

62. Vercingetorix, on this total rout of the Gaulish cavalry, drew off his troops, whom he had formed in order of battle before the camp, and immediately retreated towards Alesia, a town belonging to the Manubii, ordering the baggage to follow him with all expedition. Cæsar, leaving his on a neighbouring hill, under a guard of two legions, pursued the enemy as far as day would permit, cut three thousand of their rear to pieces, and arrived on the morrow before Alesia. After examining the situation of the town, as he saw the enemy much daunted by the defeat of their cavalry, which was the part of their strength in which they chiefly confided, he exhorted his soldiers not to be discouraged at the labour they must undergo, and resolved to invest the place.

63. The city of Alesia was situated on the top of a very high hill, so as not to be taken without a formal siege. The bottom of the hill was washed on the two sides by two rivers. Before the town was a plain, extending about three miles in length; but everywhere else, a ridge of hills, whose summits were nearly on a level, ran round the place at a moderate distance. Under the walls, on the side facing the east, lay all the forces of the Gauls encamped; who filled that whole space, and were defended by a ditch, and a rampart six feet high. The line of contravallation begun by the Romans took in a circuit of eleven miles. The camp was conveniently situated, and strengthened with three-and-twenty redoubts, in which sentinels were placed by day, to give notice of any sudden irruption, and a strong guard by night, to defend them in case of assault.

64. While the Romans were employed in these works Vercingetorix ventured on another engagement of the horse, in the plain between the hills, which we have said extended about three miles in length. The contest was sharply maintained on both sides; but our men at length beginning to give ground, Cæsar detached the Germans to their assistance, and drew up the legions in order of battle before the camp, that he might be ready to oppose any sudden irruption of the enemy's infantry. The sight of the legions revived the courage of our men: the enemy were put to flight; and, crowding on one another in their retreat, so obstructed the gates of the camp, that it became in a manner impossible to enter. The Germans pursued them to their intrenchments, where a very great slaughter ensued. Some, quitting their horses, endeavoured to pass the ditch, and get over the rampart. Cæsar, perceiving their disorder, ordered the legions, whom he had drawn out before the camp, to advance a little. This motion no less alarmed the Gauls within the rampart; who, believing the whole body of the Roman army was coming to attack them, sounded to arms. Some in their fright fled into the town; on which Vercingetorix, fearing the camp would be abandoned, ordered the gates to be shut. At length the Germans, having slain great numbers of the enemy, and taken a multitude of horses, returned from the pursuit.

65. Vercingetorix, before our line was completed, resolved to dismiss his cavalry by night. At parting he enjoined them "to repair severally to their respective states, and assemble all the men capable of bearing arms. He set forth the many services he had done them, and conjured them not to neglect his safety, or abandon to the cruelty of the enemy one who had deserved so well of the common liberty. He told them that if they were remiss in the execution of his orders, no less than eighty thousand

chosen men must perish with him : that by computation he had scarce corn for thirty days ; and that even with the utmost economy it could be made to hold out but a very little longer." After giving these instructions, he dismissed them quietly about nine at night, on the side where the Roman line was not yet finished. He then ordered the people of the town to bring in all their corn, threatening them with death in case of disobedience. As there was a great number of cattle in the place, which had been driven thither by the Mandubians, he distributed them to the soldiers, man by man, resolving to deliver out the corn sparingly and by measure. At the same time he made all his forces enter the town ; and having thus settled the plan of his defence, waited for the expected succours.

66. Cæsar, having notice of these things from the prisoners and deserters, constructed his lines in the following manner. He made a ditch twenty feet wide, with perpendicular sides, giving it the same breadth at bottom as at top. All the other works were four hundred feet farther off the town than this ditch. As his lines included so great a space, and therefore could not be alike guarded in all parts, he judged this precaution necessary, to secure them against sudden sallies by night, and screen the workmen from the enemy's darts by day. Observing this distance, he made two other ditches, fifteen feet broad, and as many deep ; and filled the innermost, which lay in a low and level ground, with water from the river. Behind these was a rampart of twelve feet high, strengthened with a parapet and battlements : and to prevent the enemy from getting over, a frieze ran along the foot of the parapet, made of long stakes, with their branches cut in points, and burnt at the end like a stag's horns. The whole work was flanked with redoubts, eighty feet distant one from another.

67. But as the soldiers were employed at the

same time to fetch wood and provisions, and to work at the fortifications, which considerably lessened the number of troops left to defend the camp, many of them being at a distance on these services; and as the Gauls, besides, often sallied at several gates, with design to interrupt the works: for all these reasons Cæsar judged it necessary to make some addition to his lines, that they might not require so many men to guard them. He therefore took trees of no great height, or large branches, which he caused to be made sharp at the ends; and running a trench of five feet deep before the lines, he ordered them to be put into it, and made fast at bottom, so that they could not be pulled up. This trench was again filled up in such a manner that nothing but the branches of the head appeared, of which the points must have run into those who should have endeavoured to pass them. As there were five rows of them interwoven in a manner with each other, they were unavoidable. The soldiers called them *cippi*. In the front of these he caused pits of three feet deep to be dug in form of the *quincunx*, and something narrower at bottom than at top. In these pits he fixed strong stakes, about the thickness of a man's thigh, burnt and sharpened at the top, which rose only four inches above the level of the ground, into which they were planted three feet deeper than the pits, for the sake of firmness. The pits were covered over with bushes, to deceive the enemy. There were eight rows of them, at the distance of three feet from each other. They were called *lilies*, from the resemblance they bore to that flower. In the front of all he sowed the whole space between the pits and the advanced ditch with crows'-feet of an extraordinary size, which the soldiers called *spurs*.

68. These works completed, he drew another line, of fourteen miles in compass, constructed in the same manner as the former, and carried through the most even places he could find, to serve as a

barrier against the enemy without ; that if the Gauls should attack the camp in his absence, they might not be able to surround it with the multitude of their troops, or charge with equal vigour in all parts. At the same time, to prevent the danger his men might be exposed to by being sent in quest of provisions and forage, he took care to lay in a sufficient stock of both for thirty days.

69. While these things passed before Alesia, a general council being held of the principal noblemen of Gaul, it was not thought proper to assemble all that were able to bear arms, as Vercingetorix desired, but to order each nation to furnish a contingent ; lest the confusion inseparable from so great a multitude should bring on a scarcity of provisions, or render the observance of military discipline impracticable. The Æduans, with their vassals the Segusians, Ambivareti, Aulerci Brannovices, and Brannovii, were rated at thirty-five thousand. A like number was demanded from the Averni, in conjunction with their dependants the Cadurci, Gabali, and Velauni. The Senones, Sequani, and Biturigians, Xantones, Rutheni, and Carnutes were ordered each to furnish twelve thousand ; the Bellovaci ten thousand ; the Lemovices the same number ; the Pictones, Turoni, Parisians, and Suessiones, each eight thousand ; the Ambiani, Mediomatrici, Petrocorians, Nervians, Morini, Nitobrigians, and Aulerci Cenomani, each five thousand ; the Atrebatians four thousand ; the Bellocasians, Lexovians, and Aulerci Eburovices, each three thousand ; the Rauraci and Boii, thirty thousand ; the maritime and Armorican states, of which number are the Curiosolites, Rhedones, Caletes, Osismians, Lemovices, Venetians, and Unellians, each six thousand. The Bellovaci alone refused to furnish the troops required, pretending it was their design to wage an independent war with the Romans, without being subject to the control of any one : however, at the request of

Commius, for whom they had a great respect, they sent a body of two thousand men.

70. This Commius, as we have related above, had been singularly faithful and serviceable to Cæsar, in his *Britannic* expedition; in consideration of which, his state had been exempted from all tribute, restored to the full enjoyment of its laws and privileges, and even enlarged, by having the country of the *Morini* added to its territories. But such was the present unanimity of the Gauls, in the design of vindicating their liberty, and recovering their wonted reputation in war, that neither benefits received nor the strictest ties of friendship could make any impression on their minds; but all with one consent flew to arms, and contributed largely to the support of the war. The country of the *Æduans* was the general rendezvous of the army, which amounted to eight thousand horse, and two hundred and forty thousand foot. Four commanders-in-chief were appointed; Commius of *Arras*, *Virdumarus* and *Eporedorix* the *Æduans*, and *Vergasillaunus* of *Auvergne*, cousin-german to *Vercingetorix*. To these were added a select number of officers, chosen from among the several states, to serve by way of a council of war. The whole army advanced towards *Alesia*, full of courage and confidence, and satisfied that the Romans would not sustain the very sight of so prodigious a multitude; especially in an encounter attended with so much hazard, where they must be exposed to a vigorous sally from the town, at the same time that they saw themselves surrounded with such numbers of horse and foot.

71. Meanwhile the troops shut up in *Alesia*, having consumed all their provisions, finding the day appointed for the arrival of succours expired, and knowing nothing of what was transacted among the *Æduans*, summoned a council of war, to debate on what was requisite in the present exigence. Various opinions were proposed; some advised a sur-

render; others were for sallying while yet their strength would permit: among the rest, Critognatus, a man of the first rank and authority in Auvergne, addressed the assembly in a speech, which for its singular and detestable inhumanity deserves a particular mention in this place. "I shall not," says he, "take notice of the opinion of those who endeavour to shelter an ignominious servitude under the plausible name of a surrender; such should neither be reckoned Gauls nor suffered to come to this council. Let me rather apply myself to them who propose a general sally: for here, as all of you seem to think, we meet with something worthy of our ancient virtue. And yet I am not afraid to say, that it is at the bottom weakness, and not courage, that inspires such thoughts, and renders us unable to support want a few days. It is easier to find those who will voluntarily rush on death than such as can patiently endure pain. I shall not, however, be against this proposal, which I confess has something generous in it, if only our own lives were at stake. But in this deliberation, we must keep all Gaul in view, whom we have called to our assistance. How would it dispirit our relations and friends, to see eighty thousand of their countrymen slaughtered in one place, and be obliged to fight in the midst of their dead bodies! Deprive not then of your assistance those who, to save you, have exposed themselves to the greatest dangers; nor, through an inconsiderate temerity, and mistaken valour, destroy at once all the expectations of Gaul, and plunge her into perpetual servitude. If the expected succours are not arrived exactly at the appointed time, ought you therefore to suspect the fidelity and constancy of your countrymen? And can you think that it is for amusement only that the Romans labour on those lines towards the country? Though you hear not from your friends, because all communication is hindered, yet you may learn

the approach of the succours from your enemies themselves ; who, through fear of them, work day and night, without ceasing, on those fortifications. What then should I propose ? What but to do as our ancestors did in the war with the Teutones and Cimbri, much less interesting than that we are now engaged in ? Compelled to shut themselves up in their towns, and reduced to a distress equal to that we now experience, rather than surrender to their enemies, they chose to sacrifice to their subsistence the bodies of those whom age incapacitated for war. Had we no such precedent to follow, yet still I should esteem it glorious, in so noble a cause as that of liberty, to institute and give one to posterity. For where had we ever a war on our hands like that we are now engaged in ? The Cimbri, after laying waste Gaul, and spreading desolation through the whole country, withdrew however their forces at length, and repaired to other regions, leaving us the full enjoyment of our laws, customs, lands, and liberties. But the Romans, instigated by envy, and jealous of a people so renowned and powerful in war, aim and intend nothing less than to establish themselves in our cities and territories, and reduce us to perpetual servitude. This has ever been the object of all their wars. If you are unacquainted with what passes in distant countries, cast your eyes on the adjoining Gaul, which, reduced into the form of a province, stripped of its laws and privileges, and subjected to the arbitrary sway of the conqueror, groans under an endless yoke of slavery." When all had delivered their opinions, a resolution was taken, that such as by age or sickness were unfit for war, should be obliged to quit the town, and every expedient be tried rather than give in to the proposal of Critognatus : but if necessity urged, and relief was long deferred, they determined on submitting to his advice, preferably to peace or a surrender. The Mandubii, to whom the city belonged,

were driven thence with their wives and children. When they came to the Roman lines, they with tears petitioned to be received as slaves, and saved from perishing miserably by famine. But Cæsar, having planted guards along the rampart, refused to admit them into his camp.

72. Meanwhile Commius, and the other general officers on whom the chief command had been conferred, arrived before Alesia with all their forces, and encamped on a hill without the town, not above five hundred paces from the Roman lines. The next day they drew out their cavalry, and covered the whole plain under the hill, which, as we have already said, extended three miles in length. The infantry were stationed at some distance on the heights, yet so as to lie concealed from the view of the Romans. As Alesia commanded a full prospect of the plain below, the succours were soon discovered by the besieged, who, assembling in crowds, congratulated each other, and testified a universal joy. Immediately they came forth with all their forces, posted themselves before the town, and having filled up the nearest ditch with earth and fascines, prepared for a vigorous sally, and every thing else that might happen.

73. Cæsar, having disposed his whole army on both sides the works, that, in case of need, every soldier might know his post, and be ready to maintain it, ordered the cavalry to sally out on the enemy, and begin the charge. The camp, running along a ridge of a rising ground, commanded a view of the plain on all sides; and the soldiers, to a man, with deep attention, waited the issue of the combat. The Gauls had interspersed among the cavalry some archers and light-armed troops, to sustain them in case of need, and check the impetuosity of our horse. Several of the Romans, being wounded by these at the first charge, were obliged to quit the battle. The Gauls, now believing they had the ad-

vantage, and seeing our men overpowered by numbers, set up a universal shout, as well within as without the place, to give new life to their troops. As the action passed in the view of both armies, who were, of course, witnesses to the valour or cowardice of the combatants, the desire of applause, or fear of ignominy, spurred on each side to exert their utmost bravery. After a conflict that lasted from noon till near sunset, victory all the while continuing doubtful, the Germans, in close order, charged furiously the enemy on one side, and forced them to give ground. Their flight leaving the archers exposed, they were all surrounded and cut to pieces. The success was equal in other parts of the field, where our men, pursuing the runaways to their camp, gave them no time to rally. The troops who had quitted Alesia, despairing now almost of victory, returned disconsolate to the town.

74. After the interval of a day, which was wholly spent in providing a great number of fascines, scaling ladders, and iron hooks, the Gauls, issuing from their camp at midnight, in great silence, attacked the Roman lines on the side of the plain. They began with setting up a sudden shout to advertise the besieged of their arrival; threw the fascines into the ditch; endeavoured, by a discharge of stones, darts, and arrows, to drive our men from the rampart; and practised every thing necessary to render the storm successful. At the same time Vercingetorix, hearing their cries, sounded to arms, and led forth his men to the attack. The Romans, whose posts had been allotted them some days before, flew to the works, and with slings, darts, bullets, and engines prepared on purpose, struck a terror into the assailants. As the parties could not see one another by reason of the darkness, many wounds were received on both sides, and a great number of darts discharged from the engines. But M. Antonius and C. Trebonius, who commanded on the side that was most

pressed by the enemy, took care to draw out parties from the more distant redoubts, and send them where their assistance was chiefly wanted.

75. While the Gauls kept at a distance from our lines, they did great execution by the multitude of their darts; but in proportion as they approached, they either entangled themselves unawares among the caltrops, or tumbling into the wells were wounded by the pointed stakes, or were pierced by the darts discharged from the towers and rampart. After many wounds given and received, finding, when day appeared, that they had not forced any part of the lines, and fearing to be taken in flank by some troops that were sallying from the redoubts on the eminence, they retreated to their camp. Meanwhile the besieged, after much time spent in preparing for a sally and filling up the advanced ditch, finding that their countrymen were retired, before they could so much as approach the works, returned into the town without effecting any thing.

76. The Gauls, thus twice repulsed with great loss, consult what new measures they are to pursue; and advising with those who knew the ground, learned from them the strength and situation of the upper camp. North of the town was a hill of too great a compass to be taken into the circumvallation: inso-much that the Romans had been obliged to post themselves on its ascent, in a very disadvantageous situation, because their camp was commanded by its summit. C. Antistius Reginus and C. Caninius Rebilus, lieutenant-generals, guarded this quarter with two legions. The enemy's generals, after informing themselves of the nature of the country by their scouts, selected five-and-fifty thousand of their best troops, concerted privately among themselves the plan and manner of acting, appointed the time for the assault about noon, and assigned the command of the detachment to Vergasillaunus of Auvergne, one of the four principal leaders, and a near relation

of Vercingetorix. Vergasillaunus, leaving his camp in the evening, finished his march by daybreak ; and concealing his troops behind a hill, ordered his soldiers to refresh themselves after their fatigue. As soon as it was noon, he approached the quarters of the two legions. At the same time the cavalry advanced into the plain, and the whole army drew out before the camp.

77. Vercingetorix, observing these motions from the citadel of Alesia, led forth his troops ; carrying along with him the fascines, long poles, covered galleries, hooks, and other instruments he had prepared for the assault. The fight was maintained on all sides at once ; nor did the Gauls leave any thing unattempted, but flocked continually to those parts of the works which appeared to be the weakest. The Roman forces, having so many works to guard, were dispersed in different places, and scarce sufficed for the defence of them all. What mostly contributed to disturb them was, the cries of the combatants behind, which informed them that their safety depended on the valour of others ; for such is the constitution of the human mind, as always to aggrandize absent objects, and magnify the danger that is out of sight.

78. Cæsar chose a post from whence he could see every thing, and then sent reinforcements where necessary. Both parties called to mind that now was the time for making the greatest effort. The Gauls had no hope of safety but in forcing the Roman lines. Our men again were sensible that if they came off victorious on this occasion, all their labours would be at an end. The chief stress of the battle lay at the higher fortifications, where Vergasillaunus charged with his detachment : because the small eminence which commanded the declivity of the hill gave the enemy great advantage. Some were employed in throwing darts : others advanced to the attack, under cover of their shields ; fresh men still

CÆS. VOL. I.—X

succeeding in the room of those that were fatigued. The earth they threw up against our lines not only enabled them to ascend the rampart, but entirely frustrated the design of the works the Romans had made in the ground. In fine, our men had neither strength nor weapons left to make resistance.

79. Cæsar, observing the danger they were in, sent Labienus, with six cohorts, to their assistance; ordering him, if he found himself unable to defend the works, to sally out on the enemy; yet this only in case of extremity. He himself went in person to the rest of the troops, exhorting them to bear up courageously under their present fatigue, and representing that the fruit of all their former victories depended on the issue of that critical day and hour. The troops within the place despairing to force the intrenchments on the side of the plain, because of the great strength of the works, attacked them in the more steep and difficult places, whither they brought all the instruments prepared for the assault. They soon drove our men from the towers, by a discharge of darts, levelled the way with earth and fascines, and began to cut down the rampart and breast-work with their hooks.

80. Cæsar first sent young Brutus, with six cohorts; after him C. Fabius, lieutenant-general, with seven more; and, last of all, as the dispute grew very warm, marched himself in person at the head of the whole detachment. Having by this means restored the battle, and forced the enemy to retire, he hastened to the side where Labienus was engaged. He drew four cohorts from the nearest fort, ordered part of the cavalry to follow him, and charged the rest to take a circuit round the outward works, and fall on the enemy's rear. Labienus, finding that neither the rampart nor ditch was sufficient to stop the progress of the enemy, drew together about thirty-nine cohorts from the nearest forts, and sent to inform Cæsar of his design. Cæsar immediately

quicken his march, that he might be present at the action.

81. His arrival being known from the colour of his garments, by which he used to distinguish himself in the day of battle, and the troops and cohorts he had ordered to follow him appearing, all which were easily discerned from the higher ground, the enemy began the charge. A mighty shout was raised on both sides, which being caught by those on the rampart, was carried quite round the lines. Our men, having cast their darts, fell on the Gauls sword in hand. At the same time the cavalry appeared unexpectedly in their rear; fresh cohorts flocked continually to our assistance: the enemy took flight, and in their retreat were encountered by our horse: a dreadful slaughter ensued. Sedulius, chief and general of the Lemovices, was slain on the spot; Vergasillaunus of Auvergne was made prisoner in the pursuit; seventy-four colours were taken, and brought to Cæsar; and, out of so great a multitude, very few regained the Gaulish camp. The rout and slaughter being observed from the town, the besieged, despairing of success, drew off their troops from the attack. Instantly, on the report of this disaster, the Gauls abandoned their camp; and, had not our troops been wearied out by the continual fatigue of the day, and the frequent reinforcements they were obliged to furnish, the enemy's whole army might have been exterminated. At midnight Cæsar detached the cavalry to pursue them; who, falling in with their rear, slew some, and took a great number of prisoners. The rest escaped to their several habitations.

82. Next day Vercingetorix, assembling a council, represented to the besieged "that he had undertaken that war, not from a motive of private interest, but to recover the common liberty of Gaul; and that, since there was a necessity of yielding to fortune, he was willing to become a victim for their safety,

whether they should think proper to appease the anger of the conqueror by his death, or deliver him up alive." A deputation immediately waited on Cæsar to receive his orders. He insisted on the surrender of their arms, and the delivering up of all their chiefs. Having accordingly seated himself at the head of his lines, before the camp, their leaders were brought, Vercingetorix delivered up, and their arms thrown into the ditch. Reserving the Æduans and Averni, as a means to recover those two potent nations, he divided the rest of the prisoners among his soldiers, giving to each one.

83. These affairs despatched, he marched into the territories of the Æduans, where he received the submission of their state. There he was addressed by the ambassadors of the Averni, who promised an entire obedience to his commands. He exacted a great number of hostages; sent his legions into winter-quarters, and restored about twenty thousand captives to the Æduans and Averni. T. Labienus, with two legions and the cavalry, was quartered among the Sequani, jointly with M. Sempronius Rutilus. C. Fabius and L. Minutius Basilus were ordered, with two legions, into the country of the Rhemi to defend it against the attempts of the Bellovaci, their neighbours. C. Antistius Reginus had his station assigned him among the Ambivareti; T. Sextius among the Biturigians; and C. Caninius Rebilus among the Rutheni; each with one legion. Q. Tullius Cicero and P. Sulpicius were placed at Cabillo and Matisco on the Arrar, in the country of the Æduans, to have the care of provisions. He himself resolved to winter at Bibracte. The senate being informed of these things by Cæsar's letters, a procession of twenty days was decreed.

BOOK VIII.—BY A. HIRTIUS.

IN consequence of your repeated importunities, Balbus, I have at last been prevailed with to engage in a very delicate work ; fearing lest my daily refusals should be construed rather to flow from idleness than any sense of the difficulty of the undertaking. I therefore here present you with a continuation of Cæsar's Commentaries of his Wars in Gaul, though not in any respect to be compared with what he himself wrote on the same subject, nor with the Memoirs of the Civil War, which he likewise left behind him imperfect, and which I have in the same manner carried down from the transactions at Alexandria to the end, I will not say of our civil dissensions, which are like to have no end, but of Cæsar's life. I would have all who read these pieces know with how much reluctance I engaged in this design, that I may be the more easily acquitted of the charge of arrogance and folly, for presuming to insert my writings among those of Cæsar. It is universally agreed that the most elaborate compositions of others fall far short of the elegance of these Commentaries. He indeed intended them only as memoirs for future historians ; but they are everywhere in such high esteem, as serves rather to discourage other writers than furnish them for the attempt. This circumstance the more commands our admiration, because, while the rest of the world can judge only of the beauty and correctness of the work, we besides know with what ease and despatch it was composed. Cæsar not only possessed the talent of writing in the highest perfection, but was likewise best able to unfold the reasons of those military operations of which he was himself the con-

triver and director. On the contrary, it was my misfortune to be present neither in the Alexandrian nor African wars ; and though I had many of the particulars relating to both from his own mouth, yet we give a very different attention to things when we hear them only through an admiration of their novelty and greatness, and when with a view of transmitting them to posterity. But I forbear any further apologies, lest, in enumerating the reasons why my work ought not to be compared with that of Cæsar, I fall under the suspicion of flattering myself that in the judgment of some it may not seem altogether unworthy of that honour. Adieu.

1. Gaul being wholly reduced, Cæsar was desirous that his troops might enjoy some repose during the winter, especially after so long and fatiguing a campaign, in which there had been no intermission from the toils of war ; but he soon understood that several states were meditating a revolt, and contriving all at once to take up arms. The cause assigned for this conduct was not improbable ; for though the Gauls were by this time fully sensible that it was impossible for them to resist the Roman army entire, by any forces they could bring into the field, yet still they thought that if many states revolted together, and set on foot as many different wars, the Romans would have neither time nor troops to subdue them all ; and that though some among them must be sufferers, their lot would be the more supportable as the delay occasioned by that diversion might procure the liberty of the whole nation.

2. Cæsar, to stifle this opinion in its birth, left M. Antony the questor to command in his winter-quarters ; and setting out the last of December from Bibracte, with a guard of cavalry, went to the camp of the thirteenth legion, which he had placed among the Biturigians, not far from the territories of the Æduans. To this he joined the eleventh legion, whose quarters lay nearest ; and leaving two cohorts

to guard the baggage, marched with the rest of the army into the most fertile parts of the country of the Biturigians; who, having large territories, and abounding in towns, had not been awed by the presence of a single legion from forming confederacies and preparing for war.

3. Cæsar, by his sudden and unexpected arrival, as was natural to suppose, found them unprepared and dispersed up and down the fields; insomuch, that they were easily surprised by the horse, before they could retreat into their towns: for he had expressly forbid setting fire to the houses, the usual sign of an invasion, that he might neither alarm the enemy by the conflagration, nor expose himself to the want of corn and forage, if he should advance far into the country. Having made many thousands of the Biturigians prisoners, such as could escape the first coming of the Romans fled in great terror to the neighbouring states, relying either on private friendship, or the ties of a mutual confederacy. But all was to no purpose; for Cæsar, by great marches, soon reached their places of retreat; and making every province anxious for its own safety, left them no time to think of giving shelter to others. This diligence confirmed the well-affected in their duty, and obliged the wavering to hearken to conditions of peace. The like offers were made to the Biturigians; who, seeing that Cæsar's clemency left the way still open to his friendship, and that the neighbouring states, on delivery of hostages, had been pardoned and received into protection, resolved to follow the example. Cæsar, to recompense the fatigue and labour of his soldiers, who, in the winter season, through difficult ways, and during the most intense colds, had followed him with incredible patience and constancy, promised a reward of two hundred sesterces to every private man, and two thousand to every centurion: and having sent back the legions to their winter-quarters, re-

turned again to Bibracte, after an absence of forty days.

4. While he was there employed in the distribution of justice, ambassadors arrived from the Biturians to implore his assistance against the Carnutes, who were laying waste their country. On this intelligence, though he had not rested above eighteen days, he immediately sent for the sixth and fourteenth legions, which he had quartered along the Arar, for the convenience of provisions, as has been related in the foregoing book. With these two legions he marched against the Carnutes; who, hearing of his approach, and dreading the same calamities which others had been made to suffer, abandoned their towns and villages, consisting mostly of little cottages run up in haste, to defend them from the cold (for most of their cities had been destroyed in the late war), and fled different ways. Cæsar, unwilling to expose his soldiers to the severity of the storms, which commonly rage with the greatest violence at that season, fixed his camp at Genabum; and lodged his men, partly in the huts lately built by the Gauls, partly in the old houses, whose walls were still standing, and which he ordered to be thatched with straw, that they might afford the better shelter to the troops. But he sent the cavalry and the auxiliary foot into all parts where he understood the enemy were retired: nor without success; for they commonly returned laden with spoil. The Carnutes, distressed by the difficulty of the season, the sense of their danger (because being driven from their habitations, they durst not continue long in any place for fear of our parties), and finding no protection in the woods against the extreme severity of the weather, were at length dispersed on all sides with great loss, and scattered among the neighbouring states.

5. Cæsar, thinking it sufficient in that difficult season to have dispersed the troops that began to assemble, and prevented their rekindling the war,

and being likewise well assured, as far as human prudence could determine, that it would be impossible for them, during the ensuing summer, to raise up any very dangerous war, left C. Trebonius, with the two legions he had brought along with him, to winter at Genabum. Meanwhile, understanding by frequent embassies from the Rhemi, that the Bellovaci, the most distinguished for bravery of all the Belgian and Gallic nations, with some of the neighbouring states, under the conduct of Correus, general of the Bellovaci, and Commius the Atrebatian, were raising an army, and drawing their forces to a general rendezvous, with design to invade the territories of the Suessiones, a people subject to the jurisdiction of the Rhemi, he thought that both honour and interest required him to undertake the defence of allies who had deserved so well of the commonwealth. He therefore drew the eleventh legion again out of its winter-quarters, wrote to C. Fabius to march the two legions under his command into the country of the Suessiones, and ordered Labienus to send one of those he was charged with. Thus, as far as the convenience of winter-quarters and the nature of the war would allow, he employed the legions alternately in expeditions, giving himself, meanwhile, no intermission from fatigue.

6. With these forces he marched against the Bellovaci; and, encamping within their territories, dispersed his cavalry on all sides to make prisoners, from whom he might learn the enemy's designs. The horse, in consequence of this commission, brought him back word that the lands and houses were in a manner quite abandoned, and that the few prisoners they had found, after a most diligent search, were not left to cultivate the ground, but to serve as spies. Cæsar, inquiring of these whither the Bellovaci were retired, and what might be their designs, found "that all of them capable of bearing arms had assembled in one place, and been joined

The Ambiani, Auleri, Caletes, Vellocasians, and
 Trebatians: that they had chosen for their camp a
 rising ground, surrounded with a difficult morass,
 and disposed of their baggage in remote woods;
 that a great many of their chiefs were concerned in
 the war, but the principal authority rested in Cor-
 reus, because he was known to bear an implacable
 hatred to the Roman name; that a few days before
 Commius had left the camp to solicit aid of the
 Germans, who were their nearest neighbours, and
 abounded in troops; that it had been resolved among
 the Bellovaci, with consent of all the generals, and
 at the earnest desire of the people, if Cæsar came
 at the head of only three legions, as was reported,
 to offer him battle; lest they should be afterward
 obliged to fight on harder and more unequal terms,
 when he had got his whole army together: but if he
 brought greater forces along with him, to continue
 within their camp, intercept his corn and convoys,
 and cut off his forage; which in that season of the
 year was extremely scarce, and very much dis-
 persed."

7. These things being confirmed by the testimony
 of all the prisoners, Cæsar, who found their designs
 full of prudence, and remote from the usual testi-
 mony of barbarians, resolved by all manner of ways
 to draw them into a contempt of his numbers, that
 he might the more easily bring them to an engage-
 ment. He had with him the seventh, eighth, and
 ninth legions, all veterans of approved valour; and
 though the eleventh was not of equal standing, nor
 had attained the same reputation of bravery, they
 were yet a chosen band of great hopes, who had
 served under him eight campaigns. Calling there-
 fore the army together, he laid before them the ad-
 vices he had received, and exhorted the soldiers to
 preserve their wonted courage. At the same time,
 to draw the enemy to an engagement by an appear-
 ance of only three legions, he so contrived the order

of his march that, disposing the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions in front; the baggage, which, as in a hasty expedition, was but moderate, behind them; and the eleventh legion in the rear of all, no more troops were in view than what the Gauls themselves had determined to hazard an action against. The army, thus drawn up, formed a kind of square, and arrived before the enemy's camp much sooner than expected.

8. When the Gauls perceived the legions advancing suddenly against them, in order of battle, with a steady pace, they altered the resolution which had been reported to Cæsar; and either fearing the success of the battle, surprised at so sudden an approach, or willing to know our further designs, drew up before their camp, without descending from the higher ground. Cæsar, though desirous to come to an engagement, yet surprised at the multitude of the enemy, and reflecting on the advantage of their situation,—as being separated from him by a valley, still more considerable for its depth than breadth,—contented himself for the present to encamp directly over-against them. He threw up a rampart twelve feet high, strengthened by a proportionable breast-work, and secured it by two ditches, each fifteen feet deep, with perpendicular sides. He likewise raised several turrets of three stories, and joined them to each other by galleries, having little parapets of osier before, that the works might be defended by a double range of soldiers; one of which, fighting from the galleries, and secured by their height, would with more boldness and advantage launch their darts against the enemy; the other, though nearer danger, and planted on the rampart itself, were yet screened by the galleries from the impending darts. All the entrances to the camp were secured by strong gates, over which he placed very high towers.

9. He had a twofold design in these fortifications:

by the greatness of the works to make the enemy believe him afraid, and thereby increase their presumption and confidence; the other, to enable him to defend his camp with a few troops, when it was necessary to go far in quest of corn and forage. Meantime there happened frequent skirmishes between the two camps, carried on for the most part with arrows at a distance, by reason of a morass that separated the combatants: sometimes, indeed, the auxiliary Gauls and Germans crossed the morass, and pursued the enemy; sometimes again the enemy, having the advantage, passed in their turn, and drove back our men. And as we daily sent our parties to forage, who were obliged to disperse and scatter themselves from house to house over the whole country, it now and then fell out, as was unavoidable in these circumstances, that our foragers were surprised and cut to pieces by their detachments. These losses, though very inconsiderable to us, as being mostly confined to some carriages and servants, yet strangely swelled the hopes of the barbarians; and the more, as Commius, who had gone to fetch the German auxiliaries, was now returned with a body of horse. And though the number was not great, they not making in all above five hundred, the enemy were nevertheless mightily encouraged by this supply.

10. Cæsar, after a stay of many days, finding that the enemy still kept within their camp, which was advantageously situated with a morass in front; and considering, at the same time, that he could neither force their intrenchments without great loss, nor enclose them with works with so small an army, wrote to Trebonius to send, with all diligence, for the thirteenth legion, which was quartered among the Biturigians, under the care of T. Sextius; and with that, and the two legions under his own command, make what haste he could to join him. Meanwhile he detached the cavalry of Rheims, of the Lingones,

and the other provinces of Gaul, of which he had great numbers in his camp, to guard by turns the foragers, and protect them from the sudden incursions of the enemy.

11. This was done every day: but custom, by degrees, relaxing their diligence, as frequently happens in things of long continuance,—the Bellovaci, who had observed the daily stations of our horse, placed a chosen body of foot in ambush in a wood, and sent their cavalry thither the next day to draw our men into a snare, and then attack them, surrounded on every side. This ill fortune fell on the cavalry of Rheims, whose turn it was that day to guard the foragers: for these, suddenly discovering the enemy's cavalry, and despising their small numbers, pursued with such eagerness that they were at length surprised and surrounded by the foot. This threw them into confusion, and obliged them to retreat hastily, with the loss of Vertiscus their general, and the chief man of their state; who, though so far advanced in years that he could hardly sit on horseback, yet, according to the custom of the Gauls, would neither decline the command on account of his age, nor suffer them to fight without him. The enemy were animated and encouraged by this success, and the death of the chief and general of the Rhemi: our men, on the other hand, were cautioned by their loss carefully to examine the ground before they took their posts, and pursue a retreating enemy with more reserve.

12. Meanwhile the daily skirmishes between the two camps, at the fords and passes of the morass, still continued. In one of these the Germans, whom Cæsar had brought from beyond the Rhine, that they might fight intermingled with the cavalry, boldly passing the morass in a body, put all that made resistance to the sword, and pursued the rest with great vigour. Fear not only seized those who fought hand to hand, or were wounded at a distance, but

CÆS. VOL. I.—Y

even the more remote parties, who were posted to sustain the others, shamefully betook themselves to flight; and being driven from height to height, ceased not to continue the rout until they had reached their very camp; nay, some, quite confounded by their fear, fled a great way beyond it. Their danger spread so universal a terror among the troops, that it appeared hard to say whether they were more apt to be elated by a trifling advantage, or depressed by an inconsiderable loss.

13. After a stay of many days in this camp, on information that C. Trebonius was approaching with the legions, the generals of the Bellovaci, fearing a siege like that of Alesia, sent away by night all whom age or infirmities rendered unfit for service, and along with them the baggage of the whole army. But before this confused and numerous train could be put in order (for the Gauls, even in their sudden expeditions, are always attended with a vast number of carriages), daylight appeared, and the enemy were obliged to draw up before their camp to hinder the Romans from disturbing the march of their baggage. Cæsar did not think proper to attack them in so advantageous a post, nor was willing to remove his legions to such a distance as might give them an opportunity of retreating without danger. Observing, therefore, that the two camps were divided by a very dangerous morass, the difficulty of passing which might greatly retard the pursuit, and that beyond the morass there was an eminence, which in a manner commanded the enemy's camp, and was separated from it only by a small valley, he laid bridges over the morass, passed his legions, and quickly gained the summit of the hill, which was secured on each side by the steepness of the ascent. Thence he marched his legions in order of battle to the extremest ridge, and posted them in a place where his engines could play on the enemy's battalions.

14. The Gauls, confiding in the strength of their post, resolved not to decline a battle, if the Romans should attack them on the hill; and not daring to make their troops file off, for fear of being charged when separated and in disorder, continued in the same posture. Cæsar, perceiving their obstinacy, kept twenty cohorts all ready drawn up; and marking out a camp in the place where he then stood, ordered it to be fortified immediately. The works being finished, he drew up his legions before the rampart, and assigned the cavalry their several posts, where they were to wait, with their horses ready bridled. The Bellovaci, seeing the Romans prepared for the pursuit, and finding it impossible to pass the night, or continue longer in that place without provisions, fell on the following stratagem to secure their retreat. They collected and placed at the head of their line all the fascines in the camp, of which the number was very great (for, as has been already observed, the Gauls commonly sit on these when drawn up in order of battle), and towards night, on a signal given, set fire to them all at once. The flame, blazing out on a sudden with great violence, covered their forces from the view of the Romans; and the Gauls, laying hold of that opportunity, retreated with the utmost diligence.

15. Though Cæsar could not perceive the enemy's departure, because of the flames, yet suspecting that this was only a contrivance to cover their flight, he made the legions advance, and detached the cavalry to pursue them. Meanwhile, apprehending an ambuscade, and that the enemy might perhaps continue in the same post, to draw our men into a place of disadvantage, he took care to follow slowly with the foot. The cavalry, not daring to enter that thick column of flame and smoke, or, if any had the courage to adventure it, being unable to discern the very heads of their horses, thought proper to retire for fear of surprise, and left the Bellovaci at full liberty

to escape. Thus, by a flight which equally spoke their fear and address, they retreated ten miles without loss, and encamped in a place of great advantage. Thence, by frequent ambuscades of horse and foot, they often attacked and cut to pieces the Roman foragers.

16. Cæsar, having received many losses of this kind, understood at last by a certain prisoner, that Correus, general of the Bellovaci, had chosen six thousand of his best foot, and a thousand horse, to form an ambuscade in a place abounding in corn and grass, and where it was therefore presumed the Romans would come to forage. On this intelligence he drew out a greater number of legionaries than usual; sent the cavalry, who formed the ordinary guard of the foragers, before; intermixed them with platoons of light-armed foot, and advanced himself as near as possible with the legions. The enemy, who lay in ambush, having chosen for the place of action a plain of about a mile every way, and environed on all sides with thick woods, or a very deep river, which enclosed it as in a toil, disposed their forces all around. Our men, who knew their design, and advanced armed and resolved for battle, because the legions were behind to sustain them, entered the plain troop by troop. On their arrival Correus, thinking that now was the proper time for action, approached first with a few of his men, and fell on the nearest squadrons. Our men resolutely sustained the attack, nor flocked together in crowds, as frequently happens among the cavalry on occasions of sudden surprise, when the very number of combatants throws all into confusion. The squadrons fighting thus in good order, and preserving a proper distance to prevent their being taken in flank, suddenly the rest of the Gauls broke from the woods, and advanced to the aid of those who fought under Correus. The contest was carried on with great heat, and continued for a long time with equal advantage

on both sides ; when at last the foot, advancing slowly in order of battle from the woods, obliged our men to give way. On this the light-armed infantry, who, as we have observed, had been sent before the legions, marched up speedily to their assistance ; and placing themselves in the intervals of the squadrons, continued the fight. The contest again became equal. At length, as was natural in an encounter of that kind, those who had sustained the first charge of the ambuscade began for this very reason to have the superiority, because the enemy had gained no advantage over them. Meanwhile the legions approached, and both sides had notice at the same time that Cæsar was advancing with his forces in order of battle. Our troops, animated by this hope, redoubled their efforts ; lest, by pushing the enemy too slowly, the legions should have time to come in for a share of the victory. The enemy, on the contrary, lost courage, and fled different ways. But in vain ; for the very difficulties of the ground, by which they hoped to have ensnared the Romans, served now to entangle themselves. Being at last vanquished and repulsed, with the loss of the best part of their men, they fled in great terror whither chance directed ; some towards the woods, some towards the river. The Romans urged the pursuit with great keenness, and put many to the sword. Meanwhile Correus, whose resolution no misfortune could abate, would neither quit the fight and retire to the woods, nor accept of any offers of quarter from our men ; but fighting on to the last with invincible courage, and wounding many of the victorious troops, constrained them at length to transfix him with their javelins.

17. After this action, Cæsar coming up just as the battle was ended, and naturally supposing that the enemy, on intelligence of so considerable a defeat, would immediately abandon their camp, which was not above eight miles distant from the place of

slaughter, though he saw his march obstructed by the river, he passed it notwithstanding, and advanced with his forces against them. But the Bellovaci, and the other states in their alliance, hearing of their disaster by some of the runaways, who, though wounded, found means to escape under cover of the woods; and finding that every thing was against them, their general slain, their cavalry and the flower of their infantry destroyed, and the Romans doubtless on the march to attack them, speedily assembling a council by sound of trumpet, demanded, with great cries, that ambassadors and hostages might be sent to Cæsar.

18. This proposal being approved by all, Commius the Atrebatian fled to the Germans, whose assistance he had obtained in the war. The rest immediately despatched ambassadors to Cæsar, and requested "that he would regard their present sufferings as a sufficient punishment for their revolt; since they were such as his humanity and clemency would never have suffered him to inflict on them, had he compelled them to submit entire, and without fighting; that their power was utterly broken by the late defeat of their cavalry: that several thousands of their best infantry were destroyed, scarce enough being left to bring them news of the disaster: that yet in so great a calamity, it was no small advantage to the Bellovaci that Correus, the author of the war, who had stirred up the multitude to revolt, was killed; because while he lived the headstrong populace would always have had more authority in the state than in the senate." Their ambassadors having ended their speech, Cæsar put them in mind "that the year before, the Bellovaci had, in conjunction with the other states of Gaul, taken up arms against the Romans: that, of all the confederates, they had persisted with the greatest obstinacy in their revolt, nor been induced by the submission of the rest to hearken to reason: that nothing was

easier than to lay the blame of their misconduct on the dead; but they would find it difficult to make him believe that a single man could have so much influence as, in spite of the opposition of the nobility and senate, and the efforts of all good men, to stir up and support a war, by the mere authority of the multitude: that, however, he would be satisfied for the present with the punishment they had brought on themselves."

19. Next night the deputies returned with Cæsar's answer, and hostages were immediately sent to the Roman camp. The deputies of the other states, who only waited the event of this treaty, immediately flocked to Cæsar, gave hostages, and submitted to his commands. Commius alone would not hear of treating, from a particular distrust of the Romans. For the year before, while Cæsar was employed in the affairs of Cisalpine Gaul, Labienus understanding that Commius was soliciting several states to rebel, and join in a confederacy against the Romans, thought it might be allowed him to use perfidy towards the perfidious. And because he expected to be refused, should he send for him to the camp, that he might not by an unsuccessful attempt put him on his guard, he employed C. Volusenus Quadratus to kill him, under pretence of an interview; furnishing him with some chosen centurions for that purpose. When the interview began, and Volusenus, by way of signal, had taken Commius by the hand, one of the centurions, as if surprised at a step so unusual, attempted to kill him; but Commius's friends hastily interposing, he was prevented: however, the first blow wounded him severely on the head. Both sides immediately drew, not so much with a design to engage as to retire; our men, because they believed Commius mortally wounded; the Gauls, because discovering the intended treachery, they apprehended the danger to be greater than as

yet appeared. From that time Commius determined never to be in the same place with any Roman.

20. Cæsar, having thus subdued the most warlike nations of Gaul, and finding no state disposed to take up arms, or make resistance, but that only some few had left their towns and possessions to avoid present subjection, resolved to divide his army into several bodies. M. Antony the questor, with the eleventh legion, had orders to continue with him. C. Fabius was sent, at the head of twenty-five cohorts, into the remotest parts of Gaul; because he understood some states were in arms on that side, whom C. Caninius Rebilus, his lieutenant, who commanded in those provinces, was scarcely strong enough to oppose with only two legions. He then sent for T. Labienus, and ordered the twelfth legion, which he commanded, into Gallia Togata, to protect the Roman colonies there, that they might not suffer by the incursions of the barbarians, as had happened the year before to the Tergestini, whose territories had been plundered by a sudden and unexpected invasion. He himself marched to ravage and lay waste the territories of Ambiorix: for finding it impossible to lay hold on that perfidious Gaul, whose fear prompted him to fly continually before him, he thought it behooved him in regard to his own dignity, so effectually to ruin the country, by destroying his towns, cattle, and subjects, as might render him odious to his followers, if any still remained, and deprive him of all hope of being restored to his possessions. Having spread his legions and auxiliaries over the whole country of Ambiorix, destroyed all with fire and sword, and either killed or made prisoners an infinite number of people, he despatched Labienus, with two legions, against the Treviri; whose country, bordering on Germany, and exercised in continual wars, differed little from the temper and

fierceness of that nation: nor ever submitted to his commands, unless enforced by the presence of an army.

21. Meantime C. Caninius, lieutenant-general, understanding by letters and messengers from Duracius, who had always continued faithful to the Romans, even in the defection of many of his own state, that great numbers of the enemy were assembled in the territories of the Pictones, marched towards the town of Limo. On his arrival there, having certain information from some prisoners that Duracius was shut up and besieged in Limo by a great army of Gauls under the conduct of Dumnacus, general of the Andes, as he was not strong enough to attack the enemy, he encamped in a place of great advantage. Dumnacus, hearing of his approach, turned all his forces against the legions, and resolved to invest the Roman camp. But after many days spent in the attack, and the loss of a great number of men, without any impression made on the intrenchments, he returned again to the siege of Limo.

22. At the same time C. Fabius, having brought over many states to their duty, and confirmed their submission by receiving hostages, on intelligence sent him by Caninius of the posture of affairs among the Pictones, marched immediately to the assistance of Duracius. Dumnacus, hearing of his arrival, and concluding himself lost, should he at the same time be obliged to make head against an enemy without, and sustain the efforts of the townsmen within, suddenly decamped with all his forces, resolving not to stop till he had got on the other side of the Loire, which, by reason of its largeness, could not be passed without a bridge. Fabius, though he had neither as yet come within sight of the enemy, nor joined forces with Caninius, yet, instructed by those who were well acquainted with the country, easily conjectured the route the Gauls would take. Where-

fore, directing his march towards the same bridge, he ordered the cavalry to keep before the legions; yet so, that without too much fatiguing their horses, they might return and encamp with them again at night. The cavalry followed the enemy as directed, came up with the rear; and attacking them flying, dismayed, and encumbered with their baggage, killed great numbers, gained a considerable booty, and returned in triumph to the camp.

22. The night following, Fabius sent the cavalry before, with orders to engage the enemy, and keep their whole army employed till he himself should come up with the legions. Q. Atius Varus, a prudent and experienced officer, who had the charge of the detachment, desirous to execute the commands of his general with success, exhorted his men; and coming up with the enemy, disposed some squadrons in the most convenient places, and engaged the Gauls with the rest. The enemy's cavalry made a resolute stand, being supported by their foot, who, halting in a body, advanced to the assistance of their own men. The conflict was sharp on both sides; for the Romans, despising enemies whom they had overcome the day before, and remembering that the legions were coming up to join them, partly ashamed to give way, partly eager to bring the battle to a speedy issue by their own valour alone, fought with great bravery against the enemy's foot. And the Gauls, who had no apprehension of the approach of more forces, because none other had appeared the day before, fancied they had now a favourable opportunity of cutting off our cavalry. As the fight continued with great obstinacy for a considerable time, Dumnacus advanced with the foot, in battle array to sustain the horse; when suddenly the legions, marching in close order, appeared within view of the enemy. This sight discomposed the Gallic squadrons, and producing a universal confusion through the whole army, which spread even

to the baggage and carriages, they with great uproar and tumult betook themselves to a precipitate flight. But our horse, who a little before had fought against an enemy that vigorously opposed them, now elated with the joy of victory, surrounded them with great cries, and urged the slaughter as far as the strength of their horses to pursue, and vigour of their right hands to destroy, were able to bear them out. Upwards of twelve thousand perished on this occasion, partly in the battle, partly in the pursuit; and the whole baggage was taken.

24. After this rout, Drapes, of the nation of the Senones (who on the first revolt of Gaul had drawn together a band of desperate men, invited slaves to join him by the hope of liberty, assembled all the fugitives he could find, received even public robbers into his service, and with that profligate crew intercepted the Roman convoys and baggage), having rallied about five thousand runaways, directed his march towards the province; being joined by Luterius of Quercy, who, as we have seen in the foregoing book, had attempted an invasion on that side at the first breaking out of the war. Caninius, having notice of this design, marched in pursuit of them with two legions, to prevent any alarm in those parts, and hinder the province from falling a prey to the ravages of a desperate and needy crew.

25. Fabius, with the rest of his army, marched against the Carnutes and other states whose forces had served under Dumnacus in the late action: for he made no doubt of finding them humbled by so great a blow; and was unwilling, by any delay, to give Dumnacus an opportunity of rousing them to a continuance of the war. In this expedition Fabius had all the success he could desire; the several states submitting immediately on his approach: for the Carnutes, who, though often harassed, had never yet made mention of peace, now surrendered and gave hostages; and the other states, inhabiting the

more remote parts of Gaul, bordering on the ocean, and known by the name of Armorica, influenced by their authority and the arrival of Fabius and his legions, readily accepted the terms he offered them. Dumnacus, expelled his territories, and forced to wander and hide himself in lurking-places, at length escaped into the furthest part of Gaul.

26. But Drapes and Luterius, understanding that Caninius was in pursuit of them with the legions; and sensible that having an army at their heels they could not, without certain destruction, make an irruption into the province, nor safely indulge themselves in the liberty of plundering and ravaging the country, halted in the territories of the Cadurci. As Luterius during his prosperity had borne a considerable sway in the state, and been always in great reputation with the multitude, as the author of new and enterprising counsels, he seized on Uxellodunum, a town strongly fortified by nature, which had formerly been under his patronage, and prevailed with the inhabitants to join his and Drapes's forces.

27. Caninius soon arrived before the place, which he found surrounded on every side with steep rocks, so very difficult of access that it was hardly possible for armed troops to ascend them, even where there were no opposers. But knowing that there was a vast quantity of baggage in the town, which could not be conveyed away so privately as to escape the legions, much less the cavalry, he divided his army into three bodies; and encamping on three remarkable eminences, resolved gradually, and as the number of his troops would allow, to carry a line of circumvallation quite round the town. Which the garrison perceiving, began to dread the fate of their countrymen at Alesia, especially Luterius, who had been present at that formidable siege, and therefore advised them to lay in store of corn. Accordingly, they resolved, with unanimous consent, to leave part of the forces to defend the town, and march out with

the rest to fetch provisions. This resolution being taken, the following night Luterius and Drapes, leaving two thousand men in the place, marched at the head of all the rest. These, in a few days, drew together a vast quantity of corn in the territories of the Cadurci, who partly stood inclined to assist them in their present exigence, partly were unable to hinder their carrying it off. Sometimes they attacked our posts by night, which made Caninius delay the circumvallation of the town, fearing he would not be able to defend the line, or man it sufficiently in all parts.

28. Luterius and Drapes, having got a great quantity of corn, took up their quarters about ten miles from the town, that they might convey it thither by degrees. Each chose his particular part: Drapes stayed behind with part of the army to guard the camp; Luterius set forward with the convoy. Having disposed parties along the road for the greater security, he began his march towards the town about four in the morning, by narrow ways, through the woods. But our sentinels, hearing a noise, and intelligence being brought by the scouts of what was doing, Caninius speedily drew some cohorts together from the nearest posts, and fell on the convoy about daybreak; who, surprised at so unexpected an attack, retreated towards their guard. Our men, perceiving this, fell with redoubled fury on the escort, giving quarter to none. Luterius escaped with a few soldiers, but returned not to the camp.

29. Caninius, having succeeded in this action, understood from the prisoners that Drapes was encamped about ten miles off, with the rest of the army. This being confirmed from many hands, as he supposed it would be easy to overwhelm them, after the terror occasioned by the defeat of one of their leaders, he thought it very fortunate that none of the fugitives had retreated towards the camp to inform Drapes of the disaster. As there was there-

CÆS. VOL. I.—Z

fore no hazard in the attempt, he ordered all the cavalry, with the German infantry, who were of remarkable swiftness, to advance before; and having distributed one legion into his three camps, followed them with the other, without baggage. As he drew near the enemy he was informed by his scouts, whom he had sent before, that the Gauls, according to custom, had pitched their camp at the foot of a mountain by the river side, and that the German foot and cavalry, coming suddenly and unexpectedly on them, had begun the fight. On this intelligence he brought forward the legion in order of battle, and giving the signal of onset, soon possessed himself of the higher ground. The Germans and cavalry, encouraged by the ensigns of the legions, redoubled their efforts. The cohorts threw themselves in crowds on the enemy, and having either slain or made them all prisoners, obtained a considerable booty. Drapes himself was taken in the battle.

30. Caninius, after so fortunate an action, in which scarce any of his soldiers had been wounded, returned to the siege of Uxellodunum. Having got rid of the enemy without, who had obliged him to augment his garrisons, and postpone the works about the place, he now resumed them with great diligence, and was the next day joined by Fabius and his forces, who undertook one side of the town.

31. Meantime Cæsar, leaving M. Antony the questor, with fifteen cohorts, in the country of the Bellovaci, to prevent any new insurrections among the Belgians, marched himself into other states to enjoin hostages, and allay their fears. When he arrived among the Carnutes, by whom the war was first begun, as Cæsar has mentioned in the preceding book, observing that they in a particular manner dreaded his resentment, from a consciousness of their guilt, that he might the sooner free them from their fears, he desired them to deliver up to justice Guturvatus, the prime mover and incendiary of that war; who,

though he hid himself even from his own countrymen, yet being diligently sought after by a whole people, was soon brought to Cæsar's camp. Cæsar, contrary to his natural clemency, was constrained to give him up to punishment by his soldiers, who imputed to Guturvatus all the losses they had sustained, and all the dangers they had been exposed to during the war. Accordingly, he was scourged and beheaded.

32. Here he was informed, by frequent advices from Caninius, of the defeat of Drapes and Luterius, and the resolution taken by the garrison of Uxellodunum. Though he despised them on account of the smallness of their number, he yet thought their obstinacy deserved the severest chastisement; that Gaul might not run into a persuasion that not strength, but constancy, had been wanting to enable them to resist the Romans; which might perhaps induce other states who had the advantage of strong towns to assert their liberty; it being universally known in Gaul that only one year of his government remained; during which, if they could but hold out, they had no further danger to apprehend. Leaving therefore the two legions he had then with him to the care of Q. Calenus, his lieutenant, with orders to follow him by easy marches, he himself, at the head of all the cavalry, hastened to Uxellodunum to forward the siege begun by Caninius.

33. He arrived before the town, unexpected either by his own troops or those of the enemy; saw the circumvallation completed, and that there was no quitting the siege without dishonour: but understanding from the deserters that the place was well stored with provisions, he resolved, if possible, to cut off their water. Uxellodunum stood on a steep rock, surrounded almost on every side by a deep valley, through which ran a river. There was no possible way of turning the course of this stream; because it flowed by the foot of the rock in so low

a channel, that ditches could not be sunk deep enough to receive it. But the descent was so difficult and steep that the townsmen, in coming to and returning from it, lay greatly exposed to our troops, who might wound and kill them at pleasure. This being known to Cæsar, he posted his archers and slingers, with some engines, over-against the places of easiest access, and thereby hindered their approach to the river. This obliged the whole multitude to water at one place, close under the walls of the town, whence issued a very plentiful fountain, on the side where the river intermitted its circuit, and left an opening of about three hundred feet. The whole army were desirous to deprive the besieged of this resource; but Cæsar alone discovered the means of effecting it. He brought forward his galleries, and began a terrace over-against the mountain, with much danger to the soldiers, incredible fatigue, and a continued series of fighting. For the garrison, rushing furiously on us from the higher ground, charged without danger, and wounded great numbers of our men as they advanced obstinately to the combat; yet without deterring them from bringing forward their machines, and by their works and assiduity surmounting the difficulties of the ground. At the same time they carried on their mines from the terrace and galleries quite to the fountain; a kind of work in which they proceeded without danger or suspicion. A terrace was raised sixty feet high, and a tower of ten stories placed on it; not indeed to equal the height of the walls, for which no works were sufficient; but to command the top of the spring. From this tower we were continually playing our engines on all the accesses to the fountain, which made it extremely dangerous to water at the place; insomuch, that not only cattle and beasts of carriage, but great numbers of people perished by thirst.

34. The enemy, terrified at this disaster, filled several barrels with tallow, pitch, and dry wood; and

having set them on fire, rolled them down on the works. At the same time they charged the Romans with great fury, that the anxiety and danger of the battle might hinder them from extinguishing the flames. The conflagration soon became general; for whatever was rolled down from above, being stopped by the machines and terrace, communicated the flame to that part. But our soldiers, though engaged in a dangerous kind of fight, because of the inequality of the ground, yet bore all with great firmness and resolution: for the action was in a conspicuous place, within view of our army, and great shouts were raised on both sides. Thus every one was the more ardent to signalize himself, and brave the flames and darts of the enemy, as his bravery would be better known, and have the testimony of many witnesses.

35. Cæsar, seeing many of his soldiers wounded, ordered the cohorts to ascend the mountain on all sides, and, as if preparing to scale the walls, raise a mighty shout. This alarmed the inhabitants, who, not knowing what passed in other parts, recalled their troops from the attack, and disposed them along the walls. Thus our men, being relieved from the battle, soon found means to extinguish or put a stop to the flames. But as the besieged still continued to defend themselves with great obstinacy, and, notwithstanding the loss of the greatest part of their number by thirst, persisted in their first resolution, Cæsar at last contrived to drain or avert the spring by mines. On this the fountain suddenly becoming dry, so effectually deprived the besieged of all hopes of safety, that they imagined it an event brought about, not by human counsel, but by the will of the gods; and therefore, compelled by necessity, immediately surrendered themselves.

36. Cæsar, conscious that his clemency was known to all, and no way fearing that his severity on this occasion would be imputed to any cruelty of nature ;

as he perceived there would be no end of the war, if other states in different parts of Gaul should in like manner form the design of a revolt; resolved, by a signal example of punishment, to deter them from all such projects. He therefore cut off the hands of all whom he found in arms; granting them their lives, that their punishment might be the more conspicuous. Drapes, who, as we have said, had been made prisoner by Caninius, either out of indignation at finding himself a captive, or dreading a severer fate, put an end to his life by abstaining from food. At the same time Luterius, who had escaped out of the battle, falling into the hands of Epasnactus of Auvergne (for, by continually moving from place to place, he was obliged to confide in many, because he could stay nowhere long without danger, and knew the little reason he had to expect favour from Cæsar), was by him, a great favourer of the Roman people, delivered, without hesitation, bound to Cæsar.

37. In the mean time Labienus engaged the cavalry of the Treviri with success; and having killed a considerable number on the spot, as likewise many Germans, who were always ready to join against the Romans, made the greatest part of their chiefs prisoners; and among the rest Surus the Æduan, a nobleman of distinguished birth and valour, and the only one of that nation who had continued until then in arms. On notice of this victory, Cæsar, who saw his affairs in a flourishing condition in Gaul, and that his last campaigns had completed the subjection of the whole country, resolved on a journey to Aquitain, where he had never yet been in person, though P. Crassus had in part reduced it to his obedience. He therefore set out for that country with two legions, designing to spend there the rest of the campaign. This expedition was attended with the desired success; for all the states of Aquitain sent ambassadors to him, and delivered hostages. He then

went with a guard of cavalry to Narbonne, and distributed his army into winter-quarters, under the care of his lieutenants. M. Antony, C. Trebonius, P. Vatinius, and Q. Tullius were quartered in Belgium, with four legions. Two were sent into the country of the Æduans, whom he knew to be the most powerful people in Gaul; two into that of the Turones, bordering on the Carnutes, to hold the maritime states in awe; and the remaining two were stationed among the Lemovices, not far from Auvergne, that none of the provinces of Gaul might be destitute of troops. He remained some days at Narbonne, held all the usual assemblies of the province, decided the differences subsisting among the people, recompensed those who had distinguished themselves by their faithful services (for he had a wonderful faculty of discerning how men stood affected in the general revolt of Gaul, which he had been able to sustain merely by the fidelity and assistance of the province); and having despatched all these affairs, repaired to the legions in Belgium, and took up his winter-quarters at Nemetocenna.

38. Here he was informed that Commius of Arras had had an engagement with his cavalry: for, after the arrival of Antony in his winter-quarters, as the Atrebatians, awed by his presence, continued in their duty to Cæsar, Commius, who ever since the wound above mentioned had kept a watchful eye on all the motions of his countrymen, that, in case of war, he might be ready to offer them his counsel and assistance, finding that the state now submitted quietly to the Romans, applied his troops to support himself and his followers by plunder, and often carried off the convoys that were going to the Roman winter-quarters.

39. Among those who commanded under Antony in his winter-quarters, was C. Volusenus Quadratus, an officer of the first rank among the horse. Him Antony sent in pursuit of the enemy's cavalry.

Volusenus, to his natural bravery, which he possessed in an eminent degree, added a particular hatred of Commius, which induced him the more readily to accept of this commission. Accordingly, having planted his ambuscades, he found means frequently to engage the enemy, and always came off victorious. At last, a very warm dispute ensuing, and Volusenus, through an eager desire of making Commius prisoner, urging the chase with only a few attendants, while Commius, by a hasty retreat, drew him a considerable way from his party, suddenly the latter, invoking the assistance of his followers, called on them to revenge the wound he had treacherously received from the Romans; and, turning short on our detachment, advanced without precaution towards Volusenus. All his cavalry did the same, and soon put our small party to flight. Commius, clapping spurs to his horse, ran furiously against Quadratus, and drove his lance through his thigh. Our men, seeing their commander wounded, instantly faced about, and forced the enemy to give ground. In this last attack the Gauls, after a considerable slaughter, were entirely routed by the vigorous charge of our cavalry. Some were trodden to death in the pursuit, others made prisoners; but Commius escaped by the swiftness of his horse. Volusenus, being dangerously wounded, almost beyond hope of recovery, was carried back to the camp. Commius, either satisfied with the revenge he had taken, or apprehensive he must at last be ruined, as he continually lost some of his men, sent a deputation to Antony, offering to retire wherever he should order him, to submit to whatever should be imposed on him, and to give hostages for the performance of these conditions: he only requested that so much regard might be shown to his just fears, as not to have it insisted on that he should appear before any Roman. Antony, conscious that his apprehensions were but too well

grounded, excused him, took hostages, and granted him peace.

Cæsar, I know, assigns a distinct book to each of his several campaigns; but I have not judged it necessary to pursue this method, because the ensuing year, under the consulship of L. Paulus and C. Marcellus, furnishes nothing memorable transacted in Gaul. However, that none may be ignorant where Cæsar and his army were during this time, I have subjoined a short account to the present commentary.

40. Cæsar, during the time of his winter-quarters in Belgium, made it his whole study to ingratiate himself with the Gauls, and deprive them of all pretence or colour for a revolt; for there was nothing he more earnestly desired than to leave Gaul peaceably disposed at his departure; lest, when he was about to withdraw his army, any sparks of rebellion should remain, which would infallibly rekindle into a war, were the Roman troops once removed. Wherefore, by treating the several states with respect, liberally rewarding their chiefs, and abstaining from the imposition of new burdens, he easily prevailed with the Gauls, wearied and exhausted by long unsuccessful wars, to embrace the ease and quiet attendant on their present submission.

41. The winter being over, contrary to his custom, he posted by long journeys into Italy, to visit the municipal towns and colonies of Cisalpine Gaul, and engage their interest in favour of M. Antony, his questor, who was then a candidate for the priesthood. He the more warmly interested himself in this affair, not only as it was in behalf of a man united to him by the strictest ties of friendship, but as it likewise gave him an opportunity of opposing a small faction, who aimed to diminish Cæsar's credit by repulsing Antony. Although he heard on the road, before he reached Italy, that Antony had been made augur, he still thought it incumbent

on him to visit the municipal towns and colonies of the province, in order to thank them for the zeal they had shown in behalf of his friends, and to recommend them his own petition for the consulship of the ensuing year: for his enemies everywhere boasted that L. Lentulus and C. Marcellus had been chosen consuls, in the view of despoiling him of all his honours and dignities; and that Sergius Galba had been excluded, though much the strongest in the number of votes, because of his known intimacy with Cæsar, and having served under him as lieutenant.

42. He was received everywhere with incredible honours, and the warmest testimonies of the people's affection: for this was the first time he had appeared among them since the total reduction of Gaul. Nothing was omitted that could contribute to the ornament of the gates, ways, and places through which he was to pass. The people, with their children, came out to meet him; sacrifices were offered in all parts; tables, richly spread, were placed in the public squares and temples; and so great was the magnificence displayed by the rich, such the eagerness of the poor to express their satisfaction, that every thing wore the face of a most splendid triumph.

43. Cæsar, having visited the several provinces of Cisalpine Gaul, returned in all haste to the army at Nemetocenna; and ordering the legions to quit their winter-quarters, and rendezvous in the territories of the Treviri, went thither and reviewed them in person. He gave the government of Cisalpine Gaul to Labienus, the better to reconcile him to his demand of the consulship; and marched the army from place to place, that, by the motion and change of air, he might prevent any sickness getting among the troops. Although he often heard that Labienus was strongly solicited by his enemies, and was, for certain, informed that some were labouring, by

means of the senate's authority, to deprive him of part of his army, yet neither did he credit any reports to Labienus's disadvantage, nor could be induced to set himself in opposition to the authority of the senate : for he made no doubt of obtaining his demand by the free suffrages of the fathers ; and the rather, because C. Curio, tribune of the people, having undertaken the defence of Cæsar's cause and dignity, had often proposed in the senate, "that if Cæsar's army gave umbrage to any, as Pompey was no less formidable to the true friends of liberty, both should be ordered to dismiss their troops, and return to a private condition, which would entirely free the commonwealth from all apprehensions of danger." Nor did he only propose this, but even began to put it to the vote. But the consuls and Pompey's friends interposed, which hindered the senate from coming to any resolution.

44. This was an authentic testimony from the whole senate, and agreeable to what had passed on a former occasion : for when Marcellus, who strove to render himself considerable by opposing Cæsar, had proposed, the year before, contrary to the law of Pompey and Crassus, to recall Cæsar before his commission was expired, the overture was rejected by a very full house. But this, instead of discouraging Cæsar's enemies, only pushed them on to new attempts, that they might, at length, bring the senate into their measures.

45. A *senatus-consultum* soon after passed, that one legion from Pompey, and another from Cæsar, should be sent to the Parthian war. But it was visibly their design to take both legions from Cæsar alone : for Pompey offered the first legion for that service, which he had lent some time before to Cæsar, having raised it in his province. But Cæsar, though now fully satisfied of the ill designs of his enemies, readily sent back Pompey's legion ; and, in compliance with the decree of the senate, ordered

the fifteenth, one of his own number, which was then in Hither Gaul, to be delivered to their commissioners; and sent the thirteenth into Italy to replace it, and supply the garrisons whence it had been drawn. He then put his army into winter-quarters. C. Trebonius, with four legions, was ordered into the country of the Belgians; and C. Fabius, with the like number, was placed among the Æduans; for thus he thought Gaul was most likely to be kept in subjection; if the Belgæ, the most renowned for their valour, and the Æduans, the most considerable for their authority, were awed by the presence of two armies.

46. After this he returned into Italy, where he understood that the two legions he had sent, in conformity to the decree of the senate, to be employed in the Parthian war, had been delivered, by the Consul Marcellus, to Pompey, and were by him still detained in Italy. Although by this it was abundantly evident that they were preparing to take up arms against him, he yet resolved to suffer every thing, while any hope remained of adjusting their differences by the methods of peace, rather than those of violence and war.

END OF VOL. I.

Date Due

DE 21 '65		
MY 27 '70		
DE 11 '70		
DE 15 '70		
DE 14 '73		
DE 12 '78		
NO 24 '82		
Y 12 '83		
DE 16 '88		
MY 16 '88		
DE 23 '87		